Flow Chart - Predicting the ramifications of an Israeli military operation against Iran

Continuing from yesterday's flow chart - Predicting the regional ramifications of a nuclear armed Iran, the chart below offers my assessment of what might happen if Israel launches a military operation against Iran. Caveat- this is just a basic outline of thoughts. Related writings can be found here.

Iran Negotiations

The French have been leaking reports of a new offer that the P5+1 will be making to Iran next week. The intention of this offer? To get Iran to give up their pursuit of highly enriched nuclear power.  

Clearly, we all want peace. However, from my perspective, this open willingness to entertain further negotiations with Iran (without first seeing Iranian trust building measures) is a mistake. Since 2003, the Iranian negotiation dynamic has been an annual occurrence (see my post from this time last year!) with a unchanging outcome - while Iran gains time to continue its nuclear development, the West gains nothing. Indeed, simultaneous with this latest outreach, the Iranians are once again showing their fundamental disinterest in the prospect of a nuclear conciliation arrangement. By installing new centrifuges, the theocrats are speeding their way along the path to a nuclear weapons capacity. And be under no illusions, Iran's nuclear pursuit is not a preference born of casual consideration. The regime believes that if it achieves a place in the nuclear club, it will thus also ensure the survival of the Islamic revolution (their ultimate political objective). Absent major pressure, Iran will not negotiate their agenda away. While various parties have argued that a nuclear Iran should be addressed by deterrent containment, for me, such a prospect is deeply concerning.

So, what do these latest developments mean? Well... I suspect that Israel will speed up plans for the use of force against Iran's nuclear program. Although the consequences of such an action would likely be serious both regionally (and in economic terms) also internationally, the probability of a spiral to regional war is low. In the end, it's a question of Netanyahu's mindset. Personally, I don't believe that the Israeli PM is willing to quietly accept a nuclear Iran.

On a related note, my thoughts on Hezbollah in Europe. 

Why Israel WILL bomb Iran

Netanyahu does not believe that in the context of the American election (for fear of raising US domestic gas prices) that Obama will be willing to increase sanctions against Iran to the degree the Israelis believe is necessary. Therefore, from the Israeli perspective, the international diplomatic pressure that would be necessary to force Iran's leadership to abandon their decision to pursue nuclear technology will not be forthcoming. If one believes that the Israeli standpoint is that a nuclear Iran is intolerable, then the military option is the only option left.

While the military complexities inherent in the action of any Israeli strike would be profound, for Israel, these complexities pale into insignificance when compared alongside the perceived alternative of a nuclear Iran. For Israel, preventing Iran from attaining nuclear power is a necessity that supersedes all other priorities (including the relationship with the US). If Israel's best military outcome would be to delay Iran's nuclear program by 2 years, the Israelis will accept this outcome on the understanding that they may have to repeat air strikes at some future point. Israel likely believes that it can carry out a successful action against Iran by initiating a high intensity, short duration operation. This will require some explicit or implicit over flight rights. Unless Israel decides to cross Iraq (which has no effective air defense network).

Israel - Iran

Israeli Defense Secretary, Ehud Barak, has said that a decision to bomb Iran is a long way off. I would read the opposite from that statement.

An earlier post - Why Israel is likely to attack Iran.

For America, Israel and Iran - policy through the prism of the US presidential election

For all three actors, strategic calculations concerning the looming US presidential election play an integral role in each state's evolving policy decisions.

 For Israel, the desire for tougher action against Iran is tempered by an understanding that Obama is reluctant to risk actions that would endanger the US economic recovery. At the same time, Israel knows that Obama would find it very difficult (in domestic political terms) to avoid supporting Israeli security in the aftermath of an Israeli military strike.

For Iran, the threatened prospect of major retaliation in the aftermath of any Israeli strike is calculated to weaken Obama's resolve in the run up to the election. The Iranian thinking is that such threats can thus encourage a false compromise (Iran's latest offers to begin talks) that enables their continued nuclear development program. Iran hopes to convince Obama that further, significant action on the part of the US will lead to a protracted, messy outcome in which no side could come out unscathed.

For the US administration, the desire to find a peaceful solution to the nuclear crisis (sanctions focus) is calculated alongside the belief that if Israel is likely to attack Iran anyway regardless (as the US believes), then Israeli action now may be preferable to action later. This thinking being that if Israel were to strike Iran in the next few months, the uncertain effects of those strikes could hopefully be contained before the election.

Iran and Obama's options

With regards to the Israel-Iran nuclear crisis, Obama's options are limited. It is highly improbable that Obama could prevent an Israeli attack simply by demanding to Netanyahu that he not proceed. Israel regards an Iranian nuclear weapon as a precursor to a second holocaust and thus as a situation absolutely irreconcilable with their national security. The importance of this determination outweighs even Israeli attitudes towards maintaining strong relations with the US. Correspondingly, the US is left with a single line of approach: increasing international pressure for sanctions and preparing for the aftermath of an Israeli strike. The US has no interest in directly participating in an Israeli operation but has every interest in preventing any Israeli strike from leading to the outbreak of a regional war (which is as I suggested, unlikely).  Obama's real choices will come after an Israeli strike - ie - what response the US takes if Iran retaliates against US interests. How would Obama confront an Iranian attempt to mine the straits of Hormuz? or an attempted attack on the US Navy? Or on US forces in the region?

Israel - Iran and the potential for 'war'

Israeli military action against Iran is likely to occur but unlikely to lead to a regional war

The growth of Iran's nuclear capability means that an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities is becoming likely. However, while the repercussions of an Israeli strike would be extremely serious, such a strike would be unlikely to escalate into a regional war.

Although the US and EU remain deeply concerned by Iran's nuclear program, for Israel, the perceived threat runs much deeper. Put simply, Israeli nuclear security strategy is indelibly hardened by the experiences of Auschwitz and Treblinka. Israel regards an Iranian nuclear weapon as a precursor to a second holocaust and thus an outcome that cannot be tolerated. Indeed, unilateral Israeli strikes against an Iraqi nuclear facility in 1981 and a suspected Syrian nuclear facility in 2007, provide clear evidence of Israeli attitudes towards perceived regional nuclear threats. The Israeli government believes that even if Iran were unlikely to use a nuclear weapon,  the very possession of that capability would enable Iran's leaders to wage unrestrained aggression against Israeli interests. This could either come through encouragement to allies like the Lebanese Hizbollah, directly through Iran's intelligence services, or through a combination of both. 

The central point is that Israel believes that a nuclear Iran would inevitably translate as an Iran that cannot be deterred.

 

In practical terms and contrary to popular opinion, effective Israeli military options against Iran, though highly complex, are not impossible. The Israeli Air Force has advanced 'bunker busting' bombs capable of penetrating hardened facilities and the Israeli Air Force regularly trains for long duration, deep penetration operations. Critically important also is the fact that Israel's sunni arab neighbours are terrified of a nuclear Iran. These states may well provide logistical support to 'quietly' facilitate Israeli action.

It is true that if Israel attacks Iran, the consequences would likely be serious. In the aftermath of Israeli strikes, Iran would probably attempt to attack Israeli interests worldwide while encouraging HAMAS and Hizbollah to launch attacks against Israel from Gaza and Lebanon. In addition, Iran might attempt to close oil transit routes through the straits of Hormuz. These actions would create  regional instability, civilian casualties and would cause significant economic disruption. However, at the same time, the Iranian leadership also know that if they were to engage in major retaliation- for example by attempting to ignite a regional war or using chemical weapons against Israel, this would result in an escalatory dynamic that they could not survive. Iran is fully cognizant of the fact that the US would not allow Israel's survival to be threatened and that any substantial attack on US interests would incur an overwhelming American response. While the Iranian leadership are right in judging that there exists no American appetite for a ground invasion of their country, they also understand that In the event of a war, the US Air Force has the capacity to launch devastating attacks against Iran with relative impunity.

Ultimately, both Israeli and Iranian policy will be born of distinct, changing but rational analysis.