Showing posts with label Hizballah. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hizballah. Show all posts

Friday, January 3, 2014

The Political Face of Sectarian Hatred in the Middle East

Yesterday's bombing in Beirut illustrates the primordial influence of sectarian hatred in shaping Middle Eastern politics dynamics. As I noted on Monday, the Lebanese Hizballah is struggling to contain the wave of Sunni extremist violence that's directed against it. Regarding this sectarian anger, it's clear that there have been two separate counter-responses to Nasrallah's intervention in Syria. On one side, the March 14 bloc is trying to weaken Hizballah's political influence at the governing level. Supported by the Saudis in the form of new aid to the Lebanese Army, Siniora and Hariri are pushing for Hizballah's separation from any new cabinet. Conversely, motivated by their fanatical ideology, Salafi extremist groups are also seeking to weaken Hizballah. However, for these groups, the chosen mechanism of political activity is significant violence. What's clear is that sectarianism is now front and center in Lebanese politics (Martin Chulov gives a good reporting primer on Hizballah's role in this evolving dynamic).

But it isn't just Lebanon. If interested, here are some of my thoughts on the challenge of sectarianism in terms of...
  • Iraq (with latest news on Anbar here)
  • Lebanon (in relation to the Syrian Civil War)
  • Somalia (in terms of internal tensions within terrorist groups) 
  • How it leads people into terrorism/helps sustain terrorist groups

Monday, December 30, 2013

Assassination in Beirut

I posted an earlier version of this piece on Saturday. However, some readers were confused that the earlier post was combined with some other thoughts on the NSA. So, paying heed to developments from over the weekend, here's an updated new post without the NSA material!

         Friday's bombing in Beirut was almost certainly the work of the Syrian GSD and/or Hizballah. I make that argument based on three factors. 

1) Hizballah is under extraordinary physical and political pressure inside Lebanon. The group is thus desperate to reassert its domestic power-perception position. Because of Chatah's symbolic representation of the March 14 bloc and his well known association with the Hariris, he offered an opportune target from which Hizballah could broadcast their overarching message - 'we are prepared to wash the streets with blood in order to maintain our power'. Let's be clear, this is political terrorism in its most unambiguous form.

2) The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (established to investigate the Hariri assassination and a number of other attacks) will shortly begin its trial (in absentia) of a number of Hizballah operatives. Those accused include Mustafa Badr al-Din (the suspected head of Hizballah's foreign operations directorate)*. In this regard, Chatah's assassination was likely intended to send another basic message to the international community - Hizballah will not acquiesce to outside pressure.

3) The Lebanese Hizballah has a long history of engaging in assassinations against its political opponents. Further, the Syrian Civil War provides abundant proof that the group has little compunction about massacring anyone who stands in their way (a truth that I once underestimated). As SOP, Hizballah denies any responsibility for these kind of atrocities. Still, their record is transparent.

                On a related note, it's critical that we pay heed to Siniora's evident fury (which reflects popular concerns) over what's just happened. In articulating that the March 14 bloc will push for restrictions on illegal arms, Siniora is (as the Daily Star notes) issuing a thinly veiled threat to Hizballah. In short, he's laying the foundations for a tougher counter-response. As a corollary, Saudi Arabia's grant of $3 billion to the Lebanese Army is surely designed to provide a counter-weight to Hizballah. The walls are closing. In further vein, it will be interesting to see how Michel Aoun reacts to this attack. Although he remains largely sympathetic to Hizballah, Aoun has also publicly flirted with the notion of a rapprochement with the Future Movement. Should Aoun decide to move towards Siniora/Hariri, even in a limited way, this assassination could cause major blowback for Hizballah. After all, it's hard to underestimate how much Hizballah relies upon Aoun; both for political support and cross-sectarian political cover.

*Interestingly, much of the evidence against Badr al-Din was garnered from cell phone intercepts. These may have been provided to the Tribunal by the NSA (Hizballah is a high priority collection target for the US Intelligence Community).

Friday, September 6, 2013

Iran plans retaliation if US strikes Assad

Reports suggest that Iran is planning to retaliate against US interests if President Obama orders air strikes against Assad. No one should be surprised. Just yesterday, I argued that perceptions of American weakness in regards to Syria would encourage Iranian hostility. The causal influence is clear - by failing to challenge Iran's aggression, America has signaled a vulnerability to that aggression. So begins a perpetuating cycle. Unfortunately, due to the fact that many Republicans in Congress do not understand the power politics of the Middle East and many Democrats are fundamentally resistant to the notion of US resolution in face of blackmail, Iran has been undeterred in their long term aggression against the United States. Indeed, in 2011, acting under orders from the ''very highest levels'' of the Iranian government, terrorists nearly blew up a popular Washington DC restaurant. The US Government's pathetic response? Condemnation.

President Obama needs to make it clear that should Iran take action against US interests, he will respond with deliberate and decisive military force. Ultimately, this isn't about bluster or warmongering, this about realpolitik - making theocratic thugs understand that their malfeasance will not go unanswered. As the excellent Dexter Filkins has also noted, Iran's strategy in Iraq was significantly influenced by US deterrent posture.

Saturday, August 10, 2013

Iran’s new President and the continuing risk of conflict

‘’We should deal with the issue through a realistic approach."
Hassan Rouhani, August 6th 2013

The Obama Administration should take those words literally. After years of diplomatic failure, only a realistic approach can improve US-Iranian relations.

Yes, Rouhani is likely to be an improvement on his inauspicious predecessor (a clownish narcissist now locked in a desperate struggle for relevance). Iran’s new President has promised to improve women’s rights and seek better relations with the west. If nothing else, his tone is more conciliatory. These developments are, even if only prospective, good.

Nonetheless, enamored by the potential for change, many western commentators have reacted with unrestrained elation. Rouhani’s election has made ‘’imaginable what for years has been unimaginable.’’ said Stephen Kinzer in The Guardian.  In response, ‘’The Obama Administration should signal a shift in style, substance and strategy’’ declared Ali Vaez in the Christian Science Monitor.  Some went even further. In a particularly odd commentary for Al Jazeera, the academics, Flynt and Hillary Leverett found that Iran now offers a ‘’concrete expression’’ of Muslim democratic emancipation.

I think not.

Rouhani might not be Ahmadinejad, but that certainly doesn’t make him an Iranian Jefferson. After all, his existing human rights record isn’t exactly stellar. During the student protests of July 1999, Rouhani embraced a gleeful brutality - "From today’’ he warned‘’our people shall witness how… we deal with these opportunists and riotous elements, if they simply dare to show their faces."  He wasn’t joking. The students were crushed. It’s also been alleged that Rouhani played a key role in the use of terrorism against Iranian dissidents living abroad.

More concerning in the present however; the new President is a proud supporter both of Iran’s nuclear program and of continued assistance to the Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad.

These facts should lead us to a cautious conclusion – a pleasant tone means nothing without substance.

Nowhere is this more true than with regards to the Iranian nuclear crisis.

While some analysts believe that Iran's present condition of international isolation and inflation make a nuclear deal likely, I'm not so sure. To me, that argument resides upon an intrinsically western conception of state interests; secular, populist and relative to the moment. Yes, Iran’s leaders obviously care about economics. Unfortunately, they care far more about joining the nuclear club. As I’ve argued before, the theocrats view nuclear power as the existential guarantor for their ongoing revolutionary project. This understanding explains why, again and again, we’ve seen nuclear negotiations rise in hope and then collapse in failure. Put simply, for the Ayatollahs, compared to the prospective feast of a nuclear dominion, western concessions are nothing. We think we have cake, but we only have crumbs.

Playing to our delusion, Iran adopts the foreign policy brother to Madoff’s Ponzi scheme- a negotiating strategy that uses trickery to buy time for nuclear advancement. The scam? Offer flirtations of peace, blame western intransigence for a negotiating failure, then, a few months later, start all over again. By allowing emotion to dominate our logic, we buy it every time.

Rouhani’s arrival allows Iran to play the same game with a fresh face.

It needn’t be this way. For all their bluster, Iran’s leaders understand that a military conflict with the United States would be a disaster for their interests. If we grasped this – we could, alongside stronger sanctions, perhaps deter them into ending their nuclear program. Unfortunately, emboldened by western impotence in Syria and Obama’s stuttering threats, American warnings bear little weight. For deterrence to be real it must first be believed.

There’s another political component at stake here- Israeli patience with diplomacy is nearly exhausted.

Following Rouhani’s election, Netanyahu again pressured the Obama Administration for tougher sanctions. I suspect that Israel’s Prime Minister fears Iran will use Rouhani the reformist to evade future sanctions. Nearly a year after Netanyahu’s ‘red line’ speech, it’s obvious that time is running out. In addition, though it's pure speculation on my part, Netanyahu's restoration of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process could indicate his desire to get President Obama 'on side' prior to an Israeli military attack on Iran.

Regardless, it's a dangerous wager to assume that Netanyahu’s warnings are a bluff. Israel’s security strategy resides upon Israel's regional supremacy of power. Where some cannot look beyond the risks of military conflict, Israelis (and the Sunni Arab monarchies) see a nuclear Iran as an intolerable threat.

In this sense, if Rouhani's style is divorced from substance, his arrival will provide little aid to the cause of peace.

My related writing.
France 24 analyst offers a different perspective.


Wednesday, August 7, 2013

The Lebanese Hizballah and a Challenge of Identity

The US-Al Qa'ida security alert is continuing. 

However, so is the Syrian civil war. In that vein, I thought I'd outline a few of my thoughts on the Lebanese Hizballah.

A couple of weeks ago, the EU blacklisted Hizballah's military wing. That was a positive (if long overdue) move. From my perspective, Hizballah should not be able claim the moral sovereignty of a democratic political actor, whilst simultaneously retaining an apparatus of terrorism.

Yet, regardless of the EU, the Lebanese Hizballah faces a growing identity challenge. There's a simple reason why - Hizballah's continued, unrepentant support for the Assad regime in Syria.

Inside Lebanon, Hizballah has long resided upon a carefully cultivated identity as a cross-sectarian resistance force against foreign aggression. The group's support for Assad is irreconcilable with that position. Consequentially, both moderate and extremist Lebanese political actors are increasing their pressure on the group. Currents of sectarian hatred are once again rising to the surface (also see Nasrallah's comments in video link below). Ultiamtely, hypocrisy is the worst enemy of political identity and Hizballah's competitors are taking full advantage of this truth. Of course, it doesn't help Hizballah's legitimacy that the group wages regular terrorist campaigns against their political opponents.

Hizballah's brutality is taking a further toll beyond Lebanese borders. For a start, the organization's reputation is now increasingly tenuous amongst regional populations. Rather than being perceived as an emancipatory force delivering justice to the Lebanese nation, in many quarters, the organization is seen as a bitter sectarian entity that acts in the pursuit of a narrow agenda.

In the long term, these difficulties pose two distinct challenges for the group. First, they serve to fundamentally undercut Hizballah's base of cross-sectarian support. Second, as Hizballah's political identity becomes toxic, there will be less inducement for other political parties to join in coalition with the organization. We're already witnessing this development in Hizballah's evolving relationship with Hamas. In addition, though mainly motivated by other concerns, the recent collapse of the March 8th ruling coalition (of which Hizballah was a key part) illustrates the significant degree to which Lebanese political dynamics rest on uncertain ground. Hizballah's power base is growing more unstable. 

Back in the summer of 2011, I argued that Hizballah would eventually abandon Assad through fear of otherwise suffering the political consequences mentioned above. They may still do so. However, I increasingly suspect that such a choice will require far greater western pressure on Assad.

For a selection of my other writings on Middle Eastern security - link here.

Thursday, August 1, 2013

CIA cover-up in Benghazi?

Benghazi. The story that keeps on running.

CNN's Jake Tapper is reporting that around 35 CIA officers were present in Benghazi during the consulate attack last September. Tapper also claims that the CIA is exerting significant pressure on those officers to remain quiet about their presence in Libya. Interestingly, Tapper's piece specifically reports that the officers in question have been subjected to unusually frequent polygraph tests in order to determine whether they've been talking to the press. 

Safe to say, this is interesting news. 

So... what were the CIA doing and why are they apparently so desperate to prevent their activities from becoming public?

Off the top of my head, I can think of four reasons.

1) As CNN notes, suspicion is growing on Capitol Hill that the CIA were using Benghazi as an operations facility for the provision of weaponry to Syrian rebels. Here, it seems understandable that the US Government would want to prevent this information from becoming common knowledge. Because of the sensitivity of covert operations towards Syria and the potential stakes for US interests in Libya were that information to become known, the need for secrecy would be obvious. Ironically, if this is the case, Benghazi was probably picked as a location for its prospective ability to offer both secrecy and some form of operational security against Assad affiliated retaliation.

2) Another possibility is that the CIA was using Benghazi as a jump-off point for Special Activities Division (SAD) operations inside Syria. Flying from Benghazi into a forward staging position in Turkey would require a relatively short hop across the Mediterranean. Therefore, from a geo-strategic point of view (and in the context of the operational security concern), it would make a near-ideal staging post for covert deployments. Reliable reporting (see Ambinder and Grady's The Deep State) indicates that the US Government has deployed covert military/intelligence teams inside Iran on a number of occasions over the past few years. In addition, prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, we know that the US deployed small groups of personnel deep inside Iraq in order to gather targeting intelligence. So, if this possibility is the case, it wouldn't be something new. In addition, it would make at least some sense. The Obama Administration only announced that they would provide weapons to select Syrian rebels in mid-June. It's therefore very possible (and quite likely) that CIA officers were on the ground in Syria before that date - gathering intelligence on the best rebel forces to support and developing foundations for the future establishment of a weapons logistical train.

3) Though less likely than the other possibilities, I also wouldn't rule out the notion that the CIA was using Benghazi as a jump off point for operations inside Iran. As pressure escalates with regards to Iran's nuclear program, the possibility of an Israeli or US strike against that country is also growing. CIA disruption operations against Iran are already well known (see Olympic Games). But the conduct of major covert actions requires a base. Perhaps that base was in Benghazi.

4) Alternatively, it's very possible that the CIA was using Benghazi as a base of operations for action against AQIM/AQIM aligned actors. Because of the politically volatile nature of a US security presence in Africa, it would make sense for the CIA to want to keep their activities quiet. This being said, in all intelligence operations rule #1 is secrecy.

CONCLUSION - Ultimately, we don't yet know what the CIA was doing. As I've stated, all of the above is, at best, an educated guess. However, assuming the CIA was engaged in action that reached beyond Libyan borders, that activity would have required a Presidential finding. Therefore, it would also have required a briefing for the gang of 8. So... whatever the CIA was up to (if anything at all significant), a small number of significant people on the Hill are likely to know something about it.

If interested, some of my related thoughts on Benghazi.

Monday, July 15, 2013

Israel pressures Obama on Iran, UK welfare state, Zimmerman trial

1) Israel is pressuring the Obama Administration to act against Iran. Following his September 2012 red line speech at the UN, Netanyahu is upping the ante once again. The Israelis are anxious for the United States to either enact tougher sanctions against the Iranians, or to more directly imply a willingness to use force. I've argued many times why I believe that Netanyahu (especially) and Israel more generally will eventually use force against Iranian nuclear facilities. For me, the key factor is this: from the Israeli perspective, while the risks of such a military operation are manageable, the consequences of inaction are not. And... unlike US caveats, Israeli red lines mean something. Further heightening the probability of Israeli action is the ongoing situation in Syria. By their undaunted support for Assad, the Lebanese Hizballah and Iran are signalling their desire to dominate the strategic evolution of the Middle East. Which leads us to point 2!

2) The Israelis have attacked a suspected Russian arms transport in Syria. Though no Russians appear to have been killed, this is serious news. The Israeli attack illustrates both Israel's overt tactical intent - to deny Assad access to high technology assets and Israel's broader strategic intent - to send a message to the Russian government (and in different ways, Iran/the US). Anyway, I salute the Israelis for their political courage in face of Russian intimidation- we in the US could learn something here.

3) The British Government has taken a small but significant step to reduce the pernicious consequences of the UK's welfare state. By imposing a cap on individual welfare eligibility, the UK may begin to see a gradual reduction in its massive state outlays. However, as a number of Conservative MP's are pointing out, much more can be done. See my thoughts on the welfare state here.

4) The Zimmerman trial has come to an end. As I argued for The Week, the news coverage was unnecessarily incessant and symptomatic of a broader problem in American society. Regardless, I do not believe that Zimmerman's guilt was established beyond all reasonable doubt - the Jury decision was correct. 
            However, I have great sympathy for Trayvon Martin's family- they are honoring their son by their highly dignified reaction to the trial outcome. Many others have reacted less impressively.

Tuesday, July 9, 2013

Conservatives should support the Israeli-Palestinian peace process

Speaking on Fox News yesterday, Rush Limbaugh declared that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be resolved only when ''one side surrendered''; for Limbaugh at least, Kerry's peace efforts are a waste of time. I strongly disagree with this assessment. Instead, I think there are four important reasons why the pursuit of peace deserves the support of American conservatives.

1) National Security - Resolving this conflict is a critical interest of American national security. The continued suffering of the Palestinian people (both real and perceived) feeds anti-American extremism around the world and in so, helps to weaken the position of regional pro-American moderates like President Abbas. Islamic extremists thrive in the well of absent justice. As numerous national security officials have stated, a durable peace deal would serve American interests in crucial ways. This isn't left wing hyperbole, rather it's the analysis of top military thinkers like Gen. Petraeus

Those who argue in implicit support for perpetual conflict are either willfully delusional or poorly informed. Or both.

2) Diplomacy - The US Secretary of State's primary responsibility is to advance the cause of American diplomacy. Peace building efforts have always been a central component of this effort. Let's cut the BS. There's simply no reason why the US Government cannot manage the Egyptian crisis whilst also advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Since when have conservatives favored an America that seeks only to manage events, rather than taking an active, positive stake in shaping them? If we believe in global leadership our global efforts cannot exist in a 9-5 mentality.

3) Legitimacy - In another regard, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict plays an intimate role in shaping delusional understandings of both America and Israel. These false conceptions of truth serve to weaken our voice in the Islamic world and beyond. A durable peace deal would empower the US with a newly perceived legitimacy on a range of other diplomatic issues - engendering further co-operation on counter-terrorism for example. Our influence would grow.

4) Israel - American conservatives (myself included) have always regarded Israel as an important ally. But we do no service to our friends if we lack the courage of boldness. Again, the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would greatly advance the interests of the Israeli people. From trade to security, peace would empower Israeli society. Though some like to claim that Israel's security wall has won the Israeli people a secure future, the facts speak to another reality. For years, successive Israeli Prime Ministers (including Netanyahu) have entertained serious compromises in pursuit of peace. They recognize that a lasting deal is crucial for Israel's security.

Conclusion
Let me be clear, I'm not advocating that Israel make all the concessions - Palestinian reciprocity must be equally forthcoming and energetic (and Palestinian recognition of Israel's Jewish existence is obviously non-negotiable). Nor am I blind to the nature of Israel's enemies - Hamas are anti-Semitic totalitarians and the Lebanese Hizballah are anti-democratic thugs. These enemies will not cease to exist when a peace deal is eventually signed. However, they will be weakened. 

In the end, I firmly believe that by using the existing negotiating templates of Camp David 2000 and Olmert 2008 (which have addressed numerous issues of contention: right of return, West Bank, water etc.), a just peace is reachable. Peace is always a noble ambition worthy of our support.
 

Saturday, February 16, 2013

Muslims must confront violent Islamic Extremism

Around the world, the greatest enemy of Muslim citizens is Islamist extremism. Today, in Pakistan, Sunni Islamists detonated a bomb in a market that is popular with Shia Pakistani families. Many are dead. These civilians were brutally murdered because of their beliefs. Just over a month ago, over 100 civilians were killed in a similar attack. But it isn't just Afghanistan and Pakistan which are suffering. In Iraq for example, alongside frequent bombings, assassinations of senior civil servants and politicians have also become more common. The main perpetrator of these attacks is the Islamic State of Iraq, an heir to Al Qa'ida in Iraq, and a group which seeks to return the country back into the bloody clutches of sectarian civil war. A time of death characterized by the torture of children, hostages killed in fire pits, the use of electric drills as implements of torture and the morally foul disinterest of too many senior American politicians.

Recognizing this brutality is crucial. But it's also equally vital that Islamic societies face up to the evil which festers inside them. For far too long, warped terrorists have found quiet excuse for the atrocities which they commit. That has to change. While effective counter-terrorism partly requires the application of force, the construction of a new social tolerance is key. In essence, the growth of a political discourse that alleviates concerns regarding cross-sectarian participation in governing society (see growing protests in Iraq). During the period between 2003-2006 in Iraq, a significant violence enabler was the US strategic failure to separate intransigent ideological extremists from broader social discontentment. When the strategy changed, violence reduced dramatically. The lesson is this - until extremists are loudly discredited from all sides of a society (or ended), they find breaches in which to take root and foundations to manipulate the broader dissatisfaction of others.

Finally, we must also condemn bigotry in all its forms. Nonetheless, because of nuclear proliferation, Islamist sectarian currents pose an exceptional threat to international security. 

On a related note, here's a link page for my other terrorism related writings.

Wednesday, February 6, 2013

The EU's Hizballah delusion

Following a comprehensive investigation, Bulgaria's security services have concluded that the Lebanese Hizballah was responsible for bombing an Israeli tour bus in July 2012. Pressure is now growing on the EU to classify Hizballah as a terrorist organization. At present, only the group's military wing is prohibited from operating in the EU.  

One might assume that this is a relatively simple issue- that evidence should lead policy. That Hizballah's political masters cannot be disconnected from their military forces. However, as Tuesday's New York Times pointed out, major European states including France and Germany remain reluctant to get tougher on the group. 

Europeans like to argue that the US policy towards the Middle East is a product of utter naivete and favoritism towards Israel. But for me, the EU's current Hizballah policy represents the height of moral and strategic deficiency.

For a start, far too many Europeans have an absurdly idealized conception of what Hizballah is and what the organization stands for. Let me give you a personal example. In the immediate aftermath of the July 2012 attack, I blogged about why I believed the bombing was part of a larger strategy of covert action on the part of Hizballah and Iran. It would now appear that my analysis has been vindicated. Back in July though, many Europeans accused me of being a mindless drone for Israeli propaganda. This criticism included strong words from a former classmate from my Middle East Politics masters program. Sadly, when it comes to Hizballah, for many politically engaged Europeans, objective analysis is absent. In large part, this discourse failure stems from the pervasive anti-Israeli sentiment which exists in Europe. A belief that Israel is a illegitimate state and that its security actions are little more than a shadow strategy of ethnic cleansing. Hizballah takes full advantage of this prejudice. Presenting themselves as  liberation actors in the (sadly) still fashionable mould of Che Guevara, Hizballah's leaders have successfully blurred their group into the broader narrative of European populist anger over Israeli/US foreign policy in the Middle East. Every time that an anti-Israeli protest takes place in European cities, Hizballah flags are on proud display. Now, aside from the fact that describing Hizballah as a liberation movement is like saying that Mao was a humanitarian, there's a broader dysfunction to the EU's emotional delusion. It dilutes effective academic discussions of complex issues and it pollutes EU policy interactions with Hizballah. Rather than recognizing that the group retains its power through a mix of democratic interactions and terrorism (domestic as well as foreign), European politicians prepare to wear rose tinted glasses. They allow Hizballah's considerable EU fundraising efforts to flourish. And in doing so, they facilitate Hizballah's aggression in Lebanon and as we see in Syria, venomous brutality abroad

However, EU policy towards Hizballah doesn't just fail on the moral count. There's also its implicit strategic weakness. Consider this quote: “There’s the overall fear if we’re too noisy about this, Hezbollah might strike again, and it might not be Israeli tourists this time.” Those words come from the editor of one of Germany's top foreign policy magazines. And they represent the pervasive power of appeasement at the heart of the EU's counter-terrorism policy. Prior to 9/11, EU states excused Al Qa'ida operatives in their midst (see Germany). Since 9/11, while EU-US counter-terrorism co-operation has improved, tensions have also developed. Why these tensions? Because Europe continues to entertain the delusion that terrorism is criminal activity. It isn't.  Terrorism is political. By any consideration of Clausewitizian doctrine, terrorism is the continuation of politics by other means. It requires a comprehensive response.
 
At the moment in Europe at least, Hizballah is smiling.

Relevant update.
 

Friday, January 11, 2013

Syrian Rebel Victory - Taftanaz, US Entertainment Industry and Free Speech

1) Syrian rebels have seized a major Assad air base in the north of the country. Their victory (assuming they are able to hold the base) represents another step towards Assad's ultimate defeat. In specific terms, the capture of the Taftanaz base offers a number of key strategic opportunities for the rebels. First, being proximate to Aleppo (about 15 miles), the facility provides a forward operating base from which the rebels can now launch operations against government forces in that city. In addition, Taftanaz is located next to the main Syrian M45 highway (have a look on google maps) or in military terms, MSR. As such, the base also offers the rebels the prospect to dominate the direct route south to Hamah, Homs and ultimately Damascus. Finally, the capture imposes another psychological blow on the Syrian regime. Apparently the Syrian Army abandoned its position during the battle for Taftanaz. This does not inspire confidence in the regime's ability to motivate its forces. (Though the regime's elite units are ideologically conjoined to Assad).
            What can we expect now? For one, further government defections in the coming weeks. Also, increasing desperation by Assad and his allies in the Lebanese Hizballah and Iran (and Russia). On the Iran/Hizballah front, it's possible these two might attempt to create an incident that distracts international attention away from Assad. One note of caution however, the group that seized Taftanaz subscribes to a Sunni extremist ideology and is regarded by the US/EU as a terrorist group. One of the reasons why I support arming Syrian rebel nationalists, is so that these elements can counter-balance the extremists. Both now and after Assad is gone. We do not want a 2006 Iraq style sectarian bloodletting in post-Assad Syria.

2) The news that entertainment groups are meeting with VP Biden's gun control task force concerns me. The Federal Government has no place pressuring the movie/tv/gaming industry to self-regulate the content of their products. The entertainment industry caters to demand - if people don't like a movie or a computer game, then they won't purchase access to that product. Fortunately, we have the First Amendment. We must ensure that we don't follow the European route of limited free speech.

Thursday, January 3, 2013

Hezbollah scared, Arabs annoying posh London, Bombing in Iraq, Israel West Bank operation, Chicago violence

1) Hizballah is freaking out because their buddy Assad is screwed. By allying themselves with his regime, Hizballah is suffering serious damage to their brand. IE - The group is suffering from a profound degradation of their carefully cultivated (albeit false) image as a cross-sectarian liberation force. Nasrallah understands that when Assad falls, Hizballah will not only have lost a key ally, by supporting his brutal crackdown, the group will be politically weakened in Lebanon and beyond. I expect that Hizballah will attempt to increase tensions with Israel in 2013, in an attempt to reconstruct their 'defender' image. Regardless, in the long term I believe that the organization will share Assad's fate. By using murder and intimidation as primary political tools and by supporting authoritarians who deny basic freedoms to their people, Hizballah will find it increasingly difficult to win legitimacy and corresponding popular support. True, Hizballah retains strong sympathy among poor Lebanese Shia, but in order to maintain its considerable power base the group must attract a wider base of interest.

2) Posh Londoners are upset because Arab playboys are driving super cars late at night. Although the noise might be annoying, I'm going to venture that these visitors make a rather positive contribution to the UK's economy. But I guess its a question of priorities - posh Londoners getting relaxing sleep, or poorer Londoners having jobs (in the clubs, bars, restaurants and stores that the playboys visit)... Ah the complexities of the British class system!

3) Around twenty people were killed in an explosion in Iraq today. The cause - a terrorist attack that was probably conducted by the Islamic State of Iraq. This organization is attempting to ignite sectarian war in the country. An ISI strategy that has elevated in momentum over the past year. As I argued back in July, the US must provide the Iraqi Government with the intelligence support that it may need in order to confront the terrorists. We must not allow extremists to erase the security successes that our military worked so hard to achieve in Iraq. Having said this, we also need to pressure PM Maliki to build cross-sectarian consensus in his country.

4) Chicago is suffering the impact of a terrible gang war. As in many American inner cities, the Democrats have failed Chicago. Conservatives can and should re-engage with these citizens to offer solutions.

5) Unless the Israelis were A) seriously concerned about leaks, or B) had imminent actionable intelligence, their raid on a West Bank apartment was a serious error. These kind of actions make President Abbas look weak and delegitimize his leadership in the eyes of Palestinian voters. The Israelis should be working to empower Abbas and isolate HAMAS, not vice versa.


Friday, October 19, 2012

Beirut Explosion

The bombing in Beirut earlier today is a firm reminder of the intense political dynamics that are at contest in Lebanon and Syria. A contest in which Syria-Iran-Hizballah are at war with regional forces of liberation. I believe that today's attack was carried out by agents of the Syrian government and perhaps also with the co-ordination or support of the Lebanese Hizballah. While I have no specific evidence to back up this assertion, I would point to a number of indicators. Also some analysis...

1) The attack took place in a predominantly Christian neighborhood of eastern Beirut and killed a senior Lebanese civil servant who was an outspoken critic of the Assad regime. In addition, Assad has previously warned that he would seek to push the conflict in Syria into a broadened external struggle.

2) Syria and Hizballah have a clear track record of support for violence against those who challenge their political power. This has involved recent, previous attacks on both major Lebanese officials and foreign entities. Iran also shares this preference for using covert force against those who oppose them.

3) Hizballah is increasingly concerned by the serious damage that their continued support for Assad is inflicting on their broader ideational legitimacy. Instigating further currents of regional instability (as today's attack would suggest) offers Hizballah a method by which they believe that they can distract world attention. I would argue that Hizballah's recent UAV flight over Israel provides another timely example of this dynamic. I have previously suggested that Hizballah would begin to abandon Assad once they came to believe that his regime was doomed. While I expected that this would have occurred before now, I remain confident of that belief. Ultimately, it is my opinion that Hizballah still believes that Assad can be saved. If evidence shows that today's attack (and the future instability that it foreshadows) is linked to Syria, it should serve to re-emphasize the need for the United States to take more concrete action to help Syrians liberate their country.

4) Faced with the EU tightened oil sanctions last week and Iran's continuing economic implosion, I believe (as I have previously argued) that Iran is likely to respond with more acts of aggression in the near future. Again, the United States must be prepared to respond to any attacks that take place.

Thursday, September 13, 2012

Violent protests - What America should do

Sadly it appears that the 'film protests' are continuing unabated. The US Embassy in Yemen is currently under attack and protests are continuing outside our embassy in Cairo. The United States is now being directly challenged. Iran, Assad, Hizballah, Al Qa'ida and every other group that hates America are now watching to see what we do. Here's what we should do.

1) The President should order the deployment of military reinforcements to secure our diplomatic facilities in the region. He has currently sent FAST units, however, this may not be sufficient. The US has considerable military assets in the EUCOM and CENTCOM areas of operation. We should not be afraid to utilize these assets as necessary.Our response should also involve tightening security procedures at diplomatic facilities in states like Indonesia and Pakistan - which may face protests after tomorrow's Friday prayers. The key is that we ensure we are able to protect our diplomats and our facilities. Secretary of State Clinton must require that host nation security forces are provided to defend our diplomats. 

2) The President should unequivocally (and angrily) condemn the violent reaction that has followed reporting on this film. His speech yesterday was not sufficient. There is no excuse for the kind of violence that we have seen. This film was produced by a private group of individuals in the conduct of free speech. Free speech defines America. We must stand up for this right while emphasizing that the US govt. had nothing to do with the film. Where there is positive regard for the United States in the Middle East, in large part this feeling stems from a high regard for our freedoms. The President must condemn those who violently protest as morally pathetic human beings. They need to be called out for their repellent ideology.

3) The President should take substantive action to bring to justice those responsible for the Benghazi bombing. This should include the application of military force if targets can be identified (for example in the Libyan desert). The US is currently appearing impotent and weak in the Middle East. From my perspective, this is in part a result of the President's appearance of timidity on Iran. Whether this is a fair perception or not, appearance is as, if not more important than reality when it comes to Middle Eastern political dynamics.

This is somewhat personal to me, my father was a diplomat with State and my grandfather was a US Marine. We need to make sure we protect our citizens.