Actors in the Syrian Civil War - Flow chart

My basic (for simplicity sake- only includes commonly known key actors) flow chart on the interrelationships between the primary actors in the Syrian Civil War. In producing this chart, my intention is twofold. First, to provide a basic reference guide. Second, to illustrate the degree to which Syria represents a proxy war between various actors with broader political interests - please see explanations below chart.

Please note - This chart shows actionable relationships (actively hostile/supporting, rather than simply ideologically adversarial) specific to the Syrian civil war. Non-state actors are shaded green and state actors are shaded grey. Red/purple lines indicate a hostile relationship and blue lines constitute an support relationship. As indicated below, a number of relationships are defined by both allied and hostile interactions. Also illustrated, when it comes to this civil war - the enemy of an enemy is not necessarily a friend.

EXPLANATIONS..

Ahrar ash-Sham - Anti-Assad Salafist Jihadis. Emerged under the leadership of a core of former prisoners of the Assad regime. Has since grown into a highly capable force. Presents itself as a hybrid Syrian nationalist-Salafist movement.

Al-Nusra Front - Anti-Assad Salafist Jihadis. In contrast to the larger regional focus of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Al-Nusra is more focused against Assad. Having said this, the group is accused of participating in the killing of Kurdish civilians in northern Syria (a troubling and under-reported element to the conflict).

Free Syrian Army (FSA) - Formation of anti-Assad rebels. In basic terms, they're the less 'jihadist'/more nationalist counterpart to Al-Nusra. Primary recipient of western military aid.

Lebanese Hizballah - Assad providing the key conduit for Iranian support to Hizballah, the group are resolute in their desire to maintain this critical relationship (even at serious cost).

Iran - Iran is desperate to preserve their key ally. They're providing major investment towards Assad's survival.

Iraq - Facilitates the Iranian logistics train to Assad.

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) - Salafist Jihadis with a regional focus (hence alliance between branches). Possess a pathalogical hatred for Shia Muslims, the West and any/all who oppose their extremism. They oppose Assad, but do so in their larger pursuit of a regional caliphate. 

          For all their particular disagreements with each other; Assad, the US and Iran are all desperate to constrain this group's growing power. It's notable that while states like Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are willing to provide support to Al-Nusra, their support for ISIS is far less significant (even they regard ISIS as too extreme).

Jordan - The Jordanians are providing key facilitation for western efforts to train anti-Assad rebels.

Lebanon - Lebanese society is sharply divided on the Syrian civil war. Angered by Assad's onslaught against a majority Sunni population, many Lebanese are vehemently hostile to his regime - a reality from which Hizballah's political opponents are trying to take advantage. In contrast, supporters of Hizballah (and others like Amal and General Aoun) stand in overt support of Assad. As a result of this dichotomy, tensions in Lebanon are increasing.

Peshmerga (Kurdish militia forces) - Responding to reports of sectarian warfare by the Islamic State of Iraq/Al-Nusra against Kurds in northern Syria, the Peshmerga have taken a more active role in the civil war.

Qatar - Plays major role in supplying Syrian rebels. This effort represents a broader intent to shape regional events in ways favorable to the monarchy.

Russia - Supports Assad with weapons, funding and international legitimacy.

Saudi Arabia - Supports both nationalist/salafist orientated anti-Assad forces with advanced weaponry. Regards the battleground in Syria as part of a larger proxy fight with Iran.

Turkey - Enraged by what they regard as Syrian govt. propagated terrorism against Turkish citizens, Turkey has become a key opponent of Assad's regime. At present, Syria supports both the FSA and the Al-Nusra Front (though their support for the later may soon dissipate).

US - Seeks Assad's fall, marginalization of Iranian influence and the post-Assad emergence of a nationalist minded, pro-US democratic authority.

*- ISIS still receives substantial funds from ideologically sympathetic individuals in the Gulf monarchies.

If interested, links to my other MENA writings can be found here.

Israel - Hamas conflict - What Israel expects from a cease fire

The conflict between Israel and Hamas shows few indications of de-escalation. From my perspective, the Israelis are conducting an effective campaign against Hamas. The IDF is weakening Hamas military infrastructure, degrading Hamas command and control apparatus and exerting huge pressure on the group's fighters. As a result of these successes, the Israeli Government believes that it has the power to impose a tough price tag on Hamas demands for a cease fire. This was evident in yesterday's failed talks in Egypt. At the discussions, in addition to requiring that Hamas end their rocket fire as a prerequisite for a reciprocal halt to IDF operations, Israel also demanded a longer term Hamas pledge to disavow violence and accept that Israel would have the enduring right to launch pre-emptive attacks in case of 'imminent' threat intelligence. In essence, the Israeli leadership made demands that would fundamentally alter the status quo. Why? Israel does not want a cease fire which only allows Hamas time to regroup and reconstitute for future attacks. I'm sympathetic to this approach. A cease fire is supposed to be an agreed termination of combat, designed to provide political space for a broader negotiation framework. A cease fire is not supposed to exist as a tactical retreat which services the pursuit of Hamas broader strategic end; the destruction of Israel. This distinction is fundamentally important in driving Israel's perspective on when Operation Pillar of Defense can end. Put simply, Israel wants a cease fire that portends a more durable peaceful reliability.

As a side note, it is crucial to remember that Hamas and their allies are extremely astute to the regional and international political environment. They understand that media reporting of Palestinian casualties in Gaza produces diplomatic difficulties for Israel. They understand that engaging Egyptian and Turkish Government anger over Gaza, in turn increases pressure on the US/EU to then pressure Israel for a quick cease fire. This dynamic informs why Hamas and the PIJ use Gaza's civilian infrastructure for cover. For these groups, Gaza civilians are little more than a shield and a propaganda tool. Fortunately, even amidst Hamas efforts to immerse themselves among the people, Israel has been effective in their clinical application of force. For an example, see this morning's highly discriminate attack on an Islamic Jihad leader who was operating out of one floor of a media building.*

It is my opinion that until Israel believes a cease fire will be durable and will lead to a real rather than fake peace, the state will not accede to Hamas demands to end the violence.

*Contrary to what some might say, if an enemy agent is operating in a media capacity that focuses on the command and control and mobilization of his forces, then that agent is not a journalist protected under international law. He is an enemy combatant and a justified military target.

Turkey and regional security

While not always acting in unison with the West, we should be grateful for Turkey's important contribution to regional security. The Turkish government has no desire for closer relations with Syria/Iran.

Cold Truths

1) Gadaffi's regime is finished. The question now.. what follows? Libya's tribal society and the distinct absence of  institutions necessary for a functioning state are not conducive to a peaceful, democratic transfer of power. Expect blood shed, instability and general chaos.

2) Meanwhile in Syria.. people are still being shot on the streets. I will hopefully have a Guardian piece come out on Hezbollah's role in Syria.

3) To me, Jon Huntsman is the best Republican candidate. Read the transcript of his weekend interview on ABC News here - honesty and tough decisions.

4) The Turkish Military is attacking the Kurdish separatist movement - Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Northern Iraq. Tensions in another part of the ME..