I'm a firm supporter of the US-Israeli alliance. Still, I struggle to understand the psychology of some Israeli politicians. Take Israeli Defense Minister Ya'alon. Studying his background, Ya'alon is clearly an intelligent, strategically minded man. After all, this is a leader who commanded Israel's foremost Special Operations unit and then became his nation's most senior military officer. But what Ya'alon said about Kerry didn't make much sense. Even if he's overly optimistic, Kerry's pursuit of Middle East peace is a worthy one (I've argued why hereandhere). As much as Ya'alon might be angry about Kerry's peacekeeping force proposals, his words were not clever. To be sure, Netanyahu doesn't like Obama. That was clear a few years ago. And in many ways, Netanyahu's dissatisfaction with Obama is understandable (US policy in the Middle East is a mess).
Nevertheless, in the context of the 'settlement snub' of 2010 and the ongoing 'Pollard release' lobby, Ya'alon's comments were unjustifiable.
For my core thoughts, please read my latest piece for the National Review Online.
Here are two further thoughts.
1) The attack undoubtedly involved a significant degree of operational planning. This preparation likely included advance reconnaissance, specific training and a considerable mobilization of manpower and resources. In this vein, it's telling that the US Intelligence Community apparently had no information to suggest a major attack was about take place. Combined with reports which suggest that three Americans may have participated in this atrocity, the US government appears to lack a satisfactory intelligence penetration of the al-Shabab network. This is a serious concern. Over the past few years, a number of Americans have traveled to Somalia to fight alongside al-Shabab. Others have provided the group with funding support. As is the case regarding US Citizens in Syria, a major fear is that Americans in Somalia will return to the United States to conduct attacks (see my recent piece on Zawahiri). In the aftermath of this incident, we can expect a beefing up of the FBI's East-Africa focused counter-terrorism teams.
2) The attack matrix was clearly orientated around a Mumbai 2008 style model: a heavily armed force seeking maximum destruction against a soft target. The cell's objective - to stay alive as long as possible - to kill as many people as possible. Due to the fact that shopping centers attract large crowds but lack major security capabilities, locales like Westgate are exceptionally difficult to protect. A further complication- mobile cells of suicide attackers pose a serious challenge for responding tactical teams. Counter terrorism officers must balance hostage rescue efforts with the containment of the attackers. The first priority is to prevent terrorist skirmishing squads from breaking off into various parts of a city. Relevant thoughts - 'Other' section
1) Israel is pressuring the Obama Administration to act against Iran. Following his September 2012 red line speech at the UN, Netanyahu is upping the ante once again. The Israelis are anxious for the United States to either enact tougher sanctions against the Iranians, or to more directly imply a willingness to use force. I've argued many times why I believe that Netanyahu (especially) and Israel more generally will eventually use force against Iranian nuclear facilities. For me, the key factor is this: from the Israeli perspective, while the risks of such a military operation are manageable, the consequences of inaction are not. And... unlike US caveats, Israeli red lines mean something. Further heightening the probability of Israeli action is the ongoing situation in Syria. By their undaunted support for Assad, the Lebanese Hizballah and Iran are signalling their desire to dominate the strategic evolution of the Middle East. Which leads us to point 2!
2) The Israelis have attacked a suspected Russian arms transport in Syria. Though no Russians appear to have been killed, this is serious news. The Israeli attack illustrates both Israel's overt tactical intent - to deny Assad access to high technology assets and Israel's broader strategic intent - to send a message to the Russian government (and in different ways, Iran/the US). Anyway, I salute the Israelis for their political courage in face of Russian intimidation- we in the US could learn something here.
3) The British Government has taken a small but significant step to reduce the pernicious consequences of the UK's welfare state. By imposing a cap on individual welfare eligibility, the UK may begin to see a gradual reduction in its massive state outlays. However, as a number of Conservative MP's are pointing out, much more can be done. See my thoughts on the welfare state here.
4) The Zimmerman trial has come to an end. As I argued for The Week, the news coverage was unnecessarily incessant and symptomatic of a broader problem in American society. Regardless, I do not believe that Zimmerman's guilt was established beyond all reasonable doubt - the Jury decision was correct.
However, I have great sympathy for Trayvon Martin's family- they are honoring their son by their highly dignified reaction to the trial outcome. Many others have reacted less impressively.
1) The Israeli Military has announced plans to update their force posture over the next five years. The major elements of these proposals include a reduction in the IDF officer corps and a greater focus on highly mobile weapon platforms like the Spike NLOS. At the forefront of these developments is a focus on potential future conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah. Recognizing the relative immobility of Israeli forces during the 2006 Lebanon war, the IDF wants to ensure that this hindrance is reduced before another outbreak of violence. Israel understands that in order to defeat enemies like Hamas/Hezbollah - which rely upon small skirmishing groups of highly mobile rocket teams etc. the IDF must be able to employ its own weapon systems that allow for the timely engagement of their adversaries. Cognizant of the sensitivities with which Israeli military operations are viewed internationally, the Israelis also know that they need weapons that are highly discriminate - IE - mechanisms that minimize the likelihood of civilian casualties. In another sense, the IDF also seems to be building front line deployments around their most aggressive, operationally experienced units. That makes sense - the IDF recognizes the vulnerabilities of relying upon fresh forces in critical operations.
However, on a more negative note, it appears that the IDF will cut spending on training operations. That's a risky proposition - dependency on technological assets cannot offset the loss of basic competencies. As a broader observation, I find it pretty staggering that the Israelis are willing to cut defense spending amidst ongoing regional instability.
2) Serious rioting broke out in Belfast, Northern Ireland on Friday. The problems arose when British loyalist marchers were prevented from walking through an Irish nationalist area of the city. This behavior is pathetic. As evidenced in footage of the scuffles, many of the aggressors were young men - probably drunk. They wanted an excuse for violence. It's deeply disappointing that occasional outbreaks of disorder like this one still occur in Northern Ireland. Though the situation is far more peaceful than it once was, sectarian hatred nevertheless remains a real problem. In a less serious but similarly interesting vein, it's worth checking out today's NY Times story on the challenges that top golfer, Rory McIlroy is forced to navigate in his home country.
3) Tensions between Syria's various rebel forces have reached a boiling point. Many will argue that these hostilities necessitate greater US detachment from the conflict. On the contrary, I believe the opposite is true. At one point or another, the US was going to have to face up to the Salafist extremist threat inside Syria. As I've argued before, the US must use all of our influence to support the nationalist minded elements of the rebellion. Such a course (though admittedly risky) would allow us to support those forces who would be best placed to replace Assad with a semi-stable, pro-western government. Disengagement is not an option. Supported by the Putin mafia and supplemented by forces from Iran and Hizballah, Assad's regime has turned the tide of the conflict. We must alter this strategic equation.
4) David Moyes has lost his first game in charge of Manchester United. It's a shame, but this game was largely irrelevant. I'm confident that Moyes will be a highly successful manager for Britain's biggest club. Regardless, I'm very much looking forward to the start of the Premier League season in a month's time. With Pellegrini at Manchester City, Mourinho back at Chelsea and Fulham under ownership of a major investor, this should be an exciting year of soccer. The battle for the top four spots will be fierce; from my perspective, Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool, Man City, Man Utd, Tottenham (and of course Everton!) all have a good opportunity to reach the Champions League.
President Obama is visiting Israel this week. Over the next few days, I will post on why the trip is important. However, in the meantime, I want to drop a quick note concerning the escalating Israeli pressure on Obama to release Jonathan Pollard. These Israeli demands are nothing new. Regardless, for two key reasons they annoy me a great deal.
1) Pollard is a convicted traitor. He betrayed our country in order to provide intelligence to another state. There are few crimes as serious. The fact that Israel is our ally is irrelevant. Pollard swore an oath to the United States. Like Kiriakou, he betrayed that oath. He deserves to be in prison.
2) The Israeli intelligence operation which ran Pollard was an inexcusable act against the United States. The United States is Israel's one enduring ally. I support this relationship - for reasons of morality and historic strategic kinship, Israel deserves American support. I also understand and respect why the Israelis have traditionally adopted an aggressive security strategy. But the United States deserves reciprocal respect. We do not deserve to have the Israelis acting against us in such an aggressive fashion. Especially in reference to HUMINT asset procurement. Certainly not on American soil.
In short, it's an audacious act of disrespect for the Israelis to demand that we release Pollard. Fortunately, it's highly unlikely that Pollard will be released. To do so would produce extreme disquiet in the US intelligence community. Indeed, former CIA Director Tenet once told President Clinton that he would resign if Pollard was released.
The French have been leaking reports of a new offer that the P5+1 will be making to Iran next week. The intention of this offer? To get Iran to give up their pursuit of highly enriched nuclear power.
Clearly, we all want peace. However, from my perspective, this open willingness to entertain further negotiations with Iran (without first seeing Iranian trust building measures) is a mistake. Since 2003, the Iranian negotiation dynamic has been an annual occurrence (see my post from this time last year!) with a unchanging outcome - while Iran gains time to continue its nuclear development, the West gains nothing. Indeed, simultaneous with this latest outreach, the Iranians are once again showing their fundamental disinterest in the prospect of a nuclear conciliation arrangement. By installing new centrifuges, the theocrats are speeding their way along the path to a nuclear weapons capacity. And be under no illusions, Iran's nuclear pursuit is not a preference born of casual consideration. The regime believes that if it achieves a place in the nuclear club, it will thus also ensure the survival of the Islamic revolution (their ultimate political objective). Absent major pressure, Iran will not negotiate their agenda away. While various parties have argued that a nuclear Iran should be addressed by deterrent containment, for me, such a prospect is deeply concerning.
So, what do these latest developments mean? Well... I suspect that Israel will speed up plans for the use of force against Iran's nuclear program. Although the consequences of such an action would likely be serious both regionally (and in economic terms) also internationally, the probability of a spiral to regional war is low. In the end, it's a question of Netanyahu's mindset. Personally, I don't believe that the Israeli PM is willing to quietly accept a nuclear Iran.
Today's bomb attack on an Israeli civilian bus, apparently conducted by the Al-Asqa martyrs brigade, will weaken the short term prospects for a peace deal. That Al Asqa would conduct such an attack suggests the group is concerned with Hamas taking ownership of 'the resistance'. Al Asqa's links to the Fatah movement of President Abbas further accentuate my impression that there is a Palestinian political motivation behind this attack, as much as there is an anti-Israel component. As I have argued over the past few days (please see previous posts), Israel does not want a cease fire that has little durable meaning and power. Hamas does not want to be seen as weak, but also neither can continue to suffer such significant military losses. Fatah does not want to be seen as an impotent bystander. There is little question that Israel retains the upper hand with negotiations. The IDF is degrading Hamas power infrastructure and is thus affording a great deal of flexibility for Netanyahu's policy options. Israel can demand major concessions from Hamas as a condition for peace-expect a final cease fire to address Israeli concerns overHamas smuggling operations from Egypt into Gaza.
In conclusion, I expect that today's bus bombing will cause an escalation in near term violence but that Hamas will ultimately make greater concessions over the next few days- leading to a cease fire. Hamas cannot continue to absorb the damage that they are suffering.
The conflict between Israel and Hamas shows few indications of de-escalation. From my perspective, the Israelis are conducting an effective campaign against Hamas. The IDF is weakening Hamas military infrastructure, degrading Hamas command and control apparatus and exerting huge pressure on the group's fighters. As a result of these successes, the Israeli Government believes that it has the power to impose a tough price tag on Hamas demands for a cease fire. This was evident in yesterday's failed talks in Egypt. At the discussions, in addition to requiring that Hamas end their rocket fire as a prerequisite for a reciprocal halt to IDF operations, Israel also demanded a longer term Hamas pledge to disavow violence and accept that Israel would have theenduring right to launch pre-emptive attacks in case of 'imminent' threat intelligence. In essence, the Israeli leadership made demands that would fundamentally alter the status quo. Why? Israel does not want a cease fire which only allows Hamas time to regroup and reconstitute for future attacks. I'm sympathetic to this approach. A cease fire is supposed to be an agreed termination of combat, designed to provide political space for a broader negotiation framework. A cease fire is not supposed to exist as a tactical retreat which services the pursuit of Hamas broader strategic end; the destruction of Israel. This distinction is fundamentally important indriving Israel's perspective on when Operation Pillar of Defense can end. Put simply, Israel wants a cease fire that portends a more durable peaceful reliability.
As a side note, it is crucial to remember that Hamas and their allies are extremely astute to the regional and international political environment. They understand that media reporting of Palestinian casualties in Gaza produces diplomatic difficulties for Israel. They understand that engaging Egyptian and Turkish Government anger over Gaza, in turn increases pressure on the US/EU to then pressure Israel for a quick cease fire.This dynamic informs why Hamas and the PIJ use Gaza's civilian infrastructure for cover. For these groups, Gaza civilians are little more than a shield and a propaganda tool. Fortunately, even amidst Hamas efforts to immerse themselvesamong the people, Israel has been effective in their clinical application of force. For an example, see this morning's highly discriminate attack on an Islamic Jihad leader who was operating out of one floor of a media building.*
It is my opinion that until Israel believesa cease fire will be
durable and will lead to a real rather than fake peace, the state will not
accede to Hamas demands to end the violence.
*Contrary to what some might say, if an enemy agent is operating in a media capacity that focuses on the command and control and mobilization of his forces, then that agent is not a journalist protected under international law. He is an enemy combatant and a justified military target.
