Geneva II and the need for a new American strategy

"If we wanted to surrender we would have surrendered from the start,"

Bashar al-Assad, January 19^th 2014

On Wednesday, representatives from the Syrian Government, the Syrian rebellion and the international community will gather in Geneva. The ‘stated’ aspiration of all sides – a just end to a brutal civil war.

In reality, Assad has little interest in meaningful concession. Yes, he’ll probably offer some vague proposals – we should expect the suggestion of a ‘national reconciliation council’. But whatever Bashar offers, if anything, it won’t be substantive. Haafez’s heir is in no mood to negotiate.

It’s not hard to understand why.

Reinforced by Khamenei, Nasrallah and Putin, Assad is applying a strategic blend of blackmail and destruction against the already fractured rebellion. As the rebels fight amongst themselves, the regime consolidates its base of power. And as much as the international community might cry at the suffering of the Syrian people, divorced from resolute policy, our tears have only greased Assad’s machine of death.

All of this leads to one centering reality – the dictator is looking forward to Geneva. In his mind, he holds all the courage and all the cards.

As such, in order to give Geneva II any chance of a positive outcome, America must reshuffle the deck. If we are timid, the Russians will simply generate another WMD disarmament-style figment deal. We can’t let that happen.

Instead, we must replace our policy of confused trepidation with a calculation of unapologetic realpolitik. In short, we need to be both simple and tough – stating the boundaries of a deal we’ll accept and explaining what will happen if Assad doesn’t acquiesce.

For a start, we’ll need to be clear about our non-negotiables. More precisely, while a short term cease fire would certainly be worth consideration, our acceptance of any final peace will require three absolutes. First, Syria’s Sunni community will have to be given a genuine, participatory role in any new government. And it will have to involve more than titles of office- Sunni alienation from Syrian government provision must come to an end. As we’re witnessing in Iraq and Lebanon, sectarian disenfranchisement is a catalyst for extremism. Second, any transitional process must ultimately end with democratic elections. Finally, Syria will need a constitution that balances representative government with protections for minority groups. Alawites, Christians and Kurds will all require the confidence of protection from sectarian abuse. None of these demands will be simple to achieve, but all of them are necessary. The alternative is chaos now or chaos deferred.

Supporting our policy imperatives, we must remember that our power is real.

Correspondingly, we must make Assad understand that America will not tolerate diversionary games. We’ll have to outline that while we’re open to meaningful discussion, Assad’s non-cooperation will come with a severe cost. The most obvious way we can do this is by stating it – clearly and directly. By clarifying that if the peace process falters, America will renew and increase our assistance to nationalist centered Syrian rebels. Indeed, the one fortunate element of the Salafi jihadist rise in Syria has been its assistance in verifying the ideological stance of other rebel formations – it’s now clearer who the ‘good guys’ actually are.

Yet we’ll also have to help Assad realize that our power doesn’t begin and end with a potential supply train. Just as General Dempsey has spoken of ‘‘different ways of action’’, we should make clear that direct military options remain on the table. That in the event of Assad’s continued slaughter; we’ll re-consider military strikes against his regime. Made credible, US deterrent power will produce effect. Just as B-52s recently gave a physical face to US power in the East China Sea, deploying SSGNs to the Eastern Mediterranean would offer the redeemed constitution of American resolve in Syria.

But our strategy in Geneva can’t simply be about getting serious with Assad. We’ll also have to recognize our adversaries in Assad’s alliance for who they actually are.

To recognize that while Khamenei’s hardliners see themselves as the new leaders of the Middle East, they’re actually calculating thugs who can be restrained.

To recognize that while Putin thinks he’s a judo-chopping, ex-KGB superman, he’s actually a skulking, mafia goon who can be deterred.

To recognize that while Hezbollah regards itself as the world’s most powerful non-state actor, its structured organization is vulnerable to pressure.

And contrary to Assad’s wishes, we cannot allow our concerns about supranational Salafi jihadists to dictate our policy. These terrorists pose a real threat, but if we empower our professionals, we’ll defeat them.

            Up until this point, American policy in Syria has been a monumental failure. We’ve empowered our enemies, neglected our prospective allies and allowed a tyrant to wreak havoc upon his people and the region. Obsessed by the serious risks of intervention, we’ve accepted the catastrophic consequences of absent American leadership.

This week, in Geneva, we can and we must begin to put things right.

Ya'alon's Silly Comments

I'm a firm supporter of the US-Israeli alliance. Still, I struggle to understand the psychology of some Israeli politicians. Take Israeli Defense Minister Ya'alon. Studying his background, Ya'alon is clearly an intelligent, strategically minded man. After all, this is a leader who commanded Israel's foremost Special Operations unit and then became his nation's most senior military officer. But what Ya'alon said about Kerry didn't make much sense. Even if he's overly optimistic, Kerry's pursuit of Middle East peace is a worthy one (I've argued why here and here). As much as Ya'alon might be angry about Kerry's peacekeeping force proposals, his words were not clever. To be sure, Netanyahu doesn't like Obama. That was clear a few years ago. And in many ways, Netanyahu's dissatisfaction with Obama is understandable (US policy in the Middle East is a mess). 

Nevertheless, in the context of the 'settlement snub' of 2010 and the ongoing 'Pollard release' lobby, Ya'alon's  comments were unjustifiable.

Related thoughts

Iran Nuclear Deal - Implementation

The implementation of the Geneva interim nuclear deal will begin on January 20th. That's welcome news. After all, in recent weeks it seemed like the agreement might fall apart before it even began. On another positive note, Iran will shortly begin to dilute its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. Still, I have a number of concerns.

• While inspectors will apparently be allowed daily, physical access to the Fordo site, there will only be monthly inspections at the Arak based heavy water reactor. That's far from ideal. If the Iranians are serious about addressing fears that they are pursuing a plutonium-route nuclear weapon, allowing more vigorous inspections at Arak would be the perfect place to start. Instead, the reluctance to afford access to Arak suggests that the Iranians may want to hide what's happening there. It raises questions and it fosters mistrust.

• The Iranians are crowing. While this is to be expected at some level (and helps Iranian moderates placate their hard-line colleagues), it's worrying that many Iranian officials are so gleeful in their claims that this deal doesn't bind them in any significant way. Again, it suggests an absence of seriousness in the pursuit of trust towards a lasting arrangement. Without hope of a lasting agreement, this deal will be rendered into irrelevance.

• It's problematic that the negotiators have taken so long to reach implementation. This reality suggests an agenda disconnect. Since 2003, Iran has attempted to evade the international community in its efforts to ensure a non-weaponized nuclear program. Delay has formed the primary strategic gambit on Iran's part. In short, what we're seeing looks like more deliberate time wasting.

While I supported this deal at the time of its creation, it's also abundantly clear to me that Geneva hasn't got off to a good start. The US will have to work exceptionally hard to ensure that Iran fulfills its obligations. At the same time, Congress will have to play a constructive but cautious role in supporting US diplomacy. Still, if this effort fails, the only options left available will be dramatically tightened sanctions alongside the prospect of military force. 

Time is running short.

Related thoughts

Syria/UN: Resolution Without Resolve

''.... but the text will not threaten the use of force for a failure to comply, officials said.''

''The final draft also does not ascribe specific blame for the Aug. 21 attack that asphyxiated hundreds of Syrians.''

This ludicrous Security Council resolution is a waste of paper- it's logically and ecologically unsound.

This is the international relations equivalent of a situation in which, after murdering an entire family, the killer is caught red handed. Then however, instead of punishing the culprit - in this case a gangbanger, the Judge simply makes him promise never to repeat his crime. 
           The Judge issues a concluding warning to the murderer- should he re-offend, the convict's co-conspirator will decide an appropriate punishment. In making his ruling, the Judge proudly claims that he has served justice, whilst simultaneously also deterring the gangster's compatriots.

As I said, this resolution is ludicrous; it belongs in the UN restroom.

This is our acquiescence in the face of slaughter. President Obama might have preserved the pretense of his credibility (and even then, only in Europe), but this deal will cost America dearly. Russia has consolidated an already obvious global victory. The rules of international order have been trashed. Peace will pay the price.

I see four direct consequences.

1) Assad will view our weakness as an explicit approval to ignore his responsibilities under the UN disarmament framework.

2) Russia will be unleashed to further dominate the conduct (retrogression?) of international affairs. Putin is laughing.

3) North Korea will be emboldened to up their nuclear ante.

4) Iran will be encouraged to re-double their support for Assad and renew their long cultivated game of false, time-buying nuclear negotiations.

On this last point, please see my post from yesterday concerning the three diplomatic delusions of the Obama Administration in their interactions with Iran.

My other related writings.

Putin's Letter - Analysis

At some level, you've got to love him. 

Putin's gall is remarkable.

''We need to use the United Nations Security Council and believe that preserving law and order in today’s complex and turbulent world is one of the few ways to keep international relations from sliding into chaos. The law is still the law, and we must follow it whether we like it or not.''

This, from the man who supports the Syrian slaughter (and the Iranian theocrats).

This, from the man who sees children as diplomatic pawns.

This, from the man who irradiates political opponents living abroad.

This, from the man who considers criminal justice to be a campaign tool.

This, from the man who uses Russian energy supplies to blackmail impoverished states.

''We must stop using the language of force and return to the path of civilized diplomatic and political settlement.''

Time for some honesty. Putin has no interest in multilateral co-operation. Nor does he care for the cause of peace. Like his Soviet predecessors, Putin has one interest - Russian domination. Don't believe me? Just re-read the letter. 

Note the implicit threat to implode the UN - ''No one wants the United Nations to suffer the fate of the League of Nations...'' Note the thinly veiled attacks against President Bush - “you’re either with us or against us.” Note Putin's emotional attack on American exceptionalism.

There's a simple but telling reason that explains why Putin hates Bush. In the summer of 2008, as Russia sought to destroy Georgia's democracy, Bush didn't back down. In fact, he stood up. Putin was forced to back off. He didn't like it.

The Russian President doesn't want a repeat of that misery. Instead, he wants an American President who will bend to his will. Sadly, President Obama is giving him that opportunity. Geneva is a joke. Everyone knows it, but no one has a political interest in admitting to absurdity.

In the end, Putin's letter should be taken for what it is.  The 2013 replication of Andropov's 1983 letter to Samantha Smith. A pretense of friendship at the price of American supplication. We mustn't believe the lie.

The American Retreat

“I have therefore asked the leaders of Congress to postpone a vote to authorize the use of force while we pursue this diplomatic path.”

President Obama, September 10th 2013

George Washington once said that ''to be prepared for war, is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.''

President Obama evidently believes otherwise.

Under this Commander in Chief, American foreign policy is adrift. The currents of others now control our course. The mafia regime of President Putin has become the arbiter of a corrupted international justice.

Children die while the world spins.

Watching his speech last night, it was clear that President Obama regards his strategy as the modern partner to Teddy Roosevelt's diplomatic mantra- ''Speak softly, and carry a big stick.''

Sadly however, if the stick is made of Jell-O, the metaphorical carrot is also rotten. 

Obama's diplomacy is negotiation without an anchor and the threat of force without a threat. It isn't real, it's just delusional. In fact, it's absurd.

Now, in a looming conference in Geneva, we await the 21st century successor to Munich. A hopeless endeavor in pursuit of an impossible cause. A pretense of peace in service of brutality.

I say pretense, because the cause of peace is only rational when it's real. Devoid of rationality; without the prospect of beneficial realization, peace is injustice cloaked in false morality. Towards Assad, it's a rhetorical abstraction purchased with suffocating children.

Yes, the President might have been passionate in arguing why our intervention is important - how, as he put it, ''Our ideals and principles, as well as our national security, are at stake in Syria.'' But as much as this sounds credible in America, our domestic perception is ultimately irrelevant. In the end, what matters is what our adversaries think. And what our friends think. 

They think we're weak. No longer can America be trusted.

This is a strategic disaster of epic proportions - a collapse of resolve and influence not seen since Saigon. A superpower humbled, uncertain and fearful. Global adversaries emboldened and unconstrained. A peace process full of holes. This is the change Obama has wrought. Its bitter taste will linger for a long, long time.

Twelve years ago today, facing our own Ghouta, President Bush framed the horror with an enduring call to American purpose.

''None of us will ever forget this day,'' he said, ''yet we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world.''

Today, twelve years on, the retreat has sounded.

Syria WMD deal? The ultimate political Ponzi scheme

The prospective WMD deal with Assad is the ultimate political hustle. On paper, everybody wins!

President Obama gets to pretend that he hasn't backed down. The President will claim that his decision to go to Congress precipitated these 'fortunate' developments. He'll argue that by moving away from the use of force, the US is serving a just peace (nothing could be further from the truth).

Putin gets to ingratiate himself with an already supplicant and now personally grateful American President (Putin has released Obama from his self-imprisonment in the authorization abyss). At the same time, Putin consolidates Assad's position. In short, he's lost nothing whilst gaining a huge political and strategic bounty. It's genius.

Assad gets to escape the military consequences that should have followed his gassing  of innocent civilians. The dictator's only sacrifice? Agreeing to a vague, unenforceable inspections regime... at a future point. Again, it's a stunning pivot.

Iran's victory is obvious. Quite simply, they've called America's cards and found us bluffing. Paying heed to Iranian security strategy, over the long term, this deal will (if it goes forward) propagate a security nightmare.

If President Obama agrees to this absurdity, he won't simply be kicking the deterrence can down the road... he'll be kicking it straight off a cliff. Right into the hands of the world's most dangerous actors. It could hardly be worse. At least if Congress had turned him down, the President could have claimed a pretense of democratic authority for his inaction. However, if he signs up to this deal, the Commander in Chief will have allowed America's enemies to score an explicit victory over the United States. At a basic level, think about the message that this deal will send to Iran, North Korea etc... 'Use WMDs and win a peace deal.' From a US security viewpoint, we're embracing strategic insanity.

Related thoughts.

Syria - 4 myths infecting the US intervention debate

1) US isolationism will insulate US interests

Watching the hearings in Congress and reading public commentary, you’d probably believe that non-intervention offers the surest protection for US interests. I take the opposite standpoint. Even under the sharpest definition of ‘national interests’, America’s alienation from this conflict is exceptionally risky.

To be clear, if the US fails to take action against Assad, we'll dramatically improve the likelihood of his victory. Devoid of deterrent imposed restraint and imbued by what he would regard as the proven fallacy of American power, Assad would be unleashed towards even greater violence. In a flowing sense, US inaction would also inspire Iran towards a more aggressive political posture. Alongside allies like the Lebanese Hizballah, they’d feel liberated to vigorously pursue their regional political objectives. The Iranian theocrats are astute actors – they cultivate policy with great consideration towards absent/present American resolve. Regardless, whether concerning the further destabilization of Lebanese democracy, increased hostility towards Israel and/or a catalyzed balance of power crisis between Iran and the Sunni Arab kingdoms, a self-inflicted American castration (aka isolationism) would be a grave mistake.

2) The Syrian civil war is limited to Syria

In their questioning of Secretary of State Kerry, many in Congress have expressed the fear that US intervention will spark a regional conflagration. These officials need to read the news... the region is already on fire. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is under attack, as are Sunnis who oppose that organization. At the Lebanese-Israeli border, signs of looming conflict are growing ever more obvious. In Iraq, each day brings multiple new horrors. Now that long suffering country stands on the precipice of another civil war. In Syria, Salafi Jihadists are waging an unconstrained war of sectarian hatred. In Turkey, terrorists (reportedly allied to the Syrian regime) have brought mayhem to once quiet streets.

3) Kerry’s ‘Boots on the ground’ comment suggests that Obama wants to invade

Kerry’s ‘controversial’ remark should not be controversial. The Administration has gone to extreme lengths to distance their proposed intervention away a ground invasion. This being said, the evident controversy indicates just how politicized the Congressional authorization has become (as I suggested it would). Trust is absent and along with it, rationality is suffering. Whether pro or anti the Administration’s intervention plans, if Al Qa’ida affiliates were to gain access to WMDs, all of us would most certainly want 'boots on the ground' to re-acquire those weapons. But even then, as Congress well knows, any such action would likely be led by JSOC (who include WMD interdiction in their core focus orientation) rather than conventional ground forces. In this sense, Kerry isn't being deceitful, he's only being prudent, honest and rational. Whether it's Pakistan or Syria, the prospect of WMDs in terrorist hands = a true doomsday scenario.

4) The Assad-Hizballah-Iran alliance is unshakable

Just as the US-UK have disagreements, so too do America's adversaries. For one example, consider the Lebanese Hizballah. Discredited by their support for Assad’s slaughter, Hizballah is facing a serious identity challenge. In this sense, reports of growing tensions between Hizballah and Assad are a big deal. These frictions follow in the footsteps of a similar weakening between Assad and another of his allies- Hamas. The US has an opportunity here. If the US were to enact the form of action that I proposed in point (2), we could hope to expand existing fractures within Assad's alliance. It’s true, Hizballah poses a significant threat to US interests. Nonetheless, like Iran, this is a group that understands and is restrained by our political courage. 

Note- for my thoughts on Russia's strategy vis-a-vis Syria -please see point (3) of this post.

5 latest thoughts - US debate over Syria

1) White House Waltz

On Monday, Senators Graham and McCain visited with President Obama at the White House. The reason for the meeting was pretty simple. The President knows that he needs Republican support to push his authorization of force 'strategy' through Congress. Yet, McCain's presence indicates something else - the President's desperation. President Obama knows that in making pledges (or even being perceived to make pledges) to McCain/Graham over a willingness to use major military force against Assad, he risks alienating other members of Congress (on both sides) who are deeply skeptical about a major strike. By inviting McCain/Graham, it's only possible to draw one conclusion - that the President has judged that he will not win authorization without the influence of more interventionist minded conservatives. 

I'm cognizant that this strategy might be a political necessity (McCain's influence is substantial). Nevertheless, it provides a profound example of the contradiction that infects this Administration's political management of the present crisis. They establish a 'red line' and then pretend it's pink. They claim that the President has authority to use force without Congress, but simultaneously, they insinuate that he doesn't. They suggest that the strikes will be ''limited and narrow'', but simultaneously, they tell others that the military action will be serious and comprehensive. 

           Whether you believe that America needs to make a more substantial intervention in Syria, or whether you believe that such a course would constitute a grievous mistake, it's evident to all that the Administration's position is devoid of clarity.

2) Obama Administration's Politicization of Leaks

The front page of the New York Times (at least online!) leads with an article on Syria. More specifically, it also offers this inadvertent gem of a quote - 

''Officials said that... Mr. Obama indicated that a covert effort by the United States to arm and train Syrian rebels was beginning to yield results: the first 50-man cell of fighters, who have been trained by the C.I.A., was beginning to sneak into Syria.'' 

I'm sorry, but if the second paragraph of the lead story of the world's most prestigious newspaper prints something... it ain't covert. To me, this latest leak represents a broader failing on the part of the Administration - when it comes to leaks, they apply two sets of rules - one for military/civil servant leakers, another for themselves. In light of the President's recent rhetoric on the need for a legislative balance to the Executive, this leaking also represents an act of exceptional hypocrisy. The Administration is treating solemn state secrets as political footballs. Except... they're playing the role of both player and referee.

3) Putin's intransigence

The Russian Government is continuing to spout their spiel about how the US is lying etc. etc. To be honest, I don't really listen to the Putin-posse anymore. President Putin seems to have taken the worst elements of Russian history - the arrogance of the Romanovs, the paranoid authoritarianism of Stalin and the cartoonish corruption of Yeltsin... mixed them together and incorporated himself in their essence. He clearly has zero interest in serious dialogue with the United States. Until he does, President Obama should just ignore him. I mean that. The 'reset' has been a complete and unmitigated disaster.

4) Hagel, Kerry and Dempsey - Hill Testimony

The President's greatest assets are off to the Hill. Their job? To persuade a highly hesitant Congress to support military action against Assad. At least on Syria, this is the Obama A-team. Kerry has been the face of American resolve since Assad's massacre and Hagel has lead the US capability-orientation for a possible strike. But most important, when it comes to Martin Dempsey (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs), as I've argued before, the President has a military leader of the highest order. Incidentally, Dempsey also has another talent...

5) Foreign Reactions

As I argued in my Week column on Sunday, when it comes to America's evolving policy towards Assad, international actors are paying very close attention to DC politics. In this vein, it's unsurprising that we're seeing the following two noticeable developments:

• Growing concern and doubt on the part of US allies in the region.
• The Lebanese Hizballah mobilizing their defensive/offensive capabilities.

Finally, if this report (that the Administration is planning to reach out to Iran) is true, it would speak to a seriously delusional endeavor. Since 2003, the Iranian negotiating strategy has proved one thing above all else - whether Ahmadinejad or Rouhani, America cannot negotiate with Iran from a position of weakness.

Kerry's Pursuit of Mid-East Peace

Following in the footsteps of many former Secretaries of State, John Kerry is in the Middle East pursuing a renewal of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. As usual, the task is significant. The Palestinian leadership remains divided between the ideological intransigents of Hamas in Gaza and the weak Fatah Government that sits in the West Bank. In Israel, Prime Minister Netanyahu presides over a coalition cross-party cabinet that holds a variation of viewpoints on the shape that a peace deal could and should take.

Amidst these difficulties it's hard to stay positive. However, we shouldn't write this effort off just yet. Reports from Israel suggest that Netanyahu is newly willing to make serious compromises in the pursuit of peace. In addition, Netanyahu knows that he must at least placate President Obama if he's to receive continued support from the US re- a prospective strike against Iranian military facilities. Further, the Palestinian Authority knows that US support requires engagement with Israel (the US won't accept a unilateral rejection of negotiations). Finally, the major contours of an ultimate Israeli-Palestinian deal are already known: ultimately, a lasting deal is likely to situate around the basic foundations of a combination of Camp David 2000 and Olmert 2008. In this sense, though Kerry's trip is unlikely to provide an immediate breakthrough, it does offer the prospect of forward momentum in the right direction.