1) The US air strike against a leader of Al-Shabab is welcome news. As I argued in the aftermath of the Nairobi Mall attack, the US must conduct a vigorous, wide ranging and durable counter-terrorism strategy against this group. It's important to note that alongside this air strike, JSOC/US IC are also conducting regular operations inside Somalia.
2) Befitting the Baathist legacy to which they subscribe, the Syrian Government is made up of pathological liars. Still, the prospect of an evacuation from Homs offers one small spark of hope from Geneva II. My thoughts on what the US should be doing at the conference are provided here.
On Wednesday, representatives from the Syrian Government, the Syrian rebellion and the international community will gather in Geneva. The ‘stated’ aspiration of all sides – a just end to a brutal civil war.
In reality, Assad has little interest in meaningful concession. Yes, he’ll probably offer some vague proposals – we should expect the suggestion of a ‘national reconciliation council’. But whatever Bashar offers, if anything, it won’t be substantive. Haafez’s heir is in no mood to negotiate.
It’s not hard to understand why.
Reinforced by Khamenei, Nasrallah and Putin, Assad is applying a strategic blend of blackmail and destruction against the already fractured rebellion. As the rebels fight amongst themselves, the regime consolidates its base of power. And as much as the international community might cry at the suffering of the Syrian people, divorced from resolute policy, our tears have only greased Assad’s machine of death.
All of this leads to one centering reality – the dictator is looking forward to Geneva. In his mind, he holds all the courage and all the cards.
As such, in order to give Geneva II any chance of a positive outcome, America must reshuffle the deck. If we are timid, the Russians will simply generate another WMD disarmament-style figment deal. We can’t let that happen.
Instead, we must replace our policy of confused trepidation with a calculation of unapologetic realpolitik. In short, we need to be both simple and tough – stating the boundaries of a deal we’ll accept and explaining what will happen if Assad doesn’t acquiesce.
For a start, we’ll need to be clear about our non-negotiables. More precisely, while a short term cease fire would certainly be worth consideration, our acceptance of any final peace will require three absolutes. First, Syria’s Sunni community will have to be given a genuine, participatory role in any new government. And it will have to involve more than titles of office- Sunni alienation from Syrian government provision must come to an end. As we’re witnessing in Iraq and Lebanon, sectarian disenfranchisement is a catalyst for extremism. Second, any transitional process must ultimately end with democratic elections. Finally, Syria will need a constitution that balances representative government with protections for minority groups. Alawites, Christians and Kurds will all require the confidence of protection from sectarian abuse. None of these demands will be simple to achieve, but all of them are necessary. The alternative is chaos now or chaos deferred.
Supporting our policy imperatives, we must remember that our power is real.
Correspondingly, we must make Assad understand that America will not tolerate diversionary games. We’ll have to outline that while we’re open to meaningful discussion, Assad’s non-cooperation will come with a severe cost. The most obvious way we can do this is by stating it – clearly and directly. By clarifying that if the peace process falters, America will renew and increase our assistance to nationalist centered Syrian rebels. Indeed, the one fortunate element of the Salafi jihadist rise in Syria has been its assistance in verifying the ideological stance of other rebel formations – it’s now clearer who the ‘good guys’ actually are.
Yet we’ll also have to help Assad realize that our power doesn’t begin and end with a potential supply train. Just as General Dempsey has spoken of ‘‘different ways of action’’, we should make clear that direct military options remain on the table. That in the event of Assad’s continued slaughter; we’ll re-consider military strikes against his regime. Made credible, US deterrent power will produce effect. Just as B-52s recently gave a physical face to US power in the East China Sea, deploying SSGNs to the Eastern Mediterranean would offer the redeemed constitution of American resolve in Syria.
But our strategy in Geneva can’t simply be about getting serious with Assad. We’ll also have to recognize our adversaries in Assad’s alliance for who they actually are.
To recognize that while Khamenei’s hardliners see themselves as the new leaders of the Middle East, they’re actually calculating thugs who can be restrained.
To recognize that while Putin thinks he’s a judo-chopping, ex-KGB superman, he’s actually a skulking, mafia goon who can be deterred.
To recognize that while Hezbollah regards itself as the world’s most powerful non-state actor, its structured organization is vulnerable to pressure.
And contrary to Assad’s wishes, we cannot allow our concerns about supranational Salafi jihadists to dictate our policy. These terrorists pose a real threat, but if we empower our professionals, we’ll defeat them.
Up until this point, American policy in Syria has been a monumental failure. We’ve empowered our enemies, neglected our prospective allies and allowed a tyrant to wreak havoc upon his people and the region. Obsessed by the serious risks of intervention, we’ve accepted the catastrophic consequences of absent American leadership.
This week, in Geneva, we can and we must begin to put things right.
Yesterday's bombing in Beirut illustrates the primordial influence of sectarian hatred in shaping Middle Eastern politics dynamics. As I noted on Monday, the Lebanese Hizballah is struggling to contain the wave of Sunni extremist violence that's directed against it. Regarding this sectarian anger, it's clear that there have been two separate counter-responses to Nasrallah's intervention in Syria. On one side, the March 14 bloc is trying to weaken Hizballah's political influence at the governing level. Supported by the Saudis in the form of new aid to the Lebanese Army, Siniora and Hariri are pushing for Hizballah's separation from any new cabinet. Conversely, motivated by their fanatical ideology, Salafi extremist groups are also seeking to weaken Hizballah. However, for these groups, the chosen mechanism of political activity is significant violence. What's clear is that sectarianism is now front and center in Lebanese politics (Martin Chulov gives a good reporting primer on Hizballah's role in this evolving dynamic).
But it isn't just Lebanon. If interested, here are some of my thoughts on the challenge of sectarianism in terms of...
I posted an earlier version of this piece on Saturday. However, some readers were confused that the earlier post was combined with some other thoughts on the NSA. So, paying heed to developments from over the weekend, here's an updated new post without the NSA material!
Friday's bombing in Beirut was almost certainly the work of the Syrian GSD and/or Hizballah. I make that argument based on three factors.
1) Hizballah is under extraordinary physical and political pressure inside Lebanon. The group is thus desperate to reassert its domestic power-perception position. Because of Chatah's symbolic representation of the March 14 bloc and his well known association with the Hariris, he offered an opportune target from which Hizballah could broadcast their overarching message - 'we are prepared to wash the streets with blood in order to maintain our power'. Let's be clear, this is political terrorism in its most unambiguous form.
2) The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (established to investigate the Hariri assassination and a number of other attacks) will shortly begin its trial (in absentia) of a number of Hizballah operatives. Those accused include Mustafa Badr al-Din (the suspected head of Hizballah's foreign operations directorate)*. In this regard, Chatah's assassination was likely intended to send another basic message to the international community - Hizballah will not acquiesce to outside pressure.
3) The Lebanese Hizballah has a long history of engaging in assassinations against its political opponents. Further, the Syrian Civil War provides abundant proof that the group has little compunction about massacring anyone who stands in their way (a truth that I once underestimated). As SOP, Hizballah denies any responsibility for these kind of atrocities. Still, their record is transparent.
On a related note, it's critical that we pay heed to Siniora's evident fury (which reflects popular concerns) over what's just happened. In articulating that the March 14 bloc will push for restrictions on illegal arms, Siniora is (as the Daily Star notes) issuing a thinly veiled threat to Hizballah. In short, he's laying the foundations for a tougher counter-response. As a corollary, Saudi Arabia's grant of $3 billion to the Lebanese Army is surely designed to provide a counter-weight to Hizballah. The walls are closing. In further vein, it will be interesting to see how Michel Aoun reacts to this attack. Although he remains largely sympathetic to Hizballah, Aoun has also publicly flirted with the notion of a rapprochement with the Future Movement. Should Aoun decide to move towards Siniora/Hariri, even in a limited way, this assassination could cause major blowback for Hizballah. After all, it's hard to underestimate how much Hizballah relies upon Aoun; both for political support and cross-sectarian political cover.
*Interestingly, much of the evidence against Badr al-Din was garnered from cell phone intercepts. These may have been provided to the Tribunal by the NSA (Hizballah is a high priority collection target for the US Intelligence Community).
1) The Lebanese Hizballah appears to have lost another leader. Whoever was responsible for Lakkis's death last week, it's obvious that hostile pressure on the group is growing. With Hizballah now fully invested in Assad's survival, sectarian reactions to that strategy are also growing in intensity - hence the less of three senior leaders in as many weeks. In basic terms, Hizballah's political adversaries are taking advantage from the group's associated guilt for incidents like this one. As I've written before, Hizballah is suffering from an identity crisis of serious proportions. Devoid of a cross-sectarian base of sympathy, the organization's carefully constructed 'anti-oppression' narrative is being rendered for the lie that it is. Whatever happens with Assad, in Lebanon and beyond, Hizballah's strategic choices will leave them increasingly vulnerable. For a few of my related thoughts on Hizballah, please click (point five here), here and here. 2) ISIL continues to wreck havoc upon Iraq. In the absence of US Intelligence capabilities (please see my BBC debate on the NSA - takes a minute to load!) and amidst continuing political discord (please see my thoughts here), ISIL and its affiliates are once again endangering Iraq's stability. As the ISW's Jessica Lewis notes, ISIL has embraced a highly effective strategy of impatient resurgence. Again, it's important that we note the targeting methodology that ISIL embraces. As with their Salafi violent-extremist counterparts around the world, they are members of a death worshiping cult. Recognizing this truth, we should still be astute to the political grievances that allow groups like ISIL to prosper. Nevertheless, we must also grapple with the reality of a movement that sees cafes, markets, malls, roads and playgrounds as military targets.
3) The protests in Ukraine continue to grow. President Yanukovych has a problem. At a basic level, he has wagered against a long brewing discontent. Outraged by endemic corruption and Yanukovych's subservience to Putin's bullying/influence, many Ukrainians believe they're in a struggle for the very future of Ukraine. Quite understandably, these citizens have little interest in a future that abandons them to the ignominy of existence as a buffer state for Putin's Russia. While it's true that Ukraine is far from unified in its support for a pro-west future, younger Ukrainians are firmly ensconced with the pro-EU/US crowd. The trend lines are clear. Still, there are US policies that could help catalyze this process. Recognizing Ukraine's deep vulnerability to Russian energy blackmail, the US should urgently begin to provide an alternate source of energy to Eastern European states. By loosening regulations on US companies, exports of US Liquefied Natural Gas exports could begin in earnest. That alternate supply portfolio would enable Ukrainians to break free from their present headlock-like relationship with Russia. For some of my thoughts on Putin, please click here and here.
I have stopped updating this page. The areas below are a frequent area for my writings so the best way to find the latest is to google "Tom Rogan [whatever area/topic you might want to read]" THANKS! I'm now updating this page less regularly (please visit my Washington Examiner page for more recent posts). Writings on other issues related to security/intelligence/counter-terrorism/AQ Core etc. are listed under OTHER header towards the end of this page. Please also see my TV/Radio page for related interviews/speeches. Relevant academic background - I hold a BA in War Studies from King's College London and a Master's degree in Middle East Politics from The School of Oriental and African Studies, London. My work has been recognized by the BBC + BBC, + BBC, + BBC, +BBC, the UK Parliament, the American
Enterprise Institute, the Council
on Foreign Relations, CNN’s FareedZakaria, the Foreign Policy
Initiative,
The Week magazine reviews, The
Wire + The
Wire + The
Wire + The
Wire,
the Center on National Security at Fordham Law School, and Real World
Politics/Real Clear Politics. My examination of US security challenges at the
end of 2013 was reviewed as the global ‘‘must read’’ of the day by the BBC.
Thank you very much for reading.
IRAQ (most Daesh/IS/ISIS/ISIL pieces under this header)
Why Hizballah will desert Assad before the end (The Guardian) (I still support the essence of my argument here, but in hindsight, it's also clear that I placed too much emphasis on Hizballah's concerns over domestic/regional political perception.)
