Yesterday's bombing in Beirut illustrates the primordial influence of sectarian hatred in shaping Middle Eastern politics dynamics. As I noted on Monday, the Lebanese Hizballah is struggling to contain the wave of Sunni extremist violence that's directed against it. Regarding this sectarian anger, it's clear that there have been two separate counter-responses to Nasrallah's intervention in Syria. On one side, the March 14 bloc is trying to weaken Hizballah's political influence at the governing level. Supported by the Saudis in the form of new aid to the Lebanese Army, Siniora and Hariri are pushing for Hizballah's separation from any new cabinet. Conversely, motivated by their fanatical ideology, Salafi extremist groups are also seeking to weaken Hizballah. However, for these groups, the chosen mechanism of political activity is significant violence. What's clear is that sectarianism is now front and center in Lebanese politics (Martin Chulov gives a good reporting primer on Hizballah's role in this evolving dynamic).
But it isn't just Lebanon. If interested, here are some of my thoughts on the challenge of sectarianism in terms of...
I posted an earlier version of this piece on Saturday. However, some readers were confused that the earlier post was combined with some other thoughts on the NSA. So, paying heed to developments from over the weekend, here's an updated new post without the NSA material!
Friday's bombing in Beirut was almost certainly the work of the Syrian GSD and/or Hizballah. I make that argument based on three factors.
1) Hizballah is under extraordinary physical and political pressure inside Lebanon. The group is thus desperate to reassert its domestic power-perception position. Because of Chatah's symbolic representation of the March 14 bloc and his well known association with the Hariris, he offered an opportune target from which Hizballah could broadcast their overarching message - 'we are prepared to wash the streets with blood in order to maintain our power'. Let's be clear, this is political terrorism in its most unambiguous form.
2) The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (established to investigate the Hariri assassination and a number of other attacks) will shortly begin its trial (in absentia) of a number of Hizballah operatives. Those accused include Mustafa Badr al-Din (the suspected head of Hizballah's foreign operations directorate)*. In this regard, Chatah's assassination was likely intended to send another basic message to the international community - Hizballah will not acquiesce to outside pressure.
3) The Lebanese Hizballah has a long history of engaging in assassinations against its political opponents. Further, the Syrian Civil War provides abundant proof that the group has little compunction about massacring anyone who stands in their way (a truth that I once underestimated). As SOP, Hizballah denies any responsibility for these kind of atrocities. Still, their record is transparent.
On a related note, it's critical that we pay heed to Siniora's evident fury (which reflects popular concerns) over what's just happened. In articulating that the March 14 bloc will push for restrictions on illegal arms, Siniora is (as the Daily Star notes) issuing a thinly veiled threat to Hizballah. In short, he's laying the foundations for a tougher counter-response. As a corollary, Saudi Arabia's grant of $3 billion to the Lebanese Army is surely designed to provide a counter-weight to Hizballah. The walls are closing. In further vein, it will be interesting to see how Michel Aoun reacts to this attack. Although he remains largely sympathetic to Hizballah, Aoun has also publicly flirted with the notion of a rapprochement with the Future Movement. Should Aoun decide to move towards Siniora/Hariri, even in a limited way, this assassination could cause major blowback for Hizballah. After all, it's hard to underestimate how much Hizballah relies upon Aoun; both for political support and cross-sectarian political cover.
*Interestingly, much of the evidence against Badr al-Din was garnered from cell phone intercepts. These may have been provided to the Tribunal by the NSA (Hizballah is a high priority collection target for the US Intelligence Community).
This chart encapsulates why I believe a serious peace deal (or it fails, the military option) must be pursued in order to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. I accept that my graphics skills are limited!
The leader of Al Qa'ida, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has released another audiotape.
Much of the recording follows Zawahiri's traditional form - calling for resistance to western civilization, ridiculing American culture, claiming AQ/affiliates have driven the US out of the Middle East etc.
Still, there are two interesting elements to this latest message.
First, when Zawahiri calls for attacks ''by one brother or a few of the brothers [followers of AQ ideology]", he's speaking to an evolving attack strategy on the part of AQ core. Astute to western capabilities in the field of communications intelligence (specifically signal intercepts), for a number of years now, AQ has sought to reduce its electronic footprint. Indeed, this renewed focus on improved operational security is further evidenced by Zawahiri's decision to release an audio rather than video tape (video tapes obviously providing more analytic utility to US Intelligence). Ultimately, Zawahiri is aware that every time his operatives communicate across the internet etc. they run the risk of detection. Combined with the fact that US Intelligence/allied services adopt a range of other actions to identify and disrupt AQ agents, the group has been forced to embrace a diversified attack strategy. By inspiring acts of violence (note his praise of the Boston bombers), Zawahiri hopes to hurt the United States without jeopardizing his assets (if interested, see my thoughts on the Tsarnaevs).
Nevertheless, in contrast to the former FBI agent who speaks in the video below, I believe that it would be a serious mistake to underestimate AQ Core's desire and capacity to employ their own operatives where possible. The apparent operational synergy between the suspects in Operation Pathway and the Zazi plotters, illustrates that AQ Core remains active beyond simple influence messaging.
Second interest element- Zawahiri's statement: “I warn my brothers in Syria against any compromise with those factions. They have to learn the lesson of Egypt... [Zawahiri then condemns Morsi for maintaining the peace treaty with Israel].” From my perspective, Zawahiri is pursuing two objectives with this message.
First, he's encouraging affiliates like ISIS to continue their campaign of destruction in the region (see point 2 here). Zawahiri believes that political instability and escalating sectarian tensions will provide a foundation for AQ's broader empowerment.*
Second, regarding his condemnation of Morsi, I suspect that Zawahiri is attempting to create fissures in the Muslim Brotherhood - seeking to attract disaffected MB supporters towards AQ linked extremism. A few weeks back, I expressed my concern that the Egyptian Army's crackdown would spark a 'Salafist Spring' (see point 5 here). Zawahiri might be a fanatic, but as he proved in his dealings with al-Zarqawi, he's also a semi-astute political actor - he senses an opportunity in the chaos.
* - AQ's obsession with violence says much about the group's organizing identity. They are extremist totalitarians - individuals who pursue catastrophic violence as their primary mechanism of action.
However, so is the Syrian civil war. In that vein, I thought I'd outline a few of my thoughts on the Lebanese Hizballah.
A couple of weeks ago, the EU blacklisted Hizballah's military wing. That was a positive (if long overdue) move. From my perspective, Hizballah should not be able claim the moral sovereignty of a democratic political actor, whilst simultaneously retaining an apparatus of terrorism.
Yet, regardless of the EU, the Lebanese Hizballah faces a growing identity challenge. There's a simple reason why - Hizballah's continued, unrepentant support for the Assad regime in Syria.
Inside Lebanon, Hizballah has long resided upon a carefully cultivated identity as a cross-sectarian resistance force against foreign aggression. The group's support for Assad is irreconcilable with that position. Consequentially, both moderate and extremist Lebanese political actors are increasing their pressure on the group. Currents of sectarian hatred are once again rising to the surface (also see Nasrallah's comments in video link below). Ultiamtely, hypocrisy is the worst enemy of political identity and Hizballah's competitors are taking full advantage of this truth. Of course, it doesn't help Hizballah's legitimacy that the group wages regular terrorist campaigns against their political opponents.
Hizballah's brutality is taking a further toll beyond Lebanese borders. For a start, the organization's reputation is now increasingly tenuous amongst regional populations. Rather than being perceived as an emancipatory force delivering justice to the Lebanesenation, in many quarters, the organization is seen as a bitter sectarian entity that acts in the pursuit of a narrow agenda.
In the long term, these difficulties pose two distinct challenges for the group. First, they serve to fundamentally undercut Hizballah's base of cross-sectarian support. Second, as Hizballah's political identity becomes toxic, there will be less inducement for other political parties to join in coalition with the organization. We're already witnessing this development in Hizballah's evolving relationship with Hamas. In addition, though mainly motivated by other concerns, the recent collapse of the March 8th ruling coalition (of which Hizballah was a key part) illustrates the significant degree to which Lebanese political dynamics rest on uncertain ground. Hizballah's power base is growing more unstable.
Back in the summer of 2011, I argued that Hizballah would eventually abandon Assad through fear of otherwise suffering the political consequences mentioned above. They may still do so. However, I increasingly suspect that such a choice will require far greater western pressure on Assad.
For a selection of my other writings on Middle Eastern security - link here.
Following a comprehensive investigation, Bulgaria's
security services have concluded that the Lebanese Hizballah was
responsible for bombing an Israeli tour bus in July 2012. Pressure is now growing on the EU to classify Hizballah as a terrorist organization. At present, only the group's military wing is prohibited from operating in the EU.
One might assume that this is a relatively simple issue- that evidence should lead policy. That Hizballah's political masters cannot be disconnected from their military forces. However, as Tuesday's New York Times pointed out, major European states including France and Germany remain reluctant to get tougher on the group.
Europeans like to argue that the US policy towards the Middle East is a product of utter naivete and favoritism towards Israel. But for me, the EU's current Hizballah policy represents the height of moral and strategic deficiency.
For a start, far too many Europeans have an absurdly idealized conception of what Hizballah is and what the organization stands for. Let me give you a personal example. In the immediate aftermath of the July 2012 attack, I blogged about why I believed the bombing was part of a larger strategy of covert action on the part of Hizballah and Iran. It would now appear that my analysis has been vindicated. Back in July though, many Europeans accused me of being a mindless drone for Israeli propaganda. This criticism included strong words from a former classmate from my Middle East Politics masters program. Sadly, when it comes to Hizballah, for many politically engaged Europeans, objective analysis is absent. In large part, this discourse failure stems from the pervasive anti-Israeli sentiment which exists in Europe. A belief that Israel is a illegitimate state and that its security actions are little more than a shadow strategy of ethnic cleansing. Hizballah takes full advantage of this prejudice. Presenting themselves as liberation actors in the (sadly) still fashionable mould of Che Guevara, Hizballah's leaders have successfully blurred their group into the broader narrative of European populist anger over Israeli/US foreign policy in the Middle East. Every time that an anti-Israeli protest takes place in European cities, Hizballah flags are on proud display. Now, aside from the fact that describing Hizballah as a liberation movement is like saying that Mao was a humanitarian, there's a broader dysfunction to the EU's emotional delusion. It dilutes effective academic discussions of complex issues and it pollutes EU policy interactions with Hizballah. Rather than recognizing that the group retains its power through a mix of democratic interactions and terrorism (domestic as well as foreign), European politicians prepare to wear rose tinted glasses. They allow Hizballah's considerable EU fundraising efforts to flourish. And in doing so, they facilitate Hizballah's aggression in Lebanon and as we see in Syria, venomous brutality abroad
However, EU policy towards Hizballah doesn't just fail on the moral count. There's also its implicit strategic weakness. Consider this quote: “There’s the overall fear if we’re too noisy about this, Hezbollah might
strike again, and it might not be Israeli tourists this time.” Those words come from the editor of one of Germany's top foreign policy magazines.And they represent the pervasive power of appeasement at the heart of the EU's counter-terrorism policy. Prior to 9/11, EU states excused Al Qa'ida operatives in their midst (see Germany). Since 9/11, while EU-US counter-terrorism co-operation has improved, tensions have also developed. Why these tensions? Because Europe continues to entertain the delusion that terrorism is criminal activity. It isn't. Terrorism is political. By any consideration of Clausewitizian doctrine, terrorism is the continuation of politics by other means. It requires a comprehensive response.
At the momentin Europe at least, Hizballah is smiling. Relevant update.
The bombing in Beirut earlier today is a firm reminder of the intense political dynamics that are at contest in Lebanon and Syria. A contest in which Syria-Iran-Hizballah are at war with regional forces of liberation. I believe that today's attack was carried out by agents of the Syrian government and perhaps also with the co-ordination or support of the Lebanese Hizballah. While I have no specific evidence to back up this assertion, I would point to a number of indicators. Also some analysis...
1) The attack took place in a predominantly Christian neighborhood of eastern Beirut and killed a senior Lebanese civil servant who was an outspoken critic of the Assad regime. In addition, Assad has previously warned that he would seek to push the conflict in Syria into a broadened external struggle.
2) Syria and Hizballah have a clear track record of support for violence against those who challenge their political power. This has involved recent, previous attacks on both major Lebanese officials and foreign entities. Iran also shares this preference for using covert force against those who oppose them.
3) Hizballah is increasingly concerned by the serious damage that their continued support for Assad is inflicting on their broader ideational legitimacy. Instigating further currents of regional instability (as today's attack would suggest) offers Hizballah a method by which they believe that they can distract world attention. I would argue that Hizballah's recent UAV flight over Israel provides another timely example of this dynamic. I have previously suggested that Hizballah would begin to abandon Assad once they came to believe that his regime was doomed. While I expected that this would have occurred before now, I remain confident of that belief. Ultimately, it is my opinion that Hizballah still believes that Assad can be saved. If evidence shows that today's attack (and the future instability that it foreshadows) is linked to Syria, it should serve to re-emphasize the need for the United States to take more concrete action to help Syrians liberate their country.
4) Faced with the EU tightened oil sanctions last week and Iran's continuing economic implosion, I believe (as I have previously argued) that Iran is likely to respond with more acts of aggression in the near future. Again, the United States must be prepared to respond to any attacks that take place.
The attack on Israelis visiting Bulgaria is probably the work of Hizballah or Iran's intelligence services. UPDATED-Hezbollah confirmed. Or both. The Iranians have been especially active in attempting to strike Israeli targets over the past few months. These actions have included incidents in Bangkok, Georgia and India. Israel's priority at the moment is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability. As I argued several months ago, for each Western/Israeli action in the region, Iran prepares a counter-response. Israel will now encourage the international community to increase pressure on Iran.
Also - Although not engaged in an actual attack - Israel claims that Hizballah operatives were detained in Kenya and Cyprus over the past few days.
