Showing posts with label Siniora. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Siniora. Show all posts

Friday, January 3, 2014

The Political Face of Sectarian Hatred in the Middle East

Yesterday's bombing in Beirut illustrates the primordial influence of sectarian hatred in shaping Middle Eastern politics dynamics. As I noted on Monday, the Lebanese Hizballah is struggling to contain the wave of Sunni extremist violence that's directed against it. Regarding this sectarian anger, it's clear that there have been two separate counter-responses to Nasrallah's intervention in Syria. On one side, the March 14 bloc is trying to weaken Hizballah's political influence at the governing level. Supported by the Saudis in the form of new aid to the Lebanese Army, Siniora and Hariri are pushing for Hizballah's separation from any new cabinet. Conversely, motivated by their fanatical ideology, Salafi extremist groups are also seeking to weaken Hizballah. However, for these groups, the chosen mechanism of political activity is significant violence. What's clear is that sectarianism is now front and center in Lebanese politics (Martin Chulov gives a good reporting primer on Hizballah's role in this evolving dynamic).

But it isn't just Lebanon. If interested, here are some of my thoughts on the challenge of sectarianism in terms of...
  • Iraq (with latest news on Anbar here)
  • Lebanon (in relation to the Syrian Civil War)
  • Somalia (in terms of internal tensions within terrorist groups) 
  • How it leads people into terrorism/helps sustain terrorist groups

Monday, December 30, 2013

Assassination in Beirut

I posted an earlier version of this piece on Saturday. However, some readers were confused that the earlier post was combined with some other thoughts on the NSA. So, paying heed to developments from over the weekend, here's an updated new post without the NSA material!

         Friday's bombing in Beirut was almost certainly the work of the Syrian GSD and/or Hizballah. I make that argument based on three factors. 

1) Hizballah is under extraordinary physical and political pressure inside Lebanon. The group is thus desperate to reassert its domestic power-perception position. Because of Chatah's symbolic representation of the March 14 bloc and his well known association with the Hariris, he offered an opportune target from which Hizballah could broadcast their overarching message - 'we are prepared to wash the streets with blood in order to maintain our power'. Let's be clear, this is political terrorism in its most unambiguous form.

2) The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (established to investigate the Hariri assassination and a number of other attacks) will shortly begin its trial (in absentia) of a number of Hizballah operatives. Those accused include Mustafa Badr al-Din (the suspected head of Hizballah's foreign operations directorate)*. In this regard, Chatah's assassination was likely intended to send another basic message to the international community - Hizballah will not acquiesce to outside pressure.

3) The Lebanese Hizballah has a long history of engaging in assassinations against its political opponents. Further, the Syrian Civil War provides abundant proof that the group has little compunction about massacring anyone who stands in their way (a truth that I once underestimated). As SOP, Hizballah denies any responsibility for these kind of atrocities. Still, their record is transparent.

                On a related note, it's critical that we pay heed to Siniora's evident fury (which reflects popular concerns) over what's just happened. In articulating that the March 14 bloc will push for restrictions on illegal arms, Siniora is (as the Daily Star notes) issuing a thinly veiled threat to Hizballah. In short, he's laying the foundations for a tougher counter-response. As a corollary, Saudi Arabia's grant of $3 billion to the Lebanese Army is surely designed to provide a counter-weight to Hizballah. The walls are closing. In further vein, it will be interesting to see how Michel Aoun reacts to this attack. Although he remains largely sympathetic to Hizballah, Aoun has also publicly flirted with the notion of a rapprochement with the Future Movement. Should Aoun decide to move towards Siniora/Hariri, even in a limited way, this assassination could cause major blowback for Hizballah. After all, it's hard to underestimate how much Hizballah relies upon Aoun; both for political support and cross-sectarian political cover.

*Interestingly, much of the evidence against Badr al-Din was garnered from cell phone intercepts. These may have been provided to the Tribunal by the NSA (Hizballah is a high priority collection target for the US Intelligence Community).