The Political Face of Sectarian Hatred in the Middle East

Yesterday's bombing in Beirut illustrates the primordial influence of sectarian hatred in shaping Middle Eastern politics dynamics. As I noted on Monday, the Lebanese Hizballah is struggling to contain the wave of Sunni extremist violence that's directed against it. Regarding this sectarian anger, it's clear that there have been two separate counter-responses to Nasrallah's intervention in Syria. On one side, the March 14 bloc is trying to weaken Hizballah's political influence at the governing level. Supported by the Saudis in the form of new aid to the Lebanese Army, Siniora and Hariri are pushing for Hizballah's separation from any new cabinet. Conversely, motivated by their fanatical ideology, Salafi extremist groups are also seeking to weaken Hizballah. However, for these groups, the chosen mechanism of political activity is significant violence. What's clear is that sectarianism is now front and center in Lebanese politics (Martin Chulov gives a good reporting primer on Hizballah's role in this evolving dynamic).

But it isn't just Lebanon. If interested, here are some of my thoughts on the challenge of sectarianism in terms of...

• Egypt

• Iraq (with latest news on Anbar here)

• Lebanon (in relation to the Syrian Civil War)

• Somalia (in terms of internal tensions within terrorist groups) 

• Syria

• Why it's catastrophic for the Islamic world (potentially even apocalyptic)

• How it leads people into terrorism/helps sustain terrorist groups

Related thoughts

Assassination in Beirut

I posted an earlier version of this piece on Saturday. However, some readers were confused that the earlier post was combined with some other thoughts on the NSA. So, paying heed to developments from over the weekend, here's an updated new post without the NSA material!

         Friday's bombing in Beirut was almost certainly the work of the Syrian GSD and/or Hizballah. I make that argument based on three factors. 

1) Hizballah is under extraordinary physical and political pressure inside Lebanon. The group is thus desperate to reassert its domestic power-perception position. Because of Chatah's symbolic representation of the March 14 bloc and his well known association with the Hariris, he offered an opportune target from which Hizballah could broadcast their overarching message - 'we are prepared to wash the streets with blood in order to maintain our power'. Let's be clear, this is political terrorism in its most unambiguous form.

2) The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (established to investigate the Hariri assassination and a number of other attacks) will shortly begin its trial (in absentia) of a number of Hizballah operatives. Those accused include Mustafa Badr al-Din (the suspected head of Hizballah's foreign operations directorate)*. In this regard, Chatah's assassination was likely intended to send another basic message to the international community - Hizballah will not acquiesce to outside pressure.

3) The Lebanese Hizballah has a long history of engaging in assassinations against its political opponents. Further, the Syrian Civil War provides abundant proof that the group has little compunction about massacring anyone who stands in their way (a truth that I once underestimated). As SOP, Hizballah denies any responsibility for these kind of atrocities. Still, their record is transparent.

                On a related note, it's critical that we pay heed to Siniora's evident fury (which reflects popular concerns) over what's just happened. In articulating that the March 14 bloc will push for restrictions on illegal arms, Siniora is (as the Daily Star notes) issuing a thinly veiled threat to Hizballah. In short, he's laying the foundations for a tougher counter-response. As a corollary, Saudi Arabia's grant of $3 billion to the Lebanese Army is surely designed to provide a counter-weight to Hizballah. The walls are closing. In further vein, it will be interesting to see how Michel Aoun reacts to this attack. Although he remains largely sympathetic to Hizballah, Aoun has also publicly flirted with the notion of a rapprochement with the Future Movement. Should Aoun decide to move towards Siniora/Hariri, even in a limited way, this assassination could cause major blowback for Hizballah. After all, it's hard to underestimate how much Hizballah relies upon Aoun; both for political support and cross-sectarian political cover.

*Interestingly, much of the evidence against Badr al-Din was garnered from cell phone intercepts. These may have been provided to the Tribunal by the NSA (Hizballah is a high priority collection target for the US Intelligence Community).

Related thoughts.

The Lebanese Hizballah and a Challenge of Identity

The US-Al Qa'ida security alert is continuing. 

However, so is the Syrian civil war. In that vein, I thought I'd outline a few of my thoughts on the Lebanese Hizballah.

A couple of weeks ago, the EU blacklisted Hizballah's military wing. That was a positive (if long overdue) move. From my perspective, Hizballah should not be able claim the moral sovereignty of a democratic political actor, whilst simultaneously retaining an apparatus of terrorism.

Yet, regardless of the EU, the Lebanese Hizballah faces a growing identity challenge. There's a simple reason why - Hizballah's continued, unrepentant support for the Assad regime in Syria.

Inside Lebanon, Hizballah has long resided upon a carefully cultivated identity as a cross-sectarian resistance force against foreign aggression. The group's support for Assad is irreconcilable with that position. Consequentially, both moderate and extremist Lebanese political actors are increasing their pressure on the group. Currents of sectarian hatred are once again rising to the surface (also see Nasrallah's comments in video link below). Ultiamtely, hypocrisy is the worst enemy of political identity and Hizballah's competitors are taking full advantage of this truth. Of course, it doesn't help Hizballah's legitimacy that the group wages regular terrorist campaigns against their political opponents.

Hizballah's brutality is taking a further toll beyond Lebanese borders. For a start, the organization's reputation is now increasingly tenuous amongst regional populations. Rather than being perceived as an emancipatory force delivering justice to the Lebanese nation, in many quarters, the organization is seen as a bitter sectarian entity that acts in the pursuit of a narrow agenda.

In the long term, these difficulties pose two distinct challenges for the group. First, they serve to fundamentally undercut Hizballah's base of cross-sectarian support. Second, as Hizballah's political identity becomes toxic, there will be less inducement for other political parties to join in coalition with the organization. We're already witnessing this development in Hizballah's evolving relationship with Hamas. In addition, though mainly motivated by other concerns, the recent collapse of the March 8th ruling coalition (of which Hizballah was a key part) illustrates the significant degree to which Lebanese political dynamics rest on uncertain ground. Hizballah's power base is growing more unstable. 

Back in the summer of 2011, I argued that Hizballah would eventually abandon Assad through fear of otherwise suffering the political consequences mentioned above. They may still do so. However, I increasingly suspect that such a choice will require far greater western pressure on Assad.

For a selection of my other writings on Middle Eastern security - link here.

The EU's Hizballah delusion

Following a comprehensive investigation, Bulgaria's security services have concluded that the Lebanese Hizballah was responsible for bombing an Israeli tour bus in July 2012. Pressure is now growing on the EU to classify Hizballah as a terrorist organization. At present, only the group's military wing is prohibited from operating in the EU.  

One might assume that this is a relatively simple issue- that evidence should lead policy. That Hizballah's political masters cannot be disconnected from their military forces. However, as Tuesday's New York Times pointed out, major European states including France and Germany remain reluctant to get tougher on the group. 

Europeans like to argue that the US policy towards the Middle East is a product of utter naivete and favoritism towards Israel. But for me, the EU's current Hizballah policy represents the height of moral and strategic deficiency.

For a start, far too many Europeans have an absurdly idealized conception of what Hizballah is and what the organization stands for. Let me give you a personal example. In the immediate aftermath of the July 2012 attack, I blogged about why I believed the bombing was part of a larger strategy of covert action on the part of Hizballah and Iran. It would now appear that my analysis has been vindicated. Back in July though, many Europeans accused me of being a mindless drone for Israeli propaganda. This criticism included strong words from a former classmate from my Middle East Politics masters program. Sadly, when it comes to Hizballah, for many politically engaged Europeans, objective analysis is absent. In large part, this discourse failure stems from the pervasive anti-Israeli sentiment which exists in Europe. A belief that Israel is a illegitimate state and that its security actions are little more than a shadow strategy of ethnic cleansing. Hizballah takes full advantage of this prejudice. Presenting themselves as  liberation actors in the (sadly) still fashionable mould of Che Guevara, Hizballah's leaders have successfully blurred their group into the broader narrative of European populist anger over Israeli/US foreign policy in the Middle East. Every time that an anti-Israeli protest takes place in European cities, Hizballah flags are on proud display. Now, aside from the fact that describing Hizballah as a liberation movement is like saying that Mao was a humanitarian, there's a broader dysfunction to the EU's emotional delusion. It dilutes effective academic discussions of complex issues and it pollutes EU policy interactions with Hizballah. Rather than recognizing that the group retains its power through a mix of democratic interactions and terrorism (domestic as well as foreign), European politicians prepare to wear rose tinted glasses. They allow Hizballah's considerable EU fundraising efforts to flourish. And in doing so, they facilitate Hizballah's aggression in Lebanon and as we see in Syria, venomous brutality abroad

However, EU policy towards Hizballah doesn't just fail on the moral count. There's also its implicit strategic weakness. Consider this quote: “There’s the overall fear if we’re too noisy about this, Hezbollah might strike again, and it might not be Israeli tourists this time.” Those words come from the editor of one of Germany's top foreign policy magazines. And they represent the pervasive power of appeasement at the heart of the EU's counter-terrorism policy. Prior to 9/11, EU states excused Al Qa'ida operatives in their midst (see Germany). Since 9/11, while EU-US counter-terrorism co-operation has improved, tensions have also developed. Why these tensions? Because Europe continues to entertain the delusion that terrorism is criminal activity. It isn't.  Terrorism is political. By any consideration of Clausewitizian doctrine, terrorism is the continuation of politics by other means. It requires a comprehensive response.
 

At the moment in Europe at least, Hizballah is smiling.

Relevant update.

 

Bulgaria bus explosion

The attack on Israelis visiting Bulgaria is probably the work of Hizballah or Iran's intelligence services. UPDATED-Hezbollah confirmed. Or both. The Iranians have been especially active in attempting to strike Israeli targets over the past few months. These actions have included incidents in Bangkok, Georgia and India. Israel's priority at the moment is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability. As I argued several months ago, for each Western/Israeli action in the region, Iran prepares a counter-response. Israel will now encourage the international community to increase pressure on Iran.

Also - Although not engaged in an actual attack - Israel claims that Hizballah operatives were detained in Kenya and Cyprus over the past few days.

What I believe the US should do in Syria

The continuing bloodshed in Syria is terrible. I believe that greater, more aggressive action is needed on the part of the international community. I also believe that Europe must learn that this situation is another example of why they must spend more on defense.

Having said this, I will break my reasoning into two considerations - the strategic utility of  a non-US Military rooted intervention and how such an intervention could be implemented effectively.

Regarding a prospective military intervention, my primary concern is that direct US Military intervention in Syria would pose substantial risks. A major point here is in the fact that much of Syria is protected by a comparatively advanced air defense system. This is a system that’s defeat would require a substantial air campaign on the part of the United States – a campaign that would risk both Syrian civilians and American flight crews. Another concern is the relative competence of the Syrian armed forces in comparison to those of Gaddafi. Faced with direct US Military intervention, these units might dramatically escalate their campaign against Syrian civilians. These units would also be likely to pose a greater threat to US interests in the region. I also worry that a military intervention would require a substantial re-direction of resources away from other critical US Military missions, while simultaneously risking Iranian escalation. In such a situation, the US would be left stretched and our regional priorities would be left highly vulnerable. Critically, Afghanistan is a core US national security priority and requires the continued focus of our national power.

My argument instead is that the US should adopt a strategy that combines increased diplomatic pressure on Assad, Iran and Hizballah AND China and Russia, with physical US support to Syrian rebel elements.  The US should make clear to the Chinese and Russian leadership that we regard their continued support for Assad with major discontent. Consequently, the US should be ready to take escalatory diplomatic reprisals if China and Russia fail to adapt their position. To be blunt, the US must ultimately be prepared to withdraw our ambassadors to Beijing and Moscow. If we truly value human rights, we must be willing to stand up with purpose. Alongside diplomatic action, I believe that the US should provide logistical support (weapons money, tools, intelligence support etc) to identified rebel elements. This support should be given in concert with European and other regional partner states, so as to maximize support efficiency and credibility, while also minimizing the risk of this 'support' entering the hands of Islamist extremists (a risk that cannot be totally eliminated). The CIA Special Activities Division is well suited to such a task.

Ultimately, I believe that this balanced approach would dramatically increase pressure on Assad while mitigating the negative risks of an open military intervention. Such action would also serve to increase pressure on the Lebanese Hizballah, via highlighting the hypocrisy of Hizballah's continued support for the Assad regime. It is in this way that the Assad-Iran-Hizballah alliance could be weakened and Assad's grip on power could be slowly but systematically degraded.

Risks and Options available to deal with Assad

In light of today's news from Syria, I wanted to post an update of a previous commentary I wrote for this blog. 

Calls for a western intervention in Syria are growing. While I understand and share the concern of many regarding Assad's continuing campaign of murder, I do not believe that military intervention in Syria would be an appropriate strategy. 

First, a direct military intervention would be far from easy. Unlike Gaddafi's weak military infrastructure, Syria possesses a formidable array of military capabilities. These include thousands of tanks and artillery pieces, an advanced air defense network and hundreds of thousands of soldiers - the key units of which are ideologically attached to the Assad regime. Military intervention would require engaging and destroying these units. Such a mission would be complex, risky and would require a much more substantial coalition military force than that which was seen in Libya. Only the United States Military could carry out this operation. The pathetic European attitude towards foreign security policy - 'big talk, no kit' means that practical support from the EU would be almost non-existent. So.. in effect, if the US were to embark on an operation in Syria, it would be forced to commit significant military resources away from critical operations in Afghanistan, while undertaking full practical responsibility for the evolution of 'post-action' events inside Syria. I would however re-consider my position on military intervention if Turkey and other regional states were willing to contribute substantial military assets to any operation.

Beyond the pure military complexities, a prospective US intervention in Syria also raises  other major concerns. First, in the context of existing tensions, Iran would likely regard direct US engagement against Assad as a direct threat to the Iranian regime. Combining this with the looming Israeli-Iranian showdown, Iran's paranoid leadership might elect to go 'all in' to support Assad. Whether through supporting terrorist attacks against western interests around the world, mining the straits of Hormuz or sending a much greater level of military support to Assad, Iran would probably take a much more overt role in the conflict. Israel might also decide to launch an early strike on Iranian nuclear facilities (to offset future negative international concerns) thus increasing the likelihood of a situation in which every regional power alliance rapidly escalated towards war. It is crucial to remember that the situation in Syria is not divorced from other regional dynamics.

In another area, for Assad domestically, a US intervention would encourage the regime to portray the internal rebellion as a foreign project controlled for example by the 'Zionist puppets in Washington'. Assad's desire to portray recent terrorist attacks as a representation of the broader protest movement, suggests that the regime would jump at any opportunity to weaken the narrative of legitimacy that the current rebellion continues to expound. Put simply, American intervention might encourage Assad to use massive amounts of force in an attempt to finally annihilate those who challenge him. In such a situation, the US might have to apply equally vigorous force to quickly remove Assad from power. This would likely be expensive in its cost on American military personnel.

I believe that there is a better route towards destroying Assad's regime. This approach should take the form of a dual track strategy.

First, the west should increase covert support to Syrian resistance cells. This should focus around provision of money to allow cells to fund logistical costs (like fuel, food and communications) and to build organisational structures that can contest Assad's forces more effectively. If possible, the west should provide military special forces advisors to help direct the resistance military strategy.

Second, the west should continue to draw attention to Assad's actions and their incompatibility with the arab spring. The west should aggressively highlight continued Chinese and Russian unjustifiable support for Assad's regime, while continuing to build regional pressure alongside allies like Turkey.  We should also seek to draw attention to the sickening hypocrisy of Iran and Hizballah in the current fight. While the Iranian regime claims to have lead the region towards revolutionary empowerment, in reality, Iran's clerical leaders are supporting the murder of thousands of innocent civilians in order to maintain their grip of power over the Syrian people. Similarly, by supporting Assad, Hizballah's narrative of 'emancipation for the oppressed weak against the power of the corrupt strong', is being rendered a transparent falsehood. At least in the case of Hezbollah, if sustained attention can continue to be brought against that group's relationship with Assad - a tipping point in which they break effective ties will probably become possible. As in Lebanon, Hezbollah is vulnerable to further negative attention.

The near/middle east is undergoing seismic shifts in state-society relations. Ultimately the current Syria-Iran-Hezbollah+Russia/China alliance is its own worse enemy. We should seek greater publicity of this alliance, coupled with more vigorous support to the Syrian rebels.

Assange and Nasrallah

Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hizballah being 'interviewed' by Assange. Within the first two minutes of the interview Nasrallah states that Israel does not have a right to exist. This remark is followed by..

Nasrallah lying about corruption in his organisation. 

Nasrallah arguing that Assad is fighting for freedom against Syrian 'terrorists'. Apparently 'Assad was very willing' to accept major reforms until 'Al Qa'ida' came and tried to wage war against him.

Nasrallah and Assange joking with each other. As Assange is supposedly a liberal anti-authoritarian, his fawning attitude towards Nasrallah shows how full of **** he actually is.

1) Hillary Clinton was right to visit Pakistan. Whatever the problems in the US relationship with Pakistan, the US needs Pakistani support for a stable Afghanistan. While the ISI will continue to try and protect their own interests (marginalizing the influence of the US/getting US aid/hostile policy towards India), there are others in the Pakistani govt/military that have a more balanced outlook. It is true that they might not win out over anti-US elements, but it is also true that without US support the chances of their political defeat are substantially higher.

2) Now that Mladic has been captured we will have another opportunity to view the dysfunction of the Hague 'justice' system. His incarceration will be characterized by comparative luxury, his trial by extreme length and his punishment if (convicted) by terrible insufficiency.

3) The Senate was right to re-authorize the Patriot Act sunset provisions. I believe that there are sufficient safeguards in place to prevent abuse (important oversight is critical though). The capabilities that these provisions provide are also critical to national security. European investigative tools are far more intrusive and without similar safeguards. For example, the UK domestic Security Service - MI5, only requires the signature of the Home Secretary to authorize wiretaps. Political authority not judicial.

4) Could not agree more with Andrew Exum on Libya. Especially the PS note....

5) Instead of using Obama's speech as a reach out to Arab and Israeli moderates, we have allowed Hizballah to spin our reaction in their favor. Nasarallah is now openly supporting Assad as part of the righteous bulwark against the Israeli-US conspiracy. The hypocrisy of Hizballah's Assad support is stunning (supporting a dictator while painting themselves as revolutionary emancipators)  but its acceptance by Arab moderates is only possible through our own stupidity in playing into their traditional talking points. We should be embarrassed. Congress should read some books on the Middle East rather than reading polling data.

6) FIFA is in a state of meltdown. Sepp Blatter is an ass hole but it appears he may also be corrupt. Sadly their appears to be no one respectable available to replace him.

7) The Red Sox are on fire. A nice change from the early season.

8) The Champions League Final tomorrow should be a great game. Man Utd must follow the motto of the SAS.

Tom Rogan Thinks..

1) How Disney ever thought that this would work is beyond me.

2) If Sarah Palin runs for President it will be unfortunate.


3) Wisconsin Republicans should pass the bill again. To do so would be good Republican politics- honest decisive action in support of basic party ideals. Republican values are not served by running around screaming like the Bachmann brigade.


4) Gen. Dempsey would be a great choice as the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I especially enjoyed his quote about AC-130s a few years ago while fighting al-Sadr in Iraq..