Geneva II and the need for a new American strategy

"If we wanted to surrender we would have surrendered from the start,"

Bashar al-Assad, January 19^th 2014

On Wednesday, representatives from the Syrian Government, the Syrian rebellion and the international community will gather in Geneva. The ‘stated’ aspiration of all sides – a just end to a brutal civil war.

In reality, Assad has little interest in meaningful concession. Yes, he’ll probably offer some vague proposals – we should expect the suggestion of a ‘national reconciliation council’. But whatever Bashar offers, if anything, it won’t be substantive. Haafez’s heir is in no mood to negotiate.

It’s not hard to understand why.

Reinforced by Khamenei, Nasrallah and Putin, Assad is applying a strategic blend of blackmail and destruction against the already fractured rebellion. As the rebels fight amongst themselves, the regime consolidates its base of power. And as much as the international community might cry at the suffering of the Syrian people, divorced from resolute policy, our tears have only greased Assad’s machine of death.

All of this leads to one centering reality – the dictator is looking forward to Geneva. In his mind, he holds all the courage and all the cards.

As such, in order to give Geneva II any chance of a positive outcome, America must reshuffle the deck. If we are timid, the Russians will simply generate another WMD disarmament-style figment deal. We can’t let that happen.

Instead, we must replace our policy of confused trepidation with a calculation of unapologetic realpolitik. In short, we need to be both simple and tough – stating the boundaries of a deal we’ll accept and explaining what will happen if Assad doesn’t acquiesce.

For a start, we’ll need to be clear about our non-negotiables. More precisely, while a short term cease fire would certainly be worth consideration, our acceptance of any final peace will require three absolutes. First, Syria’s Sunni community will have to be given a genuine, participatory role in any new government. And it will have to involve more than titles of office- Sunni alienation from Syrian government provision must come to an end. As we’re witnessing in Iraq and Lebanon, sectarian disenfranchisement is a catalyst for extremism. Second, any transitional process must ultimately end with democratic elections. Finally, Syria will need a constitution that balances representative government with protections for minority groups. Alawites, Christians and Kurds will all require the confidence of protection from sectarian abuse. None of these demands will be simple to achieve, but all of them are necessary. The alternative is chaos now or chaos deferred.

Supporting our policy imperatives, we must remember that our power is real.

Correspondingly, we must make Assad understand that America will not tolerate diversionary games. We’ll have to outline that while we’re open to meaningful discussion, Assad’s non-cooperation will come with a severe cost. The most obvious way we can do this is by stating it – clearly and directly. By clarifying that if the peace process falters, America will renew and increase our assistance to nationalist centered Syrian rebels. Indeed, the one fortunate element of the Salafi jihadist rise in Syria has been its assistance in verifying the ideological stance of other rebel formations – it’s now clearer who the ‘good guys’ actually are.

Yet we’ll also have to help Assad realize that our power doesn’t begin and end with a potential supply train. Just as General Dempsey has spoken of ‘‘different ways of action’’, we should make clear that direct military options remain on the table. That in the event of Assad’s continued slaughter; we’ll re-consider military strikes against his regime. Made credible, US deterrent power will produce effect. Just as B-52s recently gave a physical face to US power in the East China Sea, deploying SSGNs to the Eastern Mediterranean would offer the redeemed constitution of American resolve in Syria.

But our strategy in Geneva can’t simply be about getting serious with Assad. We’ll also have to recognize our adversaries in Assad’s alliance for who they actually are.

To recognize that while Khamenei’s hardliners see themselves as the new leaders of the Middle East, they’re actually calculating thugs who can be restrained.

To recognize that while Putin thinks he’s a judo-chopping, ex-KGB superman, he’s actually a skulking, mafia goon who can be deterred.

To recognize that while Hezbollah regards itself as the world’s most powerful non-state actor, its structured organization is vulnerable to pressure.

And contrary to Assad’s wishes, we cannot allow our concerns about supranational Salafi jihadists to dictate our policy. These terrorists pose a real threat, but if we empower our professionals, we’ll defeat them.

            Up until this point, American policy in Syria has been a monumental failure. We’ve empowered our enemies, neglected our prospective allies and allowed a tyrant to wreak havoc upon his people and the region. Obsessed by the serious risks of intervention, we’ve accepted the catastrophic consequences of absent American leadership.

This week, in Geneva, we can and we must begin to put things right.

Actors in the Syrian Civil War - Flow chart

My basic (for simplicity sake- only includes commonly known key actors) flow chart on the interrelationships between the primary actors in the Syrian Civil War. In producing this chart, my intention is twofold. First, to provide a basic reference guide. Second, to illustrate the degree to which Syria represents a proxy war between various actors with broader political interests - please see explanations below chart.

Please note - This chart shows actionable relationships (actively hostile/supporting, rather than simply ideologically adversarial) specific to the Syrian civil war. Non-state actors are shaded green and state actors are shaded grey. Red/purple lines indicate a hostile relationship and blue lines constitute an support relationship. As indicated below, a number of relationships are defined by both allied and hostile interactions. Also illustrated, when it comes to this civil war - the enemy of an enemy is not necessarily a friend.

EXPLANATIONS..

Ahrar ash-Sham - Anti-Assad Salafist Jihadis. Emerged under the leadership of a core of former prisoners of the Assad regime. Has since grown into a highly capable force. Presents itself as a hybrid Syrian nationalist-Salafist movement.

Al-Nusra Front - Anti-Assad Salafist Jihadis. In contrast to the larger regional focus of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Al-Nusra is more focused against Assad. Having said this, the group is accused of participating in the killing of Kurdish civilians in northern Syria (a troubling and under-reported element to the conflict).

Free Syrian Army (FSA) - Formation of anti-Assad rebels. In basic terms, they're the less 'jihadist'/more nationalist counterpart to Al-Nusra. Primary recipient of western military aid.

Lebanese Hizballah - Assad providing the key conduit for Iranian support to Hizballah, the group are resolute in their desire to maintain this critical relationship (even at serious cost).

Iran - Iran is desperate to preserve their key ally. They're providing major investment towards Assad's survival.

Iraq - Facilitates the Iranian logistics train to Assad.

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) - Salafist Jihadis with a regional focus (hence alliance between branches). Possess a pathalogical hatred for Shia Muslims, the West and any/all who oppose their extremism. They oppose Assad, but do so in their larger pursuit of a regional caliphate. 

          For all their particular disagreements with each other; Assad, the US and Iran are all desperate to constrain this group's growing power. It's notable that while states like Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are willing to provide support to Al-Nusra, their support for ISIS is far less significant (even they regard ISIS as too extreme).

Jordan - The Jordanians are providing key facilitation for western efforts to train anti-Assad rebels.

Lebanon - Lebanese society is sharply divided on the Syrian civil war. Angered by Assad's onslaught against a majority Sunni population, many Lebanese are vehemently hostile to his regime - a reality from which Hizballah's political opponents are trying to take advantage. In contrast, supporters of Hizballah (and others like Amal and General Aoun) stand in overt support of Assad. As a result of this dichotomy, tensions in Lebanon are increasing.

Peshmerga (Kurdish militia forces) - Responding to reports of sectarian warfare by the Islamic State of Iraq/Al-Nusra against Kurds in northern Syria, the Peshmerga have taken a more active role in the civil war.

Qatar - Plays major role in supplying Syrian rebels. This effort represents a broader intent to shape regional events in ways favorable to the monarchy.

Russia - Supports Assad with weapons, funding and international legitimacy.

Saudi Arabia - Supports both nationalist/salafist orientated anti-Assad forces with advanced weaponry. Regards the battleground in Syria as part of a larger proxy fight with Iran.

Turkey - Enraged by what they regard as Syrian govt. propagated terrorism against Turkish citizens, Turkey has become a key opponent of Assad's regime. At present, Syria supports both the FSA and the Al-Nusra Front (though their support for the later may soon dissipate).

US - Seeks Assad's fall, marginalization of Iranian influence and the post-Assad emergence of a nationalist minded, pro-US democratic authority.

*- ISIS still receives substantial funds from ideologically sympathetic individuals in the Gulf monarchies.

If interested, links to my other MENA writings can be found here.