The Political Face of Sectarian Hatred in the Middle East

Yesterday's bombing in Beirut illustrates the primordial influence of sectarian hatred in shaping Middle Eastern politics dynamics. As I noted on Monday, the Lebanese Hizballah is struggling to contain the wave of Sunni extremist violence that's directed against it. Regarding this sectarian anger, it's clear that there have been two separate counter-responses to Nasrallah's intervention in Syria. On one side, the March 14 bloc is trying to weaken Hizballah's political influence at the governing level. Supported by the Saudis in the form of new aid to the Lebanese Army, Siniora and Hariri are pushing for Hizballah's separation from any new cabinet. Conversely, motivated by their fanatical ideology, Salafi extremist groups are also seeking to weaken Hizballah. However, for these groups, the chosen mechanism of political activity is significant violence. What's clear is that sectarianism is now front and center in Lebanese politics (Martin Chulov gives a good reporting primer on Hizballah's role in this evolving dynamic).

But it isn't just Lebanon. If interested, here are some of my thoughts on the challenge of sectarianism in terms of...

• Egypt

• Iraq (with latest news on Anbar here)

• Lebanon (in relation to the Syrian Civil War)

• Somalia (in terms of internal tensions within terrorist groups) 

• Syria

• Why it's catastrophic for the Islamic world (potentially even apocalyptic)

• How it leads people into terrorism/helps sustain terrorist groups

Related thoughts

Assassination in Beirut

I posted an earlier version of this piece on Saturday. However, some readers were confused that the earlier post was combined with some other thoughts on the NSA. So, paying heed to developments from over the weekend, here's an updated new post without the NSA material!

         Friday's bombing in Beirut was almost certainly the work of the Syrian GSD and/or Hizballah. I make that argument based on three factors. 

1) Hizballah is under extraordinary physical and political pressure inside Lebanon. The group is thus desperate to reassert its domestic power-perception position. Because of Chatah's symbolic representation of the March 14 bloc and his well known association with the Hariris, he offered an opportune target from which Hizballah could broadcast their overarching message - 'we are prepared to wash the streets with blood in order to maintain our power'. Let's be clear, this is political terrorism in its most unambiguous form.

2) The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (established to investigate the Hariri assassination and a number of other attacks) will shortly begin its trial (in absentia) of a number of Hizballah operatives. Those accused include Mustafa Badr al-Din (the suspected head of Hizballah's foreign operations directorate)*. In this regard, Chatah's assassination was likely intended to send another basic message to the international community - Hizballah will not acquiesce to outside pressure.

3) The Lebanese Hizballah has a long history of engaging in assassinations against its political opponents. Further, the Syrian Civil War provides abundant proof that the group has little compunction about massacring anyone who stands in their way (a truth that I once underestimated). As SOP, Hizballah denies any responsibility for these kind of atrocities. Still, their record is transparent.

                On a related note, it's critical that we pay heed to Siniora's evident fury (which reflects popular concerns) over what's just happened. In articulating that the March 14 bloc will push for restrictions on illegal arms, Siniora is (as the Daily Star notes) issuing a thinly veiled threat to Hizballah. In short, he's laying the foundations for a tougher counter-response. As a corollary, Saudi Arabia's grant of $3 billion to the Lebanese Army is surely designed to provide a counter-weight to Hizballah. The walls are closing. In further vein, it will be interesting to see how Michel Aoun reacts to this attack. Although he remains largely sympathetic to Hizballah, Aoun has also publicly flirted with the notion of a rapprochement with the Future Movement. Should Aoun decide to move towards Siniora/Hariri, even in a limited way, this assassination could cause major blowback for Hizballah. After all, it's hard to underestimate how much Hizballah relies upon Aoun; both for political support and cross-sectarian political cover.

*Interestingly, much of the evidence against Badr al-Din was garnered from cell phone intercepts. These may have been provided to the Tribunal by the NSA (Hizballah is a high priority collection target for the US Intelligence Community).

Related thoughts.

Turkish Pilots Kidnapped

This incident reeks of Hizballah. As I argued earlier this week, the organization is facing major pressure both inside and outside Lebanon. Further, the group's modus operandi illustrates that they are in love with this form of calculating, semi-covert warfare. In addition, it takes serious capability to pull off something like this - intelligence planning, combat skill and political conviction (the Turkish Government isn't likely to be happy). Oh... and don't be so sure that those 'pilgrims' (see the BBC article) were actually pilgrims. My related links. Tomorrow, I'll be writing on Iran's new President.

Beirut Explosion

The bombing in Beirut earlier today is a firm reminder of the intense political dynamics that are at contest in Lebanon and Syria. A contest in which Syria-Iran-Hizballah are at war with regional forces of liberation. I believe that today's attack was carried out by agents of the Syrian government and perhaps also with the co-ordination or support of the Lebanese Hizballah. While I have no specific evidence to back up this assertion, I would point to a number of indicators. Also some analysis...

1) The attack took place in a predominantly Christian neighborhood of eastern Beirut and killed a senior Lebanese civil servant who was an outspoken critic of the Assad regime. In addition, Assad has previously warned that he would seek to push the conflict in Syria into a broadened external struggle.

2) Syria and Hizballah have a clear track record of support for violence against those who challenge their political power. This has involved recent, previous attacks on both major Lebanese officials and foreign entities. Iran also shares this preference for using covert force against those who oppose them.

3) Hizballah is increasingly concerned by the serious damage that their continued support for Assad is inflicting on their broader ideational legitimacy. Instigating further currents of regional instability (as today's attack would suggest) offers Hizballah a method by which they believe that they can distract world attention. I would argue that Hizballah's recent UAV flight over Israel provides another timely example of this dynamic. I have previously suggested that Hizballah would begin to abandon Assad once they came to believe that his regime was doomed. While I expected that this would have occurred before now, I remain confident of that belief. Ultimately, it is my opinion that Hizballah still believes that Assad can be saved. If evidence shows that today's attack (and the future instability that it foreshadows) is linked to Syria, it should serve to re-emphasize the need for the United States to take more concrete action to help Syrians liberate their country.

4) Faced with the EU tightened oil sanctions last week and Iran's continuing economic implosion, I believe (as I have previously argued) that Iran is likely to respond with more acts of aggression in the near future. Again, the United States must be prepared to respond to any attacks that take place.

Bulgaria bus explosion

The attack on Israelis visiting Bulgaria is probably the work of Hizballah or Iran's intelligence services. UPDATED-Hezbollah confirmed. Or both. The Iranians have been especially active in attempting to strike Israeli targets over the past few months. These actions have included incidents in Bangkok, Georgia and India. Israel's priority at the moment is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability. As I argued several months ago, for each Western/Israeli action in the region, Iran prepares a counter-response. Israel will now encourage the international community to increase pressure on Iran.

Also - Although not engaged in an actual attack - Israel claims that Hizballah operatives were detained in Kenya and Cyprus over the past few days.

Hezbollah

Some good photos from Ashura in Beirut yesterday. Hezbollah has major problems. They are stuck with escalating tensions vis-a-vis Israel and Iran, their support for Assad is hugely destructive to the emancipation narrative that supposedly underpins their organisation and they also have to deal with unwanted attention from the Hariri investigation. As I have previously noted, as Assad approaches his ultimate fall from power, Hezbollah will likely distance themselves from his regime. Hezbollah is playing a long game which requires the appearance at least of cross-sectarian legitimacy. Innocent people being killed by regime forces does not coalesce well with this agenda.