Yesterday's bombing in Beirut illustrates the primordial influence of sectarian hatred in shaping Middle Eastern politics dynamics. As I noted on Monday, the Lebanese Hizballah is struggling to contain the wave of Sunni extremist violence that's directed against it. Regarding this sectarian anger, it's clear that there have been two separate counter-responses to Nasrallah's intervention in Syria. On one side, the March 14 bloc is trying to weaken Hizballah's political influence at the governing level. Supported by the Saudis in the form of new aid to the Lebanese Army, Siniora and Hariri are pushing for Hizballah's separation from any new cabinet. Conversely, motivated by their fanatical ideology, Salafi extremist groups are also seeking to weaken Hizballah. However, for these groups, the chosen mechanism of political activity is significant violence. What's clear is that sectarianism is now front and center in Lebanese politics (Martin Chulov gives a good reporting primer on Hizballah's role in this evolving dynamic).
But it isn't just Lebanon. If interested, here are some of my thoughts on the challenge of sectarianism in terms of...
1) The Lebanese Hizballah appears to have lost another leader. Whoever was responsible for Lakkis's death last week, it's obvious that hostile pressure on the group is growing. With Hizballah now fully invested in Assad's survival, sectarian reactions to that strategy are also growing in intensity - hence the less of three senior leaders in as many weeks. In basic terms, Hizballah's political adversaries are taking advantage from the group's associated guilt for incidents like this one. As I've written before, Hizballah is suffering from an identity crisis of serious proportions. Devoid of a cross-sectarian base of sympathy, the organization's carefully constructed 'anti-oppression' narrative is being rendered for the lie that it is. Whatever happens with Assad, in Lebanon and beyond, Hizballah's strategic choices will leave them increasingly vulnerable. For a few of my related thoughts on Hizballah, please click (point five here), here and here. 2) ISIL continues to wreck havoc upon Iraq. In the absence of US Intelligence capabilities (please see my BBC debate on the NSA - takes a minute to load!) and amidst continuing political discord (please see my thoughts here), ISIL and its affiliates are once again endangering Iraq's stability. As the ISW's Jessica Lewis notes, ISIL has embraced a highly effective strategy of impatient resurgence. Again, it's important that we note the targeting methodology that ISIL embraces. As with their Salafi violent-extremist counterparts around the world, they are members of a death worshiping cult. Recognizing this truth, we should still be astute to the political grievances that allow groups like ISIL to prosper. Nevertheless, we must also grapple with the reality of a movement that sees cafes, markets, malls, roads and playgrounds as military targets.
3) The protests in Ukraine continue to grow. President Yanukovych has a problem. At a basic level, he has wagered against a long brewing discontent. Outraged by endemic corruption and Yanukovych's subservience to Putin's bullying/influence, many Ukrainians believe they're in a struggle for the very future of Ukraine. Quite understandably, these citizens have little interest in a future that abandons them to the ignominy of existence as a buffer state for Putin's Russia. While it's true that Ukraine is far from unified in its support for a pro-west future, younger Ukrainians are firmly ensconced with the pro-EU/US crowd. The trend lines are clear. Still, there are US policies that could help catalyze this process. Recognizing Ukraine's deep vulnerability to Russian energy blackmail, the US should urgently begin to provide an alternate source of energy to Eastern European states. By loosening regulations on US companies, exports of US Liquefied Natural Gas exports could begin in earnest. That alternate supply portfolio would enable Ukrainians to break free from their present headlock-like relationship with Russia. For some of my thoughts on Putin, please click here and here.
1) The Israeli Military has announced plans to update their force posture over the next five years. The major elements of these proposals include a reduction in the IDF officer corps and a greater focus on highly mobile weapon platforms like the Spike NLOS. At the forefront of these developments is a focus on potential future conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah. Recognizing the relative immobility of Israeli forces during the 2006 Lebanon war, the IDF wants to ensure that this hindrance is reduced before another outbreak of violence. Israel understands that in order to defeat enemies like Hamas/Hezbollah - which rely upon small skirmishing groups of highly mobile rocket teams etc. the IDF must be able to employ its own weapon systems that allow for the timely engagement of their adversaries. Cognizant of the sensitivities with which Israeli military operations are viewed internationally, the Israelis also know that they need weapons that are highly discriminate - IE - mechanisms that minimize the likelihood of civilian casualties. In another sense, the IDF also seems to be building front line deployments around their most aggressive, operationally experienced units. That makes sense - the IDF recognizes the vulnerabilities of relying upon fresh forces in critical operations.
However, on a more negative note, it appears that the IDF will cut spending on training operations. That's a risky proposition - dependency on technological assets cannot offset the loss of basic competencies. As a broader observation, I find it pretty staggering that the Israelis are willing to cut defense spending amidst ongoing regional instability.
2) Serious rioting broke out in Belfast, Northern Ireland on Friday. The problems arose when British loyalist marchers were prevented from walking through an Irish nationalist area of the city. This behavior is pathetic. As evidenced in footage of the scuffles, many of the aggressors were young men - probably drunk. They wanted an excuse for violence. It's deeply disappointing that occasional outbreaks of disorder like this one still occur in Northern Ireland. Though the situation is far more peaceful than it once was, sectarian hatred nevertheless remains a real problem. In a less serious but similarly interesting vein, it's worth checking out today's NY Times story on the challenges that top golfer, Rory McIlroy is forced to navigate in his home country.
3) Tensions between Syria's various rebel forces have reached a boiling point. Many will argue that these hostilities necessitate greater US detachment from the conflict. On the contrary, I believe the opposite is true. At one point or another, the US was going to have to face up to the Salafist extremist threat inside Syria. As I've argued before, the US must use all of our influence to support the nationalist minded elements of the rebellion. Such a course (though admittedly risky) would allow us to support those forces who would be best placed to replace Assad with a semi-stable, pro-western government. Disengagement is not an option. Supported by the Putin mafia and supplemented by forces from Iran and Hizballah, Assad's regime has turned the tide of the conflict. We must alter this strategic equation.
4) David Moyes has lost his first game in charge of Manchester United. It's a shame, but this game was largely irrelevant. I'm confident that Moyes will be a highly successful manager for Britain's biggest club. Regardless, I'm very much looking forward to the start of the Premier League season in a month's time. With Pellegrini at Manchester City, Mourinho back at Chelsea and Fulham under ownership of a major investor, this should be an exciting year of soccer. The battle for the top four spots will be fierce; from my perspective, Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool, Man City, Man Utd, Tottenham (and of course Everton!) all have a good opportunity to reach the Champions League.
In addition to my US politics focus, I have an MSc in Middle East Politics from SOAS, London. The area is one where I maintain a more analytical interest. The actions that took place yesterday at the US Embassy in Cairo and the US Consulate in Benghazi, Libya were disgusting. In Cairo, the US flag was ripped down, set on fire and then replaced with a black flag representative to that adopted by Al Qa'ida. In Benghazi, an armed mob attacked the US Consulate and murdered the US Ambassador as well as three other staffers. Why did this happen? Because some individuals are upset about a video. Yes, a video. In this case, the video is one apparently being produced by moronic Florida pastor Terry Jones and a number of Egyptian Copts who live in the United States. Jones is the same guy who threatened to burn Korans a while back. There are a number of comments that I want to make here.
1) There is absolutely no excuse for the violence we saw yesterday. Freedom of speech is an inherent right. If Terry Jones wants to be a moron then he has that right under the 1st amendment. Those who are upset by his film have every right to protest, but must do so in a peaceful way. Anyone who thinks that the appropriate reaction is to resort to violence and murder innocent diplomats is a pathetic human being. Religious leaders across the Islamic world must assert this point. There is a profound example of where this guidance has previously occurred - Ayatollah Sistani. In post-2003 Iraq, Sistani played a major role in persuading Iraqi Shia to engage with the political process and to reject the sectarian war that AQI and Sadr sought.
2) The US State Department public reaction to this incident was not good. Although Hillary Clinton has offered a tougher statement of condemnation this morning, the decision by the US Embassy in Cairo to condemn free speech was a grave error. Instead, the Embassy should have noted the US legal position on free speech while distancing themselves from Jones's idiocy. Relinquishing free speech in face of violent intimidation is always the wrong choice.
3) These incidents indicate the broader tensions that are still cooking in the region. In Egypt, the Copt community has long faced sustained persecution (including violence since President Morsi was elected). It would appear that the Salafist extremists who made up at least part of yesterday's Cairo protest, were to a degree, motivated by their natural hatred for the Copts. In Libya, political fractures remain a key challenge for the provisional government. The key is that regional political dynamics remain fundamentally unstable.
4) The USMC Embassy Security Detachment did a superb job in Cairo. They were calm, professional and allowed the crowd's fury to burn itself out. What happened in Benghazi is less clear. UPDATE - It appears that two US Marines were killed while attempting to protect diplomatic personnel in Benghazi. The US Military has initiated a Crisis Action Team and is in the process of deploying a FAST unit to reinforce US security capabilities in Libya.
