I'm a firm supporter of the US-Israeli alliance. Still, I struggle to understand the psychology of some Israeli politicians. Take Israeli Defense Minister Ya'alon. Studying his background, Ya'alon is clearly an intelligent, strategically minded man. After all, this is a leader who commanded Israel's foremost Special Operations unit and then became his nation's most senior military officer. But what Ya'alon said about Kerry didn't make much sense. Even if he's overly optimistic, Kerry's pursuit of Middle East peace is a worthy one (I've argued why hereandhere). As much as Ya'alon might be angry about Kerry's peacekeeping force proposals, his words were not clever. To be sure, Netanyahu doesn't like Obama. That was clear a few years ago. And in many ways, Netanyahu's dissatisfaction with Obama is understandable (US policy in the Middle East is a mess).
Nevertheless, in the context of the 'settlement snub' of 2010 and the ongoing 'Pollard release' lobby, Ya'alon's comments were unjustifiable.
The implementation of the Geneva interim nuclear deal will begin on January 20th. That's welcome news. After all, in recent weeks it seemed like the agreement might fall apart before it even began. On another positive note, Iran will shortly begin to dilute its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. Still, I have a number of concerns.
While inspectors will apparently be allowed daily, physical access to the Fordo site, there will only be monthly inspections at the Arak based heavy water reactor. That's far from ideal. If the Iranians are serious about addressing fears that they are pursuing a plutonium-route nuclear weapon, allowing more vigorous inspections at Arak would be the perfect place to start. Instead, the reluctance to afford access to Arak suggests that the Iranians may want to hide what's happening there. It raises questions and it fosters mistrust.
The Iranians are crowing. While this is to be expected at some level (and helps Iranian moderates placate their hard-line colleagues), it's worrying that many Iranian officials are so gleeful in their claims that this deal doesn't bind them in any significant way. Again, it suggests an absence of seriousness in the pursuit of trust towards a lasting arrangement. Without hope of a lasting agreement, this deal will be rendered into irrelevance.
It's problematic that the negotiators have taken so long to reach implementation. This reality suggests an agenda disconnect. Since 2003, Iran has attempted to evade the international community in its efforts to ensure a non-weaponized nuclear program. Delay has formed the primary strategic gambit on Iran's part. In short, what we're seeing looks like more deliberate time wasting.
While I supported this deal at the time of its creation, it's also abundantly clear to me that Geneva hasn't got off to a good start. The US will have to work exceptionally hard to ensure that Iran fulfills its obligations. At the same time, Congress will have to play a constructive but cautious role in supporting US diplomacy. Still, if this effort fails, the only options left available will be dramatically tightened sanctions alongside the prospect of military force.
This chart encapsulates why I believe a serious peace deal (or it fails, the military option) must be pursued in order to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. I accept that my graphics skills are limited!
Regarding President Obama's
phone call with President Rouhani, please also peruse my recent posts on Iran (as
provided below).
I'm concerned.
I'm worried that this call will reinforce Iranian
perceptions of the US as weak - and that those perceptions will drive a negative Iranian negotiating strategy.
Let's be clear; on paper, a
phone call makes sense - it offers a reinforcement of trust and it broadcasts
a mutual willingness to move beyond previous hostilities. As I said, good on
paper. Unfortunately however, flowing alongside the ongoing US debacle over Syria, I fear that the message of this call will
be heard differently in Tehran and Washington. That the theocrats will increasingly believe that the US lacks the willpower to prevent their nuclear ascendancy.
If the Iranians believe that the US is buffing over the threat of military force, they'll call that bluff.
''.... but the text will notthreaten the use of
force for a failure to comply, officials said.'' ''The final draft also does not ascribe specific blame for the Aug. 21 attack that asphyxiated hundreds of Syrians.''
This ludicrousSecurity Council resolutionis
a waste of paper- it's logically and ecologically unsound. This is the international relations equivalent of a situation in which, after murdering an entire family, the killer is caught red handed. Then however, instead of punishing the culprit - in this case a gangbanger, the Judge simply makes him promise never to repeat his crime. The Judge issues a concluding warning to the murderer- should he re-offend, the convict's co-conspirator will decide an appropriate punishment. In making his ruling, the Judge proudly claims that he has served justice, whilst simultaneously also deterring the gangster's compatriots. As I said, this resolution is ludicrous; it belongs in the UN restroom.
This is our acquiescence in the face of slaughter. President Obama might have preserved the pretense of his credibility (and even then, only in Europe), but this deal will cost America dearly. Russia has consolidated an alreadyobvious global victory. The rules of international order have been trashed. Peace will pay the price.
I see four direct consequences. 1) Assad will view our weakness as an explicitapproval
to ignore his responsibilitiesunder
the UN disarmament framework. 2) Russia will beunleashed
to further dominatethe conduct (retrogression?) of international affairs. Putin is laughing. 3) North Korea will be emboldened to up theirnuclear
ante. 4) Iran will be encouraged to re-double their support for Assad and renew theirlong
cultivated gameof false, time-buying nuclear negotiations. On this last point, please seemy
post from yesterday concerning the three diplomatic delusions of the Obama Administration in their interactions with Iran.
This piece by Dexter Filkins on Qassem Suleimani, CO of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards - Quds Force, is a must read. At least for anyone who has an interest in the politics of the Middle East.
My 4 takeaways...
1) Suleimani is a comfortable regime hardliner
Put simply, you don't become the head of the Quds Force unless you are an ideological hardliner. Take this quote from the general: ''When I see the children of the martyrs, I want to smell their scent and I lose myself.'' Suleimani has no doubt in the righteousness of the Islamic revolutionary project of which he is a part. As he sees it, he's an heir to Husayn; a pious servant in the service of divine righteousness. This notion of ordained purpose coalesces with Suleimani's comments on the ''paradise'' of ''the battlefield''. The general's sustaining ideological motivations are far from flexible. This is not a guy who'll one day sit down and become a supporter of democracy.
2) Suleimani is a semi-astute political actor
Unlike Salafi Jihadists, Suleimani carefully attunes his activities towards his specific interests in the political moment. As Filkins notes, Suleimani is occasionally willing to work with the United States - Filkins references Crocker's (former US Abmbassador-Iraq) decision to allow Suleimani to help shape Iraq's first post-war provisional government. What Filkins neglects to mention is that Suleimani played a very clever game with this endeavor - see a certain Ahmed Chalabi...
Nevertheless, Suleimani isn't a political mastermind. For one, he seems to underestimate the US Intelligence Community - see his absurd letter denying responsibility for attacks on US forces/the 2011 plot against the Saudi Ambassador in DC.
In a final regard, there should be no doubt that Suleimani considers the United States to be a fundamental enemy - Filkins aptly points out the general's support for EFP cells in Iraq.
3) US Foreign Policy can both deter and embolden Iranian aggression
As Filkins hints, Suleimani's fluctuating aggression has been explicitly linked to Iranian perceptions of American confidence or weakness. In essence, when the US is seen as timid, Iran becomes more aggressive. On the flip side, the opposite is true. From my perspective, this speaks to two things - 1) That the US collapse in Syria is indeed a strategic catastrophe in terms of the motivating signal it sends to Iran. 2) That a credible threat of military force could push Iran towards serious compromise in their nuclear ambitions.
4) Iran is fully engaged in support of Assad
During the recent Syria intervention debate, some suggested that even a limited US operation would encourage major Iranian escalation in support of Assad. Yet, as Filkins explains, the Iranians are already fully committed to the survival of their key ally. In that sense, by sitting on the Syria sidelines, we're allowing Iran to dominate the Syria battlespace. We're also indirectly empowering Salafi Jihadist formations over nationalist rebel formations. In short, our Syria strategy is completely idiotic.
My related thoughts on the Middle East can be found here.
The Snowden induced diplomatic fallout continues...
Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff has decided to cancel a looming state visit to the United States. In short, Rousseff is angry that the NSA has been spying on her government.
Although the cancellation is obviously a major embarrassment for the US (state visits are regarded as the highest form of diplomatic honor), President Obama has agreed with this decision (or so his Press Secretary claims). Anyway, from my perspective this is all a bit overblown. Sure, the Brazilians are pissed off. That's understandable. Nevertheless, as I've argued before, robust and wide ranging US intelligence operations are both lawful and necessary. The US Government is certainly far from unique in its pursuit of information.
To be clear, the Brazilian government is fully aware as to why espionage occurs. Behind closed doors, they probably aren't that bothered about this scandal (positive US-Brazilian relations are simply too important for both nations).
That being said, President Rousseff has to balance practical reality with domestic political reality (placating Brazilian nationalism)... Brazil's next election takes place in a little over a year.
Incidentally, new reports suggest that the NSA may have also operated a major proxy-station intercept program in Belgium. Again, this would make sense... Belgium is home to a significant number of Islamist extremists. The US has a compelling state interest in monitoring these individuals.
The ultimate truth behind NSA activities?
9/11 taught the US Government that it cannot rely upon others to defend the American people.
''We need to use the United
Nations Security Council and believe that preserving law and order in today’s
complex and turbulent world is one of the few ways to keep international
relations from sliding into chaos. The law is still the law, and we must follow
it whether we like it or not.''
This, from the man who irradiates political opponents living abroad.
This, from the man who considers criminal justice to be a campaign tool.
This, from the man who uses Russian energy supplies to blackmail impoverished states.
''We must stop using the language of force and return to the path of civilized diplomatic and political settlement.''
Time for some honesty. Putin has no interest in multilateral co-operation. Nor does he care for the cause of peace. Like his Soviet predecessors, Putin has one interest - Russian domination. Don't believe me? Just re-read the letter.
Note the implicit threat to implode the UN - ''No one wants the United Nations to suffer the fate of the League of Nations...'' Note the thinly veiled attacks against President Bush - “you’re either with us or against us.” Note Putin's emotional attack on American exceptionalism.
There's a simple but telling reason that explains why Putin hates Bush. In the summer of 2008, as Russia sought to destroy Georgia's democracy, Bush didn't back down. In fact, he stood up. Putin was forced to back off. He didn't like it.
The Russian President doesn't want a repeat of that misery. Instead, he wants an American President who will bend to his will. Sadly, President Obama is giving him that opportunity. Geneva is a joke. Everyone knows it, but no one has a political interest in admitting to absurdity.
In the end, Putin's letter should be taken for what it is. The 2013 replication of Andropov's 1983 letter to Samantha Smith. A pretense of friendship at the price of American supplication. We mustn't believe the lie.
What occurred was a massacre (see El Amrani at The Arabist for his take on the possible motivations for the crackdown).
This wasn't a ''security'' operation, it was protest clearance from the school of brutal totalitarianism- via bulldozers and snipers. The Egyptian government decided that they were going to crush Morsi's supporters and they did just that.
Others are covering the specificEgyptian political angle, but I want to consider why American diplomacy was unable to foresee or restrain this human disaster. I think there are three key reasons.
Absent policy clarity/direction
From the very start of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, the US Government has been hesitant to adopt a clear policy in Egypt. After promising to support Egyptian democracy, President Obama then cut related aid. Only when Mubarak's fall became inevitable and the bloodshed intolerable, did Obama finally pressure Mubarak to fall from power. The Egyptian people asked for our support and they found our equivocation. In a similar vein, Secretary of State Kerry's remarkstoday were the first significant US condemnation of the Army since Morsi's removal from power a few weeks ago. We're still unwilling to commit to the basic premise of Egyptian democratic rights.
To Egyptians on all sides, the political essence of US policy is now viewed in largely the same manner- that the US Government lacks the courage and confidence to establish a clear policy and then support that agenda with action. In result, America's influence has withered and Egyptian political dynamics have run out ahead of us. At terrible cost. Instead of shaping Egypt's transition towards stable democracy, all too often, we've been chasing the metaphorical greyhound. This failure helps explain why the US is so mistrusted by Egyptians. In short, by attempting to hedge our bets, we've ended up burning our cards.
Absent moral courage
At its core, US foreign policy must reside upon certain non-negotiable values. These should include our unyielding support for democracy, civilian protection and the rule of law. If there's one thing that encompasses all these concerns, it's that America won't tolerate the use of violence against innocent protesters. The Egyptian government believed that we wouldn't stand in support of that belief. This evening, nearly 300 people are dead. Don't misconstrue me, I'm not saying that America should have supported Morsi against the Army (his tenure was hardly defined by adherence to democratic tradition). But because we've been willing to tolerate the Army's increasing brutality since Morsi's fall, we've played to the propaganda narrative of the hardliners who oppose us - the notion of an America without honor. The sad reality is that our gelatinous morality has born a terrible cost - the US Government has discredited itself in the eyes of the Egyptian people and has discredited American values in the eyes of the world.
Absent will to engage with political complexity
At the heart of American dysfunction in Egypt is our emotionally laden and logically deficient foreign policy discourse at home. Since 2011, most American politicians and commentators have sought to define Egypt's political crisis as a fight between existential forces of democracy (the Army/anti-Morsi protesters) and totalitarian Sunni Islamism (the Muslim Brotherhood). From both the American political right and political left, our policy debates have taken refuge in intransigent understandings that discourage foreign policy bi-partisanship on Egypt. We've entertained the myth of simple policy prescriptions - support the army/oppose the Brotherhood - an approach that was and remains fundamentally flawed. This has weakened the prospective power of our diplomats. Alongside a determined policy born of moral and strategic clarity, we also need influence with all Egypt's actors. Most of all, we need to reclaim American foreign policy to a position of intellectual endeavor. The politics of the Middle East and north Africa are not simple.
In the end, the political repercussions of today's events are likely to reverberate for years to come. Salafist extremists will be lavishing over the prospect of a new batch of disaffected recruits - individuals who thought protesting was a democratic right and paid for that belief in blood. This is a huge propaganda coup for theenemies of democracy. Yet, America can recover. We can rebuild our influence. If we use this tragedy to inject a new courage to our policy in Egypt - to propagate a policy centering around a mix of absolute values and flexible relationships, we can help Egyptians reach a better, more inclusive and decidedly more hopeful future.
The Guardian is reporting that the US has been spying on major European allies. These reports follow similar accusations by a prominent German news magazine. Safe to say, the reaction will be interesting. Although the reports are significant, they shouldn't be shocking. The US has vested interests in monitoring the activities of the EU. The Lebanese Hizballah offers one good example, Iraq 2003 offers another. The simple truth? When it comes to states like France, US interests don't always align with those of our foreign partners. In some cases, these diverging interests are highly significant - there's a rationale for our understanding of these divergences.
In another regard, it's also worth noting that these latest leaks suggest that the US has not spied on the UK or Germany. Again, this is unsurprising. In the UK's case, espionage action would be construed as a major breach of the longstanding US-UK intelligence alliance. The blowback of such an operation would be catastrophic. This being said, though strong, the US-UK intelligence relationship is not without its challenges.
More important is the fact that Snowden has leaked this information. From my perspective, this particular leak is Snowden's most serious so far. It offers the prospect of seriously jeopardized US relations with historic allies and it will likely lead to a termination of active collection efforts. At a basic political level, it's also terribly embarrassing (imagine the calls that Obama is going to have to make over the next few days...). But the leak also points to another concern for the US Government - how was Snowden (who was a contractor not a government employee) able to access such a wide array of specially compartmentalized intelligence materials? This leads to another question - one that will greatly worry
US Intelligence - what else does Snowden know and who else has he given that knowledge to?
The US must expect that Russian intelligence officers from the FSB
are conducting compliant interrogations of Snodwen. As a result, US Intelligence must protect intelligence assets that Snodwen may have compromised.
'May' is the operative word here. The US Intelligence community cannot afford to risk Snowden only knowing some things - they must guard against all those
things he could possibly know. And, to borrow a Rumsfeld quote, they likely don't know what he knows.
The flowing consequence of all this - major intelligence operations may have to be shut down or reformed. That's why Snowden has annoyed so many in the US leadership.
Finally, it's worth examining why these reports surfaced today. I wonder whether, as he sits in limbo at Moscow's airport, Snowden is attempting to increase his support base re- prospective asylum. Perhaps he thinks that Iceland might offer him a passport? Certainly US influence over extradition arrangements will be weakened.
During my time in London, I was frequently asked why the US maintains such a close relationship with Israel. Could, I was asked, America's support for Israel truly be justified?
For me, the answer was and remains pretty simple - Not only is this alliance justified, it's also inherently necessary.
Don't get me wrong, the Israeli Government angers me from time to time. But no relationship is perfect. After all, even our relationship with the UK has its problems.
But contrasting the disagreements are an abundance of commonalities and four key imperatives.
First, the US was intimately involved in the creation of the Israeli state. That historic legacy sustains our desire to maintain Israel's existence and security.
Second, in the aftermath of the Holocaust and against the long and horrific history of Antisemitism, America vowed that we would protect Israeli democracy from destruction. Flowing in union with our finest values (freedom, honor, commitment), this is an oath worthy of our continued support.
Third, Israeli co-operation with the United States on issues of joint concern (Iran, for example) is of direct value to the national security of the United States.
Fourth, Israel needs American support. Surrounded by violent extremists who possess savvy PR capabilities (blaming Israelis for the terrorism that they respond to), America is crucial to the assertion of Israel's rightful global legitimacy.
The bombing in Beirut earlier today is a firm reminder of the intense political dynamics that are at contest in Lebanon and Syria. A contest in which Syria-Iran-Hizballah are at war with regional forces of liberation. I believe that today's attack was carried out by agents of the Syrian government and perhaps also with the co-ordination or support of the Lebanese Hizballah. While I have no specific evidence to back up this assertion, I would point to a number of indicators. Also some analysis...
1) The attack took place in a predominantly Christian neighborhood of eastern Beirut and killed a senior Lebanese civil servant who was an outspoken critic of the Assad regime. In addition, Assad has previously warned that he would seek to push the conflict in Syria into a broadened external struggle.
2) Syria and Hizballah have a clear track record of support for violence against those who challenge their political power. This has involved recent, previous attacks on both major Lebanese officials and foreign entities. Iran also shares this preference for using covert force against those who oppose them.
3) Hizballah is increasingly concerned by the serious damage that their continued support for Assad is inflicting on their broader ideational legitimacy. Instigating further currents of regional instability (as today's attack would suggest) offers Hizballah a method by which they believe that they can distract world attention. I would argue that Hizballah's recent UAV flight over Israel provides another timely example of this dynamic. I have previously suggested that Hizballah would begin to abandon Assad once they came to believe that his regime was doomed. While I expected that this would have occurred before now, I remain confident of that belief. Ultimately, it is my opinion that Hizballah still believes that Assad can be saved. If evidence shows that today's attack (and the future instability that it foreshadows) is linked to Syria, it should serve to re-emphasize the need for the United States to take more concrete action to help Syrians liberate their country.
4) Faced with the EU tightened oil sanctions last week and Iran's continuing economic implosion, I believe (as I have previously argued) that Iran is likely to respond with more acts of aggression in the near future. Again, the United States must be prepared to respond to any attacks that take place.
If when conducting a poll the vote tally is counter to desired outcome, repeat poll. 2) If after two further polls the vote tally remains counter to desired outcome, ignore poll results and declare vote outcome as desired. 3) Ignore any irony of Democratic Party name.
The Democratic Party no longer belongs to its members, it belongs to the party spin masters (and their Union bosses - see post below).
The attack today on Syria's governing elite represents another step towards the fall of the Assad regime. As increasing numbers of the Syrian ruling elite and their families come to understand that Assad is finished, they will abandon him for their own safety. This trend has been accelerating in recent days. To add to his troubles, Assad is running out of money and simultaneously is loosing trust in the loyalty of his armed forces. As I have previously argued, the US should seek to provide more support to Syrian rebel groups while building sustained diplomatic pressure on China and Russia. While I believe that it is ultimately inevitable that Assad's regime will collapse, I also believe that there are still substantial risks in the near future. Primarily, if Assad decides to go "all out" against the rebels, he may consider the use of chemical weapons against Syrian urban centers. He also might dramatically increase his use of conventional force against Syrian civilians in a much more indiscriminate way (sadly this is still possible). In each of these two scenarios the US must be ready to provide direct intervention capabilities to prevent huge loss of life. The consequences of Assad using chemical weapons against his own people or allowing those weapons to fall into the hands of hostile entities would be catastrophic.
In light of today's news from Syria, I wanted to post an update of a previous commentary I wrote for this blog.
Calls for a western intervention in Syria are growing. While I understand and share the concern of many regarding Assad's continuing campaign of murder, I do not believe that military intervention in Syria would be an appropriate strategy.
First, a direct military intervention would be far from easy. Unlike Gaddafi's weak military infrastructure, Syria possesses a formidable array of military capabilities. These include thousands of tanks and artillery pieces, an advanced air defense network and hundreds of thousands of soldiers - the key units of which are ideologically attached to the Assad regime. Military intervention would require engaging and destroying these units. Such a mission would be complex, risky and would require a much more substantial coalition military force than that which was seen in Libya. Only the United States Military could carry out this operation. The pathetic European attitude towards foreign security policy - 'big talk, no kit' means that practical support from the EU would be almost non-existent. So.. in effect, if the US were to embark on an operation in Syria, it would be forced to commit significant military resources away from critical operations in Afghanistan, while undertaking full practical responsibility for the evolution of 'post-action' events inside Syria. I would however re-consider my position on military intervention if Turkey and other regional states were willing to contribute substantial military assets to any operation.
Beyond the pure military complexities, a prospective US intervention in Syria also raises other major concerns. First, in the context of existing tensions, Iran would likely regard direct US engagement against Assad as a direct threat to the Iranian regime. Combining this with the looming Israeli-Iranian showdown, Iran's paranoid leadership might elect to go 'all in' to support Assad. Whether through supporting terrorist attacks against western interests around the world, mining the straits of Hormuz or sending a much greater level of military support to Assad, Iran would probably take a much more overt role in the conflict. Israel might also decide to launch an early strike on Iranian nuclear facilities (to offset future negative international concerns) thus increasing the likelihood of a situation in which every regional power alliance rapidly escalated towards war. It is crucial to remember that the situation in Syria is not divorced from other regional dynamics.
In another area, for Assad domestically, a US intervention would encourage the regime to portray the internal rebellion as a foreign project controlled for example by the 'Zionist puppets in Washington'. Assad's desire to portray recent terrorist attacks as a representation of the broader protest movement, suggests that the regime would jump at any opportunity to weaken the narrative of legitimacy that the current rebellion continues to expound. Put simply, American intervention might encourage Assad to use massive amounts of force in an attempt to finally annihilate those who challenge him. In such a situation, the US might have to apply equally vigorous force to quickly remove Assad from power. This would likely be expensive in its cost on American military personnel.
I believe that there is a better route towards destroying Assad's regime. This approach should take the form of a dual track strategy.
First, the west should increase covert support to Syrian resistance cells. This should focus around provision of money to allow cells to fund logistical costs (like fuel, food and communications) and to build organisational structures that can contest Assad's forces more effectively. If possible, the west should provide military special forces advisors to help direct the resistance military strategy.
Second, the west should continue to draw attention to Assad's actions and their incompatibility with the arab spring. The west should aggressively highlight continued Chinese and Russian unjustifiable support for Assad's regime, while continuing to build regional pressure alongside allies like Turkey. We should also seek to draw attention to the sickening hypocrisy of Iran and Hizballah in the current fight. While the Iranian regime claims to have lead the region towards revolutionary empowerment, in reality, Iran's clerical leaders are supporting the murder of thousands of innocent civilians in order to maintain their grip of power over the Syrian people. Similarly, by supporting Assad, Hizballah's narrative of 'emancipation for the oppressed weak against the power of the corrupt strong', is being rendered a transparent falsehood. At least in the case of Hezbollah, if sustained attention can continue to be brought against that group's relationship with Assad - a tipping point in which they break effective ties will probably become possible. As in Lebanon, Hezbollah is vulnerable to further negative attention.
The near/middle east is undergoing seismic shifts in state-society relations. Ultimately the current Syria-Iran-Hezbollah+Russia/China alliance is its own worse enemy. We should seek greater publicity of this alliance, coupled with more vigorous support to the Syrian rebels.
IF.. it is true that the Obama Administration forced Chen out, it is just another incident in which the Administration has failed to support pro-freedom movements. IF it is true, it is a profoundly sad moment for the US Govt. When someone enters our embassy because they fear prosecution for free speech, we have a responsibility to stand up for that individual.
Another two examples of where (early on in his term) Obama failed to stand up for individual freedom..
