Iran Nuclear Deal - Implementation

The implementation of the Geneva interim nuclear deal will begin on January 20th. That's welcome news. After all, in recent weeks it seemed like the agreement might fall apart before it even began. On another positive note, Iran will shortly begin to dilute its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. Still, I have a number of concerns.

• While inspectors will apparently be allowed daily, physical access to the Fordo site, there will only be monthly inspections at the Arak based heavy water reactor. That's far from ideal. If the Iranians are serious about addressing fears that they are pursuing a plutonium-route nuclear weapon, allowing more vigorous inspections at Arak would be the perfect place to start. Instead, the reluctance to afford access to Arak suggests that the Iranians may want to hide what's happening there. It raises questions and it fosters mistrust.

• The Iranians are crowing. While this is to be expected at some level (and helps Iranian moderates placate their hard-line colleagues), it's worrying that many Iranian officials are so gleeful in their claims that this deal doesn't bind them in any significant way. Again, it suggests an absence of seriousness in the pursuit of trust towards a lasting arrangement. Without hope of a lasting agreement, this deal will be rendered into irrelevance.

• It's problematic that the negotiators have taken so long to reach implementation. This reality suggests an agenda disconnect. Since 2003, Iran has attempted to evade the international community in its efforts to ensure a non-weaponized nuclear program. Delay has formed the primary strategic gambit on Iran's part. In short, what we're seeing looks like more deliberate time wasting.

While I supported this deal at the time of its creation, it's also abundantly clear to me that Geneva hasn't got off to a good start. The US will have to work exceptionally hard to ensure that Iran fulfills its obligations. At the same time, Congress will have to play a constructive but cautious role in supporting US diplomacy. Still, if this effort fails, the only options left available will be dramatically tightened sanctions alongside the prospect of military force. 

Time is running short.

Related thoughts

Flow Chart- Predicting the regional ramifications of a nuclear armed Iran

This chart encapsulates why I believe a serious peace deal (or it fails, the military option) must be pursued in order to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. I accept that my graphics skills are limited!

Related writing links. If you prefer flow charts, here's my relevant piece on the Syrian Civil War.

Obama-Rouhani phone call

Regarding President Obama's phone call with President Rouhani, please also peruse my recent posts on Iran (as provided below). 

I'm concerned.

I'm worried that this call will reinforce Iranian perceptions of the US as weak - and that those perceptions will drive a negative Iranian negotiating strategy. 

Let's be clear; on paper, a phone call makes sense - it offers a reinforcement of trust and it broadcasts a mutual willingness to move beyond previous hostilities. As I said, good on paper. Unfortunately however, flowing alongside the ongoing US debacle over Syria, I fear that the message of this call will be heard differently in Tehran and Washington. That the theocrats will increasingly believe that the US lacks the willpower to prevent their nuclear ascendancy.

If the Iranians believe that the US is buffing over the threat of military force, they'll call that bluff.

2 Presidents and 3 diplomatic delusions regarding Iran (Blog)

4 Takeaways from the Filkins study of Qassem Suleimani (Blog)

Is the US-Russia deal on Syria the right move? (The Guardian)

Iran, the US and the UN - A skeptical take (Blog) 

Iran plans retaliation if US strikes Assad (Blog)

President Rouhani and the continuing risk of conflict (Blog)

The geo-strategic impact of Iran attaining a nuclear weapons capability (The Commentator)

How domestic politics influences Iranian, US and Israeli foreign policy (Blog)

How Iran will use brinkmanship to protect its nuclear program (The Guardian)

Israel could attack Iran without causing a major war in the region (The Guardian)

Iran and Diplomacy (Blog)

Strategic interplay in the Near/Middle East (The Daily Caller)

Netanyahu at the UN (Blog)

Netanyahu's strategy on Iran (The Daily Caller)

Iran plots against US and How US should have responded (Blog)

2 Presidents and 3 diplomatic delusions regarding Iran

Few agendas are as necessary or as noble as the advancement of global peace. After all, a just peace represents the merging of morality and unified political interest.

But peace isn’t easy.

For a start, it requires the honest appraisal of realities in the moment, not the appraisal of realities as we would wish them to be. The distinction is important – diplomatic delusion feeds political dysfunction. History is littered with bloody testimony to the dear costs of wishful thinking.

Regrettably, regarding Iran, I fear that US delusion is back in town.

1)      Delusions regarding the Iranian leadership

It’s no secret that President Rouhani lacks ultimate power over his country’s policies - that authority flows from Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. Nonetheless, western excitement over Rouhani’s supposed détente has encouraged the belief that a nuclear deal is near. The new implication – Rouhani wants peace, Obama wants peace and thus peace will become reality.

There’s a problem here.

Not only does Rouhani lack decisive power in Iran’s political system, his power is inherently limited by the governing essence of the Iranian theocracy. In Iran, the underpinning of political authority has a central source - the ‘Guardianship of the Jurist.’ Conveniently codified by the Ayatollah Khomeini, this doctrine enshrines absolute power in Iran’s Supreme Leader. Absolute is the operative word here. In comparative terms, this guardianship is Iran’s opposite to the European royalist ‘divine right of kings’ – one leader proffering the ordained will of God on Earth.

In other words, Khamenei is the key.

So follows the question- does the Supreme Leader want a deal?

Some say yes. David Ignatius (a top analyst plugged into the US Intelligence Community) suggests that Khamenei's willing to give serious peace a go.

 I'm not so sure.

Political rule 101 - always review the historical record in preference to the campaign speech. At a basic level, Khamenei is no friend of peace – his power resides upon the bodies of the Iranian people. The Supreme Leader cannot be trusted. Moreover, studying Khamenei's statements and those of the men who sit close to his throne, it’s abundantly clear that America isn't regarded as a prospective partner (an understanding on which a successful nuclear deal would depend). Consider the words of the Chairman of Iran’s powerful Guardian Council, Ayatollah Jannati:

‘’At the end of the day, we are an anti-American regime. America is our enemy, and we are the enemies of America. The hostility between us is not a personal matter. It is a matter of principle. We are in disagreement over the very principles that underlie our revolution and our Islam.’’

Men like Khamenei, Jannati and their ideological spawn (think Qassem Soleimani) are principled enemies of the United States. They don’t want our friendship. They want us gone from the region. It’s crucial that we grapple with this reality. At best, Rouhani is a well-intentioned Secretary of State style figure. But divorced from real power, his words are words alone.

2)      Delusions regarding Iran’s nuclear intentions

Iran’s leaders like to claim that their nuclear pursuit is peaceful – as Rouhani argued at the UN: it’s all about societal advancement (an assertion that would be more believable if the regime weren't so desperate to control information flows). Yet, this isn’t about society. It’s about power. And not the energy supply kind. Rather, Iran’s leaders believe that the day they come into possession of a nuclear weapon, will be the moment that they guarantee the survival of their regional revolutionary project (this judgment having been reinforced by perceptions of Assad's WMD enabled survival). As a corollary, when we pretend otherwise; that somehow Iran’s nuclear ambitions are on the bargaining table of standard diplomacy, we guarantee one of two outcomes. Either an Israeli strike against Iran, or eventually, a nuclear armed Iran.

Instead, if we’re to avoid a nuclear Iran, we must first take stock of the importance that the theocrats place in their nuclear endeavor. Normal diplomacy just isn’t going to cut it. We’re going to need to up the ante; offering Iran a peaceful low-enrichment program with one hand and tougher sanctions/the credible threat of military force with the other.

Put simply, Khamenei must come to realize that the price of nuclear weapons will be too heavy to bear.

3)      Delusions regarding US-Iranian ‘mutual interests'

In his speech to the UN, President Obama stated the following:

 ‘’I don’t believe this difficult history can be overcome overnight – the suspicion runs too deep. But I do believe that if we can resolve the issue of Iran’s nuclear program, that can serve as a major step down a long road toward a different relationship – one based on mutual interests and mutual respect.­­­’’

I’d love to know what ‘mutual interests’ the President is talking about.

Apart from what’s now effectively an indirect alliance in Syria, across the world, US and Iranian interests stand in starkest opposition. Just a few examples…

The US supports Lebanese democracy; Iran supports a Hizballah hegemony.

The US operates a robust network of alliances with the Sunni Arab kingdoms; Iran regards those governments with an overt and active hatred. (Admittedly the Arab monarchies aren't huge fans of Iran.)

The US opposes North Korean nuclear proliferation; Iran stands in alliance with the Stalinist kingdom.

The US seeks an Iraqi government independent of malevolent influence; Iran supports militias in furtherance of its agenda in both Iraq and Syria.

The US pursues a semi-stable democracy in Afghanistan; Iran supplies the Taliban.

The US confronts those who slaughter civilians; Iran embraces terrorism with zeal.

These are the facts. We ignore this reality at our peril.

                     Don’t get me wrong. These three delusions are not to say that diplomacy with Iran is pointless. In fact, because of the scale of these problems, effective diplomacy is of pivotal importance.

That's my point - our diplomacy must be level headed.

Preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon will require far more than wishful thinking and a sprinkling of pleasant words - that path is plainly redundant. If Iran is to change course, it won’t be because of Obama's outreach (new centrifuges indicate that they’re quite happy with their current road to Damascus), it will be because their nuclear road is blocked by American resolve.

The appropriate US strategy is a simple one – to empower our East River dialogue with New York bluntness – speaking to Khamenei in terms he will easily understand. America must offer the Ayatollah two choices- peace by verified disarmament, or tougher sanctions backed up by the certain threat of US military power.

To those who call me a warmonger for this post - that Rouhani deserves our easy trust and flexibility, I have a simple rebuttal. In his speech yesterday, President Rouhani claimed that Iran defends ''.... peace based on democracy and the ballot box everywhere.. and believe[s] that there are no violent solutions to world crises.''

If you believe that, you'll believe anything.

Links to my other related writings

Iran, the US and the UN - A skeptical take

It appears that President Obama is to meet with President Rouhani of Iran. The reason for the meeting is simple - the White House believes that Rouhani's election offers a renewed prospect for peace.

As Obama put it,

''I think this new president [Rouhani] is not going to suddenly make it easy. But, you know, my view is that if you have both a credible threat of force, combined with a rigorous diplomatic effort, that, in fact, you can strike a deal."

I believe that the President is overly optimistic.

First, post-Syria, US credibility regarding the potential use of military force has been evaporated. Second, Iran's Supreme Leader, Khamenei, holds the cards when it comes to the nuclear game. Third, see below... a re-post of my piece from a month back on Iran's diplomatic strategy.

         ‘’We should deal with the issue through a realistic approach."

           Hassan Rouhani, August 6^th 2013

The Obama Administration should take those words literally. After years of diplomatic failure, only a realistic approach can improve US-Iranian relations.

Yes, Rouhani is likely to be an improvement on his inauspicious predecessor (a clownish narcissist now locked in a desperate struggle for relevance). Iran’s new President has promised to improve women’s rights and seek better relations with the west. If nothing else, his tone is more conciliatory. These developments are, even if only prospective, good.

Nevertheless, enamored by the potential for change, many western commentators have reacted with unrestrained elation. Rouhani’s election has made ‘’imaginable what for years has been unimaginable.’’ said Stephen Kinzer in The Guardian.  In response, ‘’The Obama Administration should signal a shift in style, substance and strategy’’ declared Ali Vaez in the Christian Science Monitor.  Some went even further. In a particularly odd commentary for Al Jazeera, the academics, Flynt and Hillary Leverett found that Iran now offers a ‘’concrete expression’’ of Muslim democratic emancipation.

I think not.

Rouhani might not be Ahmadinejad, but that certainly doesn’t make him an Iranian Jefferson. After all, his existing human rights record isn’t exactly stellar. During the student protests of July 1999, Rouhani embraced a gleeful brutality - "From today’’ he warned, ‘’our people shall witness how… we deal with these opportunists and riotous elements, if they simply dare to show their faces."  He wasn’t joking. The students were crushed. It’s also been alleged that Rouhani played a key role in the use of terrorism against Iranian dissidents living abroad. (UPDATE_ He also apparently believes that the Holocaust is a myth). 

More concerning in the present however; the new President is a proud supporter both of Iran’s nuclear program and of continued assistance to the Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad.

These facts should lead us to a cautious conclusion – a pleasant tone means nothing without substance.

Nowhere is this more true than with regards to the Iranian nuclear crisis.

While some analysts believe that Iran's present condition of international isolation and inflation make a nuclear deal likely, I'm not so sure. To me, that argument resides upon an intrinsically western conception of state interests; secular, populist and relative to the moment. Yes, Iran’s leaders obviously care about economics. Unfortunately, they care far more about joining the nuclear club. As I've argued before, the theocrats view nuclear power as the existential guarantor for their ongoing revolutionary project. This understanding explains why we’ve seen repeated nuclear negotiations rise in hope and then collapse in failure. Put simply, for the Ayatollahs, compared to the prospective feast of a nuclear dominion, western concessions are nothing. We think we have cake, but we only have crumbs.

Playing to our delusion, Iran adopts the foreign policy brother to Madoff’s Ponzi scheme- a negotiating strategy that uses trickery to buy time for nuclear advancement. The scam? Offer flirtations of peace, blame western intransigence for a negotiating failure, then, a few months later, start all over again. By allowing emotion to dominate our logic, we buy it every time.

Rouhani’s arrival allows Iran to play the same game with a fresh face.

It needn’t be this way. For all their bluster, Iran’s leaders understand that a military conflict with the United States would be a disaster for their interests. If we grasped this – we could, alongside stronger sanctions, perhaps deter them into ending their nuclear program. Unfortunately, emboldened by western impotence in Syria and Obama’s stuttering threats, American warnings bear little weight. For deterrence to be real it must first be believed.

There’s another political component at stake here- Israeli patience with diplomacy is nearly exhausted.

Following Rouhani’s election, Netanyahu again pressured the Obama Administration for tougher sanctions. I suspect that Israel’s Prime Minister fears Iran will use Rouhani the reformist to evade future sanctions. Nearly a year after Netanyahu’s ‘red line’ speech, it’s obvious that time is running out. In addition, though it's pure speculation on my part, Netanyahu's restoration of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process could indicate his desire to get President Obama 'on side' prior to an Israeli military attack on Iran.

Regardless, it's a dangerous wager to assume that Netanyahu’s warnings are a bluff. Israel’s security strategy resides upon Israel's regional supremacy of power. Where some cannot look beyond the risks of military conflict, Israelis (and the Sunni Arab monarchies) see a nuclear Iran as an intolerable threat.

In this sense, if Rouhani's style is divorced from substance, his arrival will provide little aid to the cause of peace.

My other clips on Iran are below.

Syria repercussions (The Guardian)

Iran plans retaliation if US strikes Assad (Blog)

The geo-strategic impact of Iran attaining a nuclear weapons capability (The Commentator)

How domestic politics influences Iranian, US and Israeli foreign policy (Blog)

How Iran will use brinkmanship to protect its nuclear program (The Guardian)

Israel could attack Iran without causing a major war in the region (The Guardian)

Iran and Diplomacy (Blog)

Strategic interplay in the Near/Middle East (The Daily Caller)

Netanyahu at the UN (Blog)

Netanyahu's strategy on Iran (The Daily Caller)

Iran plots against US and How US should have responded (Blog)

5 latest thoughts - US debate over Syria

1) White House Waltz

On Monday, Senators Graham and McCain visited with President Obama at the White House. The reason for the meeting was pretty simple. The President knows that he needs Republican support to push his authorization of force 'strategy' through Congress. Yet, McCain's presence indicates something else - the President's desperation. President Obama knows that in making pledges (or even being perceived to make pledges) to McCain/Graham over a willingness to use major military force against Assad, he risks alienating other members of Congress (on both sides) who are deeply skeptical about a major strike. By inviting McCain/Graham, it's only possible to draw one conclusion - that the President has judged that he will not win authorization without the influence of more interventionist minded conservatives. 

I'm cognizant that this strategy might be a political necessity (McCain's influence is substantial). Nevertheless, it provides a profound example of the contradiction that infects this Administration's political management of the present crisis. They establish a 'red line' and then pretend it's pink. They claim that the President has authority to use force without Congress, but simultaneously, they insinuate that he doesn't. They suggest that the strikes will be ''limited and narrow'', but simultaneously, they tell others that the military action will be serious and comprehensive. 

           Whether you believe that America needs to make a more substantial intervention in Syria, or whether you believe that such a course would constitute a grievous mistake, it's evident to all that the Administration's position is devoid of clarity.

2) Obama Administration's Politicization of Leaks

The front page of the New York Times (at least online!) leads with an article on Syria. More specifically, it also offers this inadvertent gem of a quote - 

''Officials said that... Mr. Obama indicated that a covert effort by the United States to arm and train Syrian rebels was beginning to yield results: the first 50-man cell of fighters, who have been trained by the C.I.A., was beginning to sneak into Syria.'' 

I'm sorry, but if the second paragraph of the lead story of the world's most prestigious newspaper prints something... it ain't covert. To me, this latest leak represents a broader failing on the part of the Administration - when it comes to leaks, they apply two sets of rules - one for military/civil servant leakers, another for themselves. In light of the President's recent rhetoric on the need for a legislative balance to the Executive, this leaking also represents an act of exceptional hypocrisy. The Administration is treating solemn state secrets as political footballs. Except... they're playing the role of both player and referee.

3) Putin's intransigence

The Russian Government is continuing to spout their spiel about how the US is lying etc. etc. To be honest, I don't really listen to the Putin-posse anymore. President Putin seems to have taken the worst elements of Russian history - the arrogance of the Romanovs, the paranoid authoritarianism of Stalin and the cartoonish corruption of Yeltsin... mixed them together and incorporated himself in their essence. He clearly has zero interest in serious dialogue with the United States. Until he does, President Obama should just ignore him. I mean that. The 'reset' has been a complete and unmitigated disaster.

4) Hagel, Kerry and Dempsey - Hill Testimony

The President's greatest assets are off to the Hill. Their job? To persuade a highly hesitant Congress to support military action against Assad. At least on Syria, this is the Obama A-team. Kerry has been the face of American resolve since Assad's massacre and Hagel has lead the US capability-orientation for a possible strike. But most important, when it comes to Martin Dempsey (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs), as I've argued before, the President has a military leader of the highest order. Incidentally, Dempsey also has another talent...

5) Foreign Reactions

As I argued in my Week column on Sunday, when it comes to America's evolving policy towards Assad, international actors are paying very close attention to DC politics. In this vein, it's unsurprising that we're seeing the following two noticeable developments:

• Growing concern and doubt on the part of US allies in the region.
• The Lebanese Hizballah mobilizing their defensive/offensive capabilities.

Finally, if this report (that the Administration is planning to reach out to Iran) is true, it would speak to a seriously delusional endeavor. Since 2003, the Iranian negotiating strategy has proved one thing above all else - whether Ahmadinejad or Rouhani, America cannot negotiate with Iran from a position of weakness.

Iran’s new President and the continuing risk of conflict

‘’We should deal with the issue through a realistic approach."

Hassan Rouhani, August 6^th 2013

The Obama Administration should take those words literally. After years of diplomatic failure, only a realistic approach can improve US-Iranian relations.

Yes, Rouhani is likely to be an improvement on his inauspicious predecessor (a clownish narcissist now locked in a desperate struggle for relevance). Iran’s new President has promised to improve women’s rights and seek better relations with the west. If nothing else, his tone is more conciliatory. These developments are, even if only prospective, good.

Nonetheless, enamored by the potential for change, many western commentators have reacted with unrestrained elation. Rouhani’s election has made ‘’imaginable what for years has been unimaginable.’’ said Stephen Kinzer in The Guardian.  In response, ‘’The Obama Administration should signal a shift in style, substance and strategy’’ declared Ali Vaez in the Christian Science Monitor.  Some went even further. In a particularly odd commentary for Al Jazeera, the academics, Flynt and Hillary Leverett found that Iran now offers a ‘’concrete expression’’ of Muslim democratic emancipation.

I think not.

Rouhani might not be Ahmadinejad, but that certainly doesn’t make him an Iranian Jefferson. After all, his existing human rights record isn’t exactly stellar. During the student protests of July 1999, Rouhani embraced a gleeful brutality - "From today’’ he warned, ‘’our people shall witness how… we deal with these opportunists and riotous elements, if they simply dare to show their faces."  He wasn’t joking. The students were crushed. It’s also been alleged that Rouhani played a key role in the use of terrorism against Iranian dissidents living abroad.

More concerning in the present however; the new President is a proud supporter both of Iran’s nuclear program and of continued assistance to the Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad.

These facts should lead us to a cautious conclusion – a pleasant tone means nothing without substance.

Nowhere is this more true than with regards to the Iranian nuclear crisis.

While some analysts believe that Iran's present condition of international isolation and inflation make a nuclear deal likely, I'm not so sure. To me, that argument resides upon an intrinsically western conception of state interests; secular, populist and relative to the moment. Yes, Iran’s leaders obviously care about economics. Unfortunately, they care far more about joining the nuclear club. As I’ve argued before, the theocrats view nuclear power as the existential guarantor for their ongoing revolutionary project. This understanding explains why, again and again, we’ve seen nuclear negotiations rise in hope and then collapse in failure. Put simply, for the Ayatollahs, compared to the prospective feast of a nuclear dominion, western concessions are nothing. We think we have cake, but we only have crumbs.

Playing to our delusion, Iran adopts the foreign policy brother to Madoff’s Ponzi scheme- a negotiating strategy that uses trickery to buy time for nuclear advancement. The scam? Offer flirtations of peace, blame western intransigence for a negotiating failure, then, a few months later, start all over again. By allowing emotion to dominate our logic, we buy it every time.

Rouhani’s arrival allows Iran to play the same game with a fresh face.

It needn’t be this way. For all their bluster, Iran’s leaders understand that a military conflict with the United States would be a disaster for their interests. If we grasped this – we could, alongside stronger sanctions, perhaps deter them into ending their nuclear program. Unfortunately, emboldened by western impotence in Syria and Obama’s stuttering threats, American warnings bear little weight. For deterrence to be real it must first be believed.

There’s another political component at stake here- Israeli patience with diplomacy is nearly exhausted.

Following Rouhani’s election, Netanyahu again pressured the Obama Administration for tougher sanctions. I suspect that Israel’s Prime Minister fears Iran will use Rouhani the reformist to evade future sanctions. Nearly a year after Netanyahu’s ‘red line’ speech, it’s obvious that time is running out. In addition, though it's pure speculation on my part, Netanyahu's restoration of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process could indicate his desire to get President Obama 'on side' prior to an Israeli military attack on Iran.

Regardless, it's a dangerous wager to assume that Netanyahu’s warnings are a bluff. Israel’s security strategy resides upon Israel's regional supremacy of power. Where some cannot look beyond the risks of military conflict, Israelis (and the Sunni Arab monarchies) see a nuclear Iran as an intolerable threat.

In this sense, if Rouhani's style is divorced from substance, his arrival will provide little aid to the cause of peace.

My related writing.

France 24 analyst offers a different perspective.