Jindal on GOP, Iraq strife, Syria, US in Mali, North Korea

A few issues today.

1) BOBBY JINDAL has said that the GOP needs to stop being stupid. He's right. But unfortunately, the problem goes far deeper than defective PR messaging and the occasional rape remark. The hard truth is that the GOP is disconnected from far too many Americans. Jindal was wrong to pretend that a simple turn of phrase will alleviate this condition of political dysfunction. Instead, conservatives need real, substantial Republican evolution. Evolution that doesn't dilute conservatism, but re-frames and re-energizes conservatism for the 21st century. We need a message that connects with inner city Americans. We need to forge a social conservatism that serves society. We need to build broad coalitions. And most certainly, WE NEED a party valuing of intellectual curiosity, rather than condemning of debate as subversion and treason. If conservatives don't address these problems, we will keep loosing elections. It's not my opinion, it's the 21st century.

Side note- If Republicans select credible candidates, the GOP can re-take the Senate in 2014.

2) IRAQ is not looking good. Five Sunni protesters were killed by government forces in Fallujah yesterday. Now the head of the Anbar Awakening Council (which was critical in helping the US Military restrain Al Qa'ida in Iraq) has threatened insurrection against government forces in Iraq's huge western province. It's important to understand that this situation is not the product of a single incident. For the past couple of years, tensions between the Shia dominated Iraqi Government and Iraqi Sunnis have steadily increased. On the one hand, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Maliki, fears a return to a Sunni dominated autocracy like that of Saddam Hussein. However, in order to guard against this, Maliki is making the terrible error of creating his own semi-autocracy. In doing so, he is playing into the hands of violent extremists like the Islamic State of Iraq coalition (an heir to Al Qa'ida in Iraq) which find power in Sunni fear. These terrorists are attempting to drive Iraq into a 2006 style sectarian civil war. And if that happens, you can guarantee that every agitator in Iraq (cue- al-Sadr)/the region (cue - Iran) will poke out their heads in order to make things even worse. To avoid this calamity, Maliki needs to engage in substantial cross-sectarian dialogue with his primary political rival- al-Iraqiya (the nationalist block). If Iraq returns to the abyss, the consequences will be catastrophic.

3) ASSAD's regime continues its downward spiral towards defeat. Following the rebels capture of Taftanaz, heavy fighting is now underway in the south-west Damascus suburb of Darayya, about two miles from Damascus city center (check google maps to see the proximity). As Nicholas Blanford's notes, the regime and its allies are investing all their resources in this last gasp battle. As a further example of the regime's endangerment, Iran is loudly trying to deter western intervention by issuing threats of a counter-response. I believe that as the rebels begin to encroach on central Damascus, the psychological pressure on the regime will cause an irreversible crumble in its power- those who can flee will do so (I expect Assad among them), those who cannot flee will try and hide. Only the extreme hardliners will remain and they will be defeated.

4) CONCERNING MALI, the French Government is now requesting major support from the US. They need our refueling assets, our logistical transport capabilities and our ISTAR resources. They need these things because for many years they have elected not to spend on these crucial assets. The French (as with their EU partners) believe it is preferable to have American taxpayers carry the weight of international security. I have to be honest, this infuriates me. European governments love to claim that they are modern servants of the enlightenment - spending on social welfare instead of on an effective military capability. During peacetime, Europeans criticize the US for our military expenditures. But without us, they are impotent. This is the false moralism of EU defense policy. Every time that military force is applied, the gaping holes in European military power become apparent. We should provide France with the support that they need, but the French must carry the cost (probably wishful thinking on my part) and President Obama should make an open statement condemning European hypocrisy on defense issues/spending (definitely wishful thinking).

5) NORTH KOREA is threatening a further nuclear test and evidence suggests that this threat is more than rhetoric. While the North Koreans are steadily improving their ICBM capability, we already know that they have an albeit basic nuclear weapons capability. To be honest, while the North Koreans are loud, aggressive and seemingly unpredictable, their unpredictability has predictable contours. In essence, North Korea's foreign policy is similar to the actions of a young child. When a child wants attention or gifts, they cry. When North Korea wants attention or gifts (economic aid), it threatens war. True, the North Koreans sometimes take major action, most recently sinking a South Korean ship in 2010. But it's also true that whether headed by il-Sung, Jong-il or Jong-un, the North Korean regime resides on a foundation of luxury and patronage. It's leaders don't want to die. For all their threats, the North Koreans are cognizant that war with the US would be an act of suicide. With American resolve and strength, North Korea can be deterred.

Syrian Rebel Victory - Taftanaz, US Entertainment Industry and Free Speech

1) Syrian rebels have seized a major Assad air base in the north of the country. Their victory (assuming they are able to hold the base) represents another step towards Assad's ultimate defeat. In specific terms, the capture of the Taftanaz base offers a number of key strategic opportunities for the rebels. First, being proximate to Aleppo (about 15 miles), the facility provides a forward operating base from which the rebels can now launch operations against government forces in that city. In addition, Taftanaz is located next to the main Syrian M45 highway (have a look on google maps) or in military terms, MSR. As such, the base also offers the rebels the prospect to dominate the direct route south to Hamah, Homs and ultimately Damascus. Finally, the capture imposes another psychological blow on the Syrian regime. Apparently the Syrian Army abandoned its position during the battle for Taftanaz. This does not inspire confidence in the regime's ability to motivate its forces. (Though the regime's elite units are ideologically conjoined to Assad).

            What can we expect now? For one, further government defections in the coming weeks. Also, increasing desperation by Assad and his allies in the Lebanese Hizballah and Iran (and Russia). On the Iran/Hizballah front, it's possible these two might attempt to create an incident that distracts international attention away from Assad. One note of caution however, the group that seized Taftanaz subscribes to a Sunni extremist ideology and is regarded by the US/EU as a terrorist group. One of the reasons why I support arming Syrian rebel nationalists, is so that these elements can counter-balance the extremists. Both now and after Assad is gone. We do not want a 2006 Iraq style sectarian bloodletting in post-Assad Syria.

2) The news that entertainment groups are meeting with VP Biden's gun control task force concerns me. The Federal Government has no place pressuring the movie/tv/gaming industry to self-regulate the content of their products. The entertainment industry caters to demand - if people don't like a movie or a computer game, then they won't purchase access to that product. Fortunately, we have the First Amendment. We must ensure that we don't follow the European route of limited free speech.

Risks and Options available to deal with Assad

In light of today's news from Syria, I wanted to post an update of a previous commentary I wrote for this blog. 

Calls for a western intervention in Syria are growing. While I understand and share the concern of many regarding Assad's continuing campaign of murder, I do not believe that military intervention in Syria would be an appropriate strategy. 

First, a direct military intervention would be far from easy. Unlike Gaddafi's weak military infrastructure, Syria possesses a formidable array of military capabilities. These include thousands of tanks and artillery pieces, an advanced air defense network and hundreds of thousands of soldiers - the key units of which are ideologically attached to the Assad regime. Military intervention would require engaging and destroying these units. Such a mission would be complex, risky and would require a much more substantial coalition military force than that which was seen in Libya. Only the United States Military could carry out this operation. The pathetic European attitude towards foreign security policy - 'big talk, no kit' means that practical support from the EU would be almost non-existent. So.. in effect, if the US were to embark on an operation in Syria, it would be forced to commit significant military resources away from critical operations in Afghanistan, while undertaking full practical responsibility for the evolution of 'post-action' events inside Syria. I would however re-consider my position on military intervention if Turkey and other regional states were willing to contribute substantial military assets to any operation.

Beyond the pure military complexities, a prospective US intervention in Syria also raises  other major concerns. First, in the context of existing tensions, Iran would likely regard direct US engagement against Assad as a direct threat to the Iranian regime. Combining this with the looming Israeli-Iranian showdown, Iran's paranoid leadership might elect to go 'all in' to support Assad. Whether through supporting terrorist attacks against western interests around the world, mining the straits of Hormuz or sending a much greater level of military support to Assad, Iran would probably take a much more overt role in the conflict. Israel might also decide to launch an early strike on Iranian nuclear facilities (to offset future negative international concerns) thus increasing the likelihood of a situation in which every regional power alliance rapidly escalated towards war. It is crucial to remember that the situation in Syria is not divorced from other regional dynamics.

In another area, for Assad domestically, a US intervention would encourage the regime to portray the internal rebellion as a foreign project controlled for example by the 'Zionist puppets in Washington'. Assad's desire to portray recent terrorist attacks as a representation of the broader protest movement, suggests that the regime would jump at any opportunity to weaken the narrative of legitimacy that the current rebellion continues to expound. Put simply, American intervention might encourage Assad to use massive amounts of force in an attempt to finally annihilate those who challenge him. In such a situation, the US might have to apply equally vigorous force to quickly remove Assad from power. This would likely be expensive in its cost on American military personnel.

I believe that there is a better route towards destroying Assad's regime. This approach should take the form of a dual track strategy.

First, the west should increase covert support to Syrian resistance cells. This should focus around provision of money to allow cells to fund logistical costs (like fuel, food and communications) and to build organisational structures that can contest Assad's forces more effectively. If possible, the west should provide military special forces advisors to help direct the resistance military strategy.

Second, the west should continue to draw attention to Assad's actions and their incompatibility with the arab spring. The west should aggressively highlight continued Chinese and Russian unjustifiable support for Assad's regime, while continuing to build regional pressure alongside allies like Turkey.  We should also seek to draw attention to the sickening hypocrisy of Iran and Hizballah in the current fight. While the Iranian regime claims to have lead the region towards revolutionary empowerment, in reality, Iran's clerical leaders are supporting the murder of thousands of innocent civilians in order to maintain their grip of power over the Syrian people. Similarly, by supporting Assad, Hizballah's narrative of 'emancipation for the oppressed weak against the power of the corrupt strong', is being rendered a transparent falsehood. At least in the case of Hezbollah, if sustained attention can continue to be brought against that group's relationship with Assad - a tipping point in which they break effective ties will probably become possible. As in Lebanon, Hezbollah is vulnerable to further negative attention.

The near/middle east is undergoing seismic shifts in state-society relations. Ultimately the current Syria-Iran-Hezbollah+Russia/China alliance is its own worse enemy. We should seek greater publicity of this alliance, coupled with more vigorous support to the Syrian rebels.