The implementation of the Geneva interim nuclear deal will begin on January 20th. That's welcome news. After all, in recent weeks it seemed like the agreement might fall apart before it even began. On another positive note, Iran will shortly begin to dilute its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. Still, I have a number of concerns.
While inspectors will apparently be allowed daily, physical access to the Fordo site, there will only be monthly inspections at the Arak based heavy water reactor. That's far from ideal. If the Iranians are serious about addressing fears that they are pursuing a plutonium-route nuclear weapon, allowing more vigorous inspections at Arak would be the perfect place to start. Instead, the reluctance to afford access to Arak suggests that the Iranians may want to hide what's happening there. It raises questions and it fosters mistrust.
The Iranians are crowing. While this is to be expected at some level (and helps Iranian moderates placate their hard-line colleagues), it's worrying that many Iranian officials are so gleeful in their claims that this deal doesn't bind them in any significant way. Again, it suggests an absence of seriousness in the pursuit of trust towards a lasting arrangement. Without hope of a lasting agreement, this deal will be rendered into irrelevance.
It's problematic that the negotiators have taken so long to reach implementation. This reality suggests an agenda disconnect. Since 2003, Iran has attempted to evade the international community in its efforts to ensure a non-weaponized nuclear program. Delay has formed the primary strategic gambit on Iran's part. In short, what we're seeing looks like more deliberate time wasting.
While I supported this deal at the time of its creation, it's also abundantly clear to me that Geneva hasn't got off to a good start. The US will have to work exceptionally hard to ensure that Iran fulfills its obligations. At the same time, Congress will have to play a constructive but cautious role in supporting US diplomacy. Still, if this effort fails, the only options left available will be dramatically tightened sanctions alongside the prospect of military force.
It appears that President Obama is to meet with President Rouhani of Iran. The reason for the meeting is simple - the White House believes that Rouhani's election offers a renewed prospect for peace.
''I think this new president [Rouhani] is not going to suddenly make it easy. But, you know, my view is that if you have both a credible threat of force, combined with a rigorous diplomatic effort, that, in fact, you can strike a deal."
I believe that the President is overly optimistic.
First, post-Syria, US credibility regarding the potential use of military force has been evaporated. Second, Iran's Supreme Leader, Khamenei, holds the cards when it comes to the nuclear game. Third, see below... a re-post of my piece from a month back on Iran's diplomatic strategy.
‘’We should deal with the issue through a realistic approach."
The Obama Administration should take those words literally. After years of diplomatic failure, only a realistic approach can improve US-Iranian relations.
Yes, Rouhani is likely to be an improvement on his inauspicious predecessor (a clownish narcissist now locked in adesperatestruggle for relevance). Iran’s new President has promised to improve women’s rights and seek better relations with the west. If nothing else, his tone is more conciliatory. These developments are, even if only prospective, good.
Nevertheless, enamored by the potential for change, many western commentators have reacted with unrestrained elation. Rouhani’s election has made ‘’imaginable what for years has been unimaginable.’’saidStephen Kinzer inThe Guardian. In response, ‘’The Obama Administration should signal a shift in style, substance and strategy’’declaredAli Vaez in the Christian Science Monitor. Some went even further. In a particularly odd commentary for Al Jazeera, the academics, Flynt and Hillary Leverettfound that Iran now offers a ‘’concrete expression’’ of Muslim democratic emancipation.
I think not.
Rouhani might not be Ahmadinejad, but that certainly doesn’t make him an Iranian Jefferson. After all, his existing human rights record isn’t exactly stellar. During the student protests of July 1999, Rouhani embraced a gleeful brutality - "From today’’he warned, ‘’our people shall witness how… we deal with these opportunists and riotous elements, if they simply dare to show their faces." He wasn’t joking. The students were crushed. It’s also beenalleged that Rouhani played a key role in the use of terrorism against Iranian dissidents living abroad. (UPDATE_ He also apparently believes that the Holocaust is a myth).
More concerning in the present however; the new President is a proud supporter both of Iran’s nuclear program and ofcontinuedassistance to the Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad.
These facts should lead us to a cautious conclusion – a pleasant tone means nothing without substance.
Nowhere is this more true than with regards to the Iranian nuclear crisis.
While some analysts believe that Iran's present condition of international isolation andinflationmake a nuclear deal likely, I'm not so sure. To me, that argument resides upon an intrinsically western conception of state interests; secular, populist and relative to the moment. Yes, Iran’s leaders obviously care about economics. Unfortunately, they care far more about joining the nuclear club. As I've argued before, the theocrats view nuclear power as the existential guarantor for their ongoing revolutionary project. This understanding explains why we’ve seen repeated nuclear negotiations rise in hope and then collapse in failure. Put simply, for the Ayatollahs, compared to the prospective feast of a nuclear dominion, western concessions are nothing. We think we have cake, but we only have crumbs.
Playing to our delusion, Iran adopts the foreign policy brother to Madoff’s Ponzi scheme- a negotiating strategy that uses trickery to buy time for nuclear advancement. The scam? Offer flirtations of peace, blame western intransigence for a negotiating failure, then, a few months later, start all over again. By allowing emotion to dominate our logic, we buy it every time.
Rouhani’s arrival allows Iran to play the same game with a fresh face.
It needn’t be this way. For all their bluster, Iran’s leaders understandthat a military conflict with the United States would be a disaster for their interests. If we grasped this – we could, alongside stronger sanctions, perhaps deter them into ending their nuclear program. Unfortunately, emboldened by westernimpotencein Syria and Obama’s stutteringthreats, American warnings bear little weight. For deterrence to be real it must first be believed.
There’s another political component at stake here- Israeli patience with diplomacy is nearly exhausted.
Following Rouhani’s election, Netanyahu again pressured the Obama Administration for tougher sanctions. I suspect that Israel’s Prime Minister fears Iran will use Rouhani the reformist to evade future sanctions. Nearly a year after Netanyahu’s‘red line’speech, it’s obvious that time is running out. In addition, though it's pure speculation on my part, Netanyahu's restoration of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process could indicate his desire to get President Obama 'on side' prior to an Israeli military attack on Iran.
Regardless, it's a dangerous wager to assume that Netanyahu’s warnings are a bluff. Israel’s security strategy resides upon Israel's regional supremacy of power. Where some cannot look beyond the risks of military conflict, Israelis (and the Sunni Arab monarchies) see a nuclear Iran as anintolerable threat.
In this sense, if Rouhani's style is divorced from substance, his arrival will provide little aid to the cause of peace.
The North Koreans are back to their usual games. Unfortunately, this time we can expect their nuclear brinkmanship to reach new levels. They'll regard President Obama as having folded on Syria. As an extension to that understanding, they'll also believe that American resolve is pliable.
