The Lebanese Hizballah and a Challenge of Identity

The US-Al Qa'ida security alert is continuing. 

However, so is the Syrian civil war. In that vein, I thought I'd outline a few of my thoughts on the Lebanese Hizballah.

A couple of weeks ago, the EU blacklisted Hizballah's military wing. That was a positive (if long overdue) move. From my perspective, Hizballah should not be able claim the moral sovereignty of a democratic political actor, whilst simultaneously retaining an apparatus of terrorism.

Yet, regardless of the EU, the Lebanese Hizballah faces a growing identity challenge. There's a simple reason why - Hizballah's continued, unrepentant support for the Assad regime in Syria.

Inside Lebanon, Hizballah has long resided upon a carefully cultivated identity as a cross-sectarian resistance force against foreign aggression. The group's support for Assad is irreconcilable with that position. Consequentially, both moderate and extremist Lebanese political actors are increasing their pressure on the group. Currents of sectarian hatred are once again rising to the surface (also see Nasrallah's comments in video link below). Ultiamtely, hypocrisy is the worst enemy of political identity and Hizballah's competitors are taking full advantage of this truth. Of course, it doesn't help Hizballah's legitimacy that the group wages regular terrorist campaigns against their political opponents.

Hizballah's brutality is taking a further toll beyond Lebanese borders. For a start, the organization's reputation is now increasingly tenuous amongst regional populations. Rather than being perceived as an emancipatory force delivering justice to the Lebanese nation, in many quarters, the organization is seen as a bitter sectarian entity that acts in the pursuit of a narrow agenda.

In the long term, these difficulties pose two distinct challenges for the group. First, they serve to fundamentally undercut Hizballah's base of cross-sectarian support. Second, as Hizballah's political identity becomes toxic, there will be less inducement for other political parties to join in coalition with the organization. We're already witnessing this development in Hizballah's evolving relationship with Hamas. In addition, though mainly motivated by other concerns, the recent collapse of the March 8th ruling coalition (of which Hizballah was a key part) illustrates the significant degree to which Lebanese political dynamics rest on uncertain ground. Hizballah's power base is growing more unstable. 

Back in the summer of 2011, I argued that Hizballah would eventually abandon Assad through fear of otherwise suffering the political consequences mentioned above. They may still do so. However, I increasingly suspect that such a choice will require far greater western pressure on Assad.

For a selection of my other writings on Middle Eastern security - link here.

The EU's Hizballah delusion

Following a comprehensive investigation, Bulgaria's security services have concluded that the Lebanese Hizballah was responsible for bombing an Israeli tour bus in July 2012. Pressure is now growing on the EU to classify Hizballah as a terrorist organization. At present, only the group's military wing is prohibited from operating in the EU.  

One might assume that this is a relatively simple issue- that evidence should lead policy. That Hizballah's political masters cannot be disconnected from their military forces. However, as Tuesday's New York Times pointed out, major European states including France and Germany remain reluctant to get tougher on the group. 

Europeans like to argue that the US policy towards the Middle East is a product of utter naivete and favoritism towards Israel. But for me, the EU's current Hizballah policy represents the height of moral and strategic deficiency.

For a start, far too many Europeans have an absurdly idealized conception of what Hizballah is and what the organization stands for. Let me give you a personal example. In the immediate aftermath of the July 2012 attack, I blogged about why I believed the bombing was part of a larger strategy of covert action on the part of Hizballah and Iran. It would now appear that my analysis has been vindicated. Back in July though, many Europeans accused me of being a mindless drone for Israeli propaganda. This criticism included strong words from a former classmate from my Middle East Politics masters program. Sadly, when it comes to Hizballah, for many politically engaged Europeans, objective analysis is absent. In large part, this discourse failure stems from the pervasive anti-Israeli sentiment which exists in Europe. A belief that Israel is a illegitimate state and that its security actions are little more than a shadow strategy of ethnic cleansing. Hizballah takes full advantage of this prejudice. Presenting themselves as  liberation actors in the (sadly) still fashionable mould of Che Guevara, Hizballah's leaders have successfully blurred their group into the broader narrative of European populist anger over Israeli/US foreign policy in the Middle East. Every time that an anti-Israeli protest takes place in European cities, Hizballah flags are on proud display. Now, aside from the fact that describing Hizballah as a liberation movement is like saying that Mao was a humanitarian, there's a broader dysfunction to the EU's emotional delusion. It dilutes effective academic discussions of complex issues and it pollutes EU policy interactions with Hizballah. Rather than recognizing that the group retains its power through a mix of democratic interactions and terrorism (domestic as well as foreign), European politicians prepare to wear rose tinted glasses. They allow Hizballah's considerable EU fundraising efforts to flourish. And in doing so, they facilitate Hizballah's aggression in Lebanon and as we see in Syria, venomous brutality abroad

However, EU policy towards Hizballah doesn't just fail on the moral count. There's also its implicit strategic weakness. Consider this quote: “There’s the overall fear if we’re too noisy about this, Hezbollah might strike again, and it might not be Israeli tourists this time.” Those words come from the editor of one of Germany's top foreign policy magazines. And they represent the pervasive power of appeasement at the heart of the EU's counter-terrorism policy. Prior to 9/11, EU states excused Al Qa'ida operatives in their midst (see Germany). Since 9/11, while EU-US counter-terrorism co-operation has improved, tensions have also developed. Why these tensions? Because Europe continues to entertain the delusion that terrorism is criminal activity. It isn't.  Terrorism is political. By any consideration of Clausewitizian doctrine, terrorism is the continuation of politics by other means. It requires a comprehensive response.
 

At the moment in Europe at least, Hizballah is smiling.

Relevant update.