Iran is claiming that it has sent a small flotilla on a patrol close to the US Atlantic border.
No need for alarm.
1) The Iranians lack the naval power to threaten the United States in any significant way. While Iranian forces in the Gulf could cause problems in the event of a localized conflagration, the ships in question here do not represent a serious challenge. In fact, the Iranians may be lying about the entire deployment.
2) The flotilla will be monitored by the US Navy. There's no doubt that the US will keep a close eye on what the Iranians do. It's in this sense that US Navy forces will protect American interests and gather intelligence on Iranian naval tactics, strategic doctrine and capabilities.
3) There's an obvious domestic political component to this action. Iran's Navy wants to exert prestige and regime hardliners want to show the US that they retain significant influence. Moreover, the imagery and narrative of Iranian vessels off the US coast is a powerful one. At least in propaganda terms. Correspondingly, Iranian state media are using these claims as an opportunity to assert Iran's presentation on the international scene. Power politics rely upon successful presentation.
4) The main point - states have the right to patrol in international waters. Indeed, the USS Harry S Truman Carrier Strike Group is currently on operations proximate to Iran. What's important is that naval powers behave responsibly. And not like China's Navy.
On Wednesday, representatives from the Syrian Government, the Syrian rebellion and the international community will gather in Geneva. The ‘stated’ aspiration of all sides – a just end to a brutal civil war.
In reality, Assad has little interest in meaningful concession. Yes, he’ll probably offer some vague proposals – we should expect the suggestion of a ‘national reconciliation council’. But whatever Bashar offers, if anything, it won’t be substantive. Haafez’s heir is in no mood to negotiate.
It’s not hard to understand why.
Reinforced by Khamenei, Nasrallah and Putin, Assad is applying a strategic blend of blackmail and destruction against the already fractured rebellion. As the rebels fight amongst themselves, the regime consolidates its base of power. And as much as the international community might cry at the suffering of the Syrian people, divorced from resolute policy, our tears have only greased Assad’s machine of death.
All of this leads to one centering reality – the dictator is looking forward to Geneva. In his mind, he holds all the courage and all the cards.
As such, in order to give Geneva II any chance of a positive outcome, America must reshuffle the deck. If we are timid, the Russians will simply generate another WMD disarmament-style figment deal. We can’t let that happen.
Instead, we must replace our policy of confused trepidation with a calculation of unapologetic realpolitik. In short, we need to be both simple and tough – stating the boundaries of a deal we’ll accept and explaining what will happen if Assad doesn’t acquiesce.
For a start, we’ll need to be clear about our non-negotiables. More precisely, while a short term cease fire would certainly be worth consideration, our acceptance of any final peace will require three absolutes. First, Syria’s Sunni community will have to be given a genuine, participatory role in any new government. And it will have to involve more than titles of office- Sunni alienation from Syrian government provision must come to an end. As we’re witnessing in Iraq and Lebanon, sectarian disenfranchisement is a catalyst for extremism. Second, any transitional process must ultimately end with democratic elections. Finally, Syria will need a constitution that balances representative government with protections for minority groups. Alawites, Christians and Kurds will all require the confidence of protection from sectarian abuse. None of these demands will be simple to achieve, but all of them are necessary. The alternative is chaos now or chaos deferred.
Supporting our policy imperatives, we must remember that our power is real.
Correspondingly, we must make Assad understand that America will not tolerate diversionary games. We’ll have to outline that while we’re open to meaningful discussion, Assad’s non-cooperation will come with a severe cost. The most obvious way we can do this is by stating it – clearly and directly. By clarifying that if the peace process falters, America will renew and increase our assistance to nationalist centered Syrian rebels. Indeed, the one fortunate element of the Salafi jihadist rise in Syria has been its assistance in verifying the ideological stance of other rebel formations – it’s now clearer who the ‘good guys’ actually are.
Yet we’ll also have to help Assad realize that our power doesn’t begin and end with a potential supply train. Just as General Dempsey has spoken of ‘‘different ways of action’’, we should make clear that direct military options remain on the table. That in the event of Assad’s continued slaughter; we’ll re-consider military strikes against his regime. Made credible, US deterrent power will produce effect. Just as B-52s recently gave a physical face to US power in the East China Sea, deploying SSGNs to the Eastern Mediterranean would offer the redeemed constitution of American resolve in Syria.
But our strategy in Geneva can’t simply be about getting serious with Assad. We’ll also have to recognize our adversaries in Assad’s alliance for who they actually are.
To recognize that while Khamenei’s hardliners see themselves as the new leaders of the Middle East, they’re actually calculating thugs who can be restrained.
To recognize that while Putin thinks he’s a judo-chopping, ex-KGB superman, he’s actually a skulking, mafia goon who can be deterred.
To recognize that while Hezbollah regards itself as the world’s most powerful non-state actor, its structured organization is vulnerable to pressure.
And contrary to Assad’s wishes, we cannot allow our concerns about supranational Salafi jihadists to dictate our policy. These terrorists pose a real threat, but if we empower our professionals, we’ll defeat them.
Up until this point, American policy in Syria has been a monumental failure. We’ve empowered our enemies, neglected our prospective allies and allowed a tyrant to wreak havoc upon his people and the region. Obsessed by the serious risks of intervention, we’ve accepted the catastrophic consequences of absent American leadership.
This week, in Geneva, we can and we must begin to put things right.
The implementation of the Geneva interim nuclear deal will begin on January 20th. That's welcome news. After all, in recent weeks it seemed like the agreement might fall apart before it even began. On another positive note, Iran will shortly begin to dilute its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. Still, I have a number of concerns.
While inspectors will apparently be allowed daily, physical access to the Fordo site, there will only be monthly inspections at the Arak based heavy water reactor. That's far from ideal. If the Iranians are serious about addressing fears that they are pursuing a plutonium-route nuclear weapon, allowing more vigorous inspections at Arak would be the perfect place to start. Instead, the reluctance to afford access to Arak suggests that the Iranians may want to hide what's happening there. It raises questions and it fosters mistrust.
The Iranians are crowing. While this is to be expected at some level (and helps Iranian moderates placate their hard-line colleagues), it's worrying that many Iranian officials are so gleeful in their claims that this deal doesn't bind them in any significant way. Again, it suggests an absence of seriousness in the pursuit of trust towards a lasting arrangement. Without hope of a lasting agreement, this deal will be rendered into irrelevance.
It's problematic that the negotiators have taken so long to reach implementation. This reality suggests an agenda disconnect. Since 2003, Iran has attempted to evade the international community in its efforts to ensure a non-weaponized nuclear program. Delay has formed the primary strategic gambit on Iran's part. In short, what we're seeing looks like more deliberate time wasting.
While I supported this deal at the time of its creation, it's also abundantly clear to me that Geneva hasn't got off to a good start. The US will have to work exceptionally hard to ensure that Iran fulfills its obligations. At the same time, Congress will have to play a constructive but cautious role in supporting US diplomacy. Still, if this effort fails, the only options left available will be dramatically tightened sanctions alongside the prospect of military force.
I posted an earlier version of this piece on Saturday. However, some readers were confused that the earlier post was combined with some other thoughts on the NSA. So, paying heed to developments from over the weekend, here's an updated new post without the NSA material!
Friday's bombing in Beirut was almost certainly the work of the Syrian GSD and/or Hizballah. I make that argument based on three factors.
1) Hizballah is under extraordinary physical and political pressure inside Lebanon. The group is thus desperate to reassert its domestic power-perception position. Because of Chatah's symbolic representation of the March 14 bloc and his well known association with the Hariris, he offered an opportune target from which Hizballah could broadcast their overarching message - 'we are prepared to wash the streets with blood in order to maintain our power'. Let's be clear, this is political terrorism in its most unambiguous form.
2) The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (established to investigate the Hariri assassination and a number of other attacks) will shortly begin its trial (in absentia) of a number of Hizballah operatives. Those accused include Mustafa Badr al-Din (the suspected head of Hizballah's foreign operations directorate)*. In this regard, Chatah's assassination was likely intended to send another basic message to the international community - Hizballah will not acquiesce to outside pressure.
3) The Lebanese Hizballah has a long history of engaging in assassinations against its political opponents. Further, the Syrian Civil War provides abundant proof that the group has little compunction about massacring anyone who stands in their way (a truth that I once underestimated). As SOP, Hizballah denies any responsibility for these kind of atrocities. Still, their record is transparent.
On a related note, it's critical that we pay heed to Siniora's evident fury (which reflects popular concerns) over what's just happened. In articulating that the March 14 bloc will push for restrictions on illegal arms, Siniora is (as the Daily Star notes) issuing a thinly veiled threat to Hizballah. In short, he's laying the foundations for a tougher counter-response. As a corollary, Saudi Arabia's grant of $3 billion to the Lebanese Army is surely designed to provide a counter-weight to Hizballah. The walls are closing. In further vein, it will be interesting to see how Michel Aoun reacts to this attack. Although he remains largely sympathetic to Hizballah, Aoun has also publicly flirted with the notion of a rapprochement with the Future Movement. Should Aoun decide to move towards Siniora/Hariri, even in a limited way, this assassination could cause major blowback for Hizballah. After all, it's hard to underestimate how much Hizballah relies upon Aoun; both for political support and cross-sectarian political cover.
*Interestingly, much of the evidence against Badr al-Din was garnered from cell phone intercepts. These may have been provided to the Tribunal by the NSA (Hizballah is a high priority collection target for the US Intelligence Community).
A few thoughts on the moves in Congress to pass a tough new sanctions bill.
1) It's already clear that the Iran deal is in jeopardy. The Iranians have yet to commit to a timetable for enaction of the Geneva protocols. At the same time, the Iranian government is complaining about US action to tighten existing sanctions. In short, the omens don't look good. For a Congress that was already deeply skeptical of the President's deal, evidence of Iranian non-compliance is a catalyst for existing trepidation. In this sense, it's obvious that the President is going to have a tough time convincing Democrats to back down.
2) It's also clear that Israeli concerns are heavily influencing this deal. In contrast to the President, the Israelis believe that only a full cessation of Iranian nuclear activities will suffice. Obama is open to a final agreement that allows for a low-enrichment capped continuation of the Iranian nuclear program. If this bill does in fact pass and carries a stipulation that the President must only accept a deal that ends Iran's nuclear program completely, the Israelis will have dragged the Administration into alignment with their own position.
That being said, as Commander-in-Chief, Obama has significant flexibility in the conduct of US foreign policy.
3) In its present reported form, this bill would, if passed, also bring other US-Iranian points of discord into the nuclear negotiations process. For a start, the bill contains caveats that continued Iranian support for terrorism against the US, and/or a bad faith negotiating strategy, would both cause these new sanctions to kick in. While I understand and share these concerns (more so than many others), their introduction into this process will be profoundly unhelpful. It would create two negative follow on effects. First, Iranian hardliners would never agree to halt ongoing covert operations against the US (these occur all the time, but rarely make the news). Second, the caveats would be destabilizing to those on the Iranian side who are prospectively amenable to a deal. It's important to remember that Iran's negotiating strategy is infected by hesitation and a balancing of interests - Rouhani's 'moderates' vs IRGC hardliners. New pressure in different areas of policy would isolate the moderates. For one example, do we seriously expect that Iran will cease support for groups like the Lebanese Hizballah?* At a basic political level, these concerns seem to have been included in the bill in order to provide Congress with a subjective window of opportunity in which to enact sanctions at a point of their own choosing. After all, Congressional leaders are fully aware that Iran will never conform to the stipulations that this bill would lay down.
4) Although the present character of this bill is unhelpful, Congress can play a constructive role here. First, as is the case with Israel, Congressional anger over this deal may actually strengthen the President's hand in the negotiating process - encouraging the Iranians to swiftly comply with that which they've already said they would comply with. Second, if Congress were to pass a simpler, tighter bill - one that focused on a clear articulation of automatic sanctions if Iran fails to enact the Geneva deal within a short time window (for example...), they could reinforce the strength of their role as noted in point one. An effective bill would also offer automatic sanctions in the event of Iranian 'game playing' with the implementation of Geneva. By pursuing this course, Congress would produce a necessary understanding in the Iranian hardliners - that the US is neither weak nor open to perpetual delays.
* - Were the bill to specify that the caveats only applied to specific terrorist attacks against US citizens, that would of course be legitimate.
1) The Lebanese Hizballah appears to have lost another leader. Whoever was responsible for Lakkis's death last week, it's obvious that hostile pressure on the group is growing. With Hizballah now fully invested in Assad's survival, sectarian reactions to that strategy are also growing in intensity - hence the less of three senior leaders in as many weeks. In basic terms, Hizballah's political adversaries are taking advantage from the group's associated guilt for incidents like this one. As I've written before, Hizballah is suffering from an identity crisis of serious proportions. Devoid of a cross-sectarian base of sympathy, the organization's carefully constructed 'anti-oppression' narrative is being rendered for the lie that it is. Whatever happens with Assad, in Lebanon and beyond, Hizballah's strategic choices will leave them increasingly vulnerable. For a few of my related thoughts on Hizballah, please click (point five here), here and here. 2) ISIL continues to wreck havoc upon Iraq. In the absence of US Intelligence capabilities (please see my BBC debate on the NSA - takes a minute to load!) and amidst continuing political discord (please see my thoughts here), ISIL and its affiliates are once again endangering Iraq's stability. As the ISW's Jessica Lewis notes, ISIL has embraced a highly effective strategy of impatient resurgence. Again, it's important that we note the targeting methodology that ISIL embraces. As with their Salafi violent-extremist counterparts around the world, they are members of a death worshiping cult. Recognizing this truth, we should still be astute to the political grievances that allow groups like ISIL to prosper. Nevertheless, we must also grapple with the reality of a movement that sees cafes, markets, malls, roads and playgrounds as military targets.
3) The protests in Ukraine continue to grow. President Yanukovych has a problem. At a basic level, he has wagered against a long brewing discontent. Outraged by endemic corruption and Yanukovych's subservience to Putin's bullying/influence, many Ukrainians believe they're in a struggle for the very future of Ukraine. Quite understandably, these citizens have little interest in a future that abandons them to the ignominy of existence as a buffer state for Putin's Russia. While it's true that Ukraine is far from unified in its support for a pro-west future, younger Ukrainians are firmly ensconced with the pro-EU/US crowd. The trend lines are clear. Still, there are US policies that could help catalyze this process. Recognizing Ukraine's deep vulnerability to Russian energy blackmail, the US should urgently begin to provide an alternate source of energy to Eastern European states. By loosening regulations on US companies, exports of US Liquefied Natural Gas exports could begin in earnest. That alternate supply portfolio would enable Ukrainians to break free from their present headlock-like relationship with Russia. For some of my thoughts on Putin, please click here and here.
I have stopped updating this page. The areas below are a frequent area for my writings so the best way to find the latest is to google "Tom Rogan [whatever area/topic you might want to read]" THANKS! I'm now updating this page less regularly (please visit my Washington Examiner page for more recent posts). Writings on other issues related to security/intelligence/counter-terrorism/AQ Core etc. are listed under OTHER header towards the end of this page. Please also see my TV/Radio page for related interviews/speeches. Relevant academic background - I hold a BA in War Studies from King's College London and a Master's degree in Middle East Politics from The School of Oriental and African Studies, London. My work has been recognized by the BBC + BBC, + BBC, + BBC, +BBC, the UK Parliament, the American
Enterprise Institute, the Council
on Foreign Relations, CNN’s FareedZakaria, the Foreign Policy
Initiative,
The Week magazine reviews, The
Wire + The
Wire + The
Wire + The
Wire,
the Center on National Security at Fordham Law School, and Real World
Politics/Real Clear Politics. My examination of US security challenges at the
end of 2013 was reviewed as the global ‘‘must read’’ of the day by the BBC.
Thank you very much for reading.
IRAQ (most Daesh/IS/ISIS/ISIL pieces under this header)
Why Hizballah will desert Assad before the end (The Guardian) (I still support the essence of my argument here, but in hindsight, it's also clear that I placed too much emphasis on Hizballah's concerns over domestic/regional political perception.)
