The Political Face of Sectarian Hatred in the Middle East

Yesterday's bombing in Beirut illustrates the primordial influence of sectarian hatred in shaping Middle Eastern politics dynamics. As I noted on Monday, the Lebanese Hizballah is struggling to contain the wave of Sunni extremist violence that's directed against it. Regarding this sectarian anger, it's clear that there have been two separate counter-responses to Nasrallah's intervention in Syria. On one side, the March 14 bloc is trying to weaken Hizballah's political influence at the governing level. Supported by the Saudis in the form of new aid to the Lebanese Army, Siniora and Hariri are pushing for Hizballah's separation from any new cabinet. Conversely, motivated by their fanatical ideology, Salafi extremist groups are also seeking to weaken Hizballah. However, for these groups, the chosen mechanism of political activity is significant violence. What's clear is that sectarianism is now front and center in Lebanese politics (Martin Chulov gives a good reporting primer on Hizballah's role in this evolving dynamic).

But it isn't just Lebanon. If interested, here are some of my thoughts on the challenge of sectarianism in terms of...

• Egypt

• Iraq (with latest news on Anbar here)

• Lebanon (in relation to the Syrian Civil War)

• Somalia (in terms of internal tensions within terrorist groups) 

• Syria

• Why it's catastrophic for the Islamic world (potentially even apocalyptic)

• How it leads people into terrorism/helps sustain terrorist groups

Related thoughts

Egypt and the failure of US policy

What occurred was a massacre (see El Amrani at The Arabist for his take on the possible motivations for the crackdown). 

This wasn't a ''security'' operation, it was protest clearance from the school of brutal totalitarianism- via bulldozers and snipers. The Egyptian government decided that they were going to crush Morsi's supporters and they did just that.

Others are covering the specific Egyptian political angle, but I want to consider why American diplomacy was unable to foresee or restrain this human disaster. I think there are three key reasons.

Absent policy clarity/direction

From the very start of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, the US Government has been hesitant to adopt a clear policy in Egypt. After promising to support Egyptian democracy, President Obama then cut related aid. Only when Mubarak's fall became inevitable and the bloodshed intolerable, did Obama finally pressure Mubarak to fall from power. The Egyptian people asked for our support and they found our equivocation. 

In a similar vein, Secretary of State Kerry's remarks today were the first significant US condemnation of the Army since Morsi's removal from power a few weeks ago. We're still unwilling to commit to the basic premise of Egyptian democratic rights.

To Egyptians on all sides, the political essence of US policy is now viewed in largely the same manner- that the US Government lacks the courage and confidence to establish a clear policy and then support that agenda with action. In result, America's influence has withered and Egyptian political dynamics have run out ahead of us. At terrible cost. Instead of shaping Egypt's transition towards stable democracy, all too often, we've been chasing the metaphorical greyhound. This failure helps explain why the US is so mistrusted by Egyptians. In short, by attempting to hedge our bets, we've ended up burning our cards.

Absent moral courage

At its core, US foreign policy must reside upon certain non-negotiable values. These should include our unyielding support for democracy, civilian protection and the rule of law. If there's one thing that encompasses all these concerns, it's that America won't tolerate the use of violence against innocent protesters. The Egyptian government believed that we wouldn't stand in support of that belief. This evening, nearly 300 people are dead.

Don't misconstrue me, I'm not saying that America should have supported Morsi against the Army (his tenure was hardly defined by adherence to democratic tradition). But because we've been willing to tolerate the Army's increasing brutality since Morsi's fall, we've played to the propaganda narrative of the hardliners who oppose us - the notion of an America without honor. The sad reality is that our gelatinous morality has born a terrible cost - the US Government has discredited itself in the eyes of the Egyptian people and has discredited American values in the eyes of the world.

Absent will to engage with political complexity

At the heart of American dysfunction in Egypt is our emotionally laden and logically deficient foreign policy discourse at home. Since 2011, most American politicians and commentators have sought to define Egypt's political crisis as a fight between existential forces of democracy (the Army/anti-Morsi protesters) and totalitarian Sunni Islamism (the Muslim Brotherhood). From both the American political right and political left, our policy debates have taken refuge in intransigent understandings that discourage foreign policy bi-partisanship on Egypt. We've entertained the myth of simple policy prescriptions - support the army/oppose the Brotherhood - an approach that was and remains fundamentally flawed. This has weakened the prospective power of our diplomats. 

Alongside a determined policy born of moral and strategic clarity, we also need influence with all Egypt's actors. Most of all, we need to reclaim American foreign policy to a position of intellectual endeavor. The politics of the Middle East and north Africa are not simple.

         In the end, the political repercussions of today's events are likely to reverberate for years to come. Salafist extremists will be lavishing over the prospect of a new batch of disaffected recruits - individuals who thought protesting was a democratic right and paid for that belief in blood. This is a huge propaganda coup for the enemies of democracy.

Yet, America can recover. We can rebuild our influence. If we use this tragedy to inject a new courage to our policy in Egypt - to propagate a policy centering around a mix of absolute values and flexible relationships, we can help Egyptians reach a better, more inclusive and decidedly more hopeful future.

Here's a link page to my other MENA writings.

Why Egypt's Army Issued a Deadline

The Egyptian Army has issued a deadline to President Morsi. Either he commences serious negotiations with the protesters who oppose him, or in 48 hours, the Army will take ''certain measures'' to ensure Egypt's stability. This is major news - the Army's decision to intervene in this political crisis exerts serious pressure on Morsi's Government (potentially existential pressure). There are a number of reasons why I believe the Army has decided to take such aggressive action.

First, the Army recognizes that it remains the most trusted institution in Egyptian political life. Allowing the protests to grow in scale and anger would risk a societal collapse. The Army knows that retaining their privileged social position necessarily requires engagement with the protesters- their popular power is too significant to ignore. The Egyptian Army is an astute political actor - its leadership are fully cognizant of the fact that institutions derive their power from the consent of the people. That's why they abandoned Mubarak when they did and in large part, that's why they're taking this action now.

Second, the Army believes that up until this point, they've granted Morsi wide latitude in terms of governing flexibility. This factor is important- it informs the Army's confidence in issuing Morsi with an ultimatum. It's obvious that the Army believes Morsi has severely jeopardized their acquiescence to his rule. In this sense, the Army believes that their deadline is justified in the interests of the Egyptian people. Up until now, the Army has been anxious to avoid perceptions of being a malevolent anti-democratic force. From their perspective, they've tolerated a lot already. Now they've had enough.

Third, (and this is the major point), the Army has never trusted the Muslim Brotherhood. The Army is deeply uncomfortable with political Islamism (at least in the form that the Brotherhood adopts). As a result, with Morsi's behavior growing increasingly controversial, these protests have provided the Army with an authorizing cover of legitimacy to re-balance power away from the MB. The Army has always wanted two major things from Morsi - civil stability and the retention of the Army's privileged power. From their perspective, he has now failed on both counts. He's fired senior Army officers and now, as the Army themselves put it, ''the national security of the state is in severe danger''.

Selected writings on Middle East and related/unrelated security issues (Ignore date tag)

This page is regularly updated (please ignore the May 5th date tag).  Most recent writings tend to be at the top of each header section. Writings on other issues related to security/intelligence/counter-terrorism/AQ Core etc. are listed in the OTHER section towards the end of this post.

Relevant academic background - I hold a BA in War Studies from King's College London and a Masters degree in Middle East Politics from The School of Oriental and African Studies, London.

IRAN

Iran Deal: Just a piece of paper. For now. (Christian Science Monitor)

Iran Nuclear Program - Discussion and Analysis (TV - Global Voice Hall)

5 Benefits of US-Israel Negotiating Discord - How it makes a good nuclear deal more likely (National Review Online)

Flow Chart - Predicting the ramifications of an Israeli military operation against Iran (Blog)

Flow Chart - Predicting the regional ramifications of a nuclear armed Iran (Blog)

US Navy deployments... Iran? (Blog)

How Obama can achieve a good nuclear deal with Iran (The Guardian)

How to manage a nuclear theocracy (Blog)

2 Presidents and 3 diplomatic delusions regarding Iran (Blog)

4 Takeaways from the Filkins study of Qassem Suleimani (Blog)

Iran, the US and the UN - A skeptical take (Blog) 

Iran plans retaliation if US strikes Assad (Blog)

President Rouhani and the continuing risk of conflict (Blog)

The geo-strategic impact of Iran attaining a nuclear weapons capability (The Commentator)

How domestic politics influences Iranian, US and Israeli foreign policy (Blog)

How Iran will use brinkmanship to protect its nuclear program (The Guardian)

Israel could attack Iran without causing a major war in the region (The Guardian)

Iran and Diplomacy (Blog)

Strategic interplay in the Near/Middle East (The Daily Caller)

Netanyahu at the UN (Blog)

Netanyahu's strategy on Iran (The Daily Caller)

Iran plots against US and How US should have responded (Blog)

SYRIA/LEBANESE HIZBALLAH/LEBANON/ (together due to overlap in the pieces)

Putin's deal is a catastrophe for Syria and the US (The Guardian)

A key difference between Bush and Obama (Blog)

Thoughts on Geneva (Radio 660 AM The Answer) 

Putin's letter - Analysis (Blog)

The American Retreat (Blog)

Syria WMD deal? The ultimate political Ponzi scheme (Blog)

The American Choice in International Affairs (National Review Online)

Syria - a pivotal week for America (Blog)

How the Bin Laden raid can guide US intervention in Syria (Blog)

Syria - 4 myths infecting the intervention debate (Blog)

Talking Syria/Congress (TV - Al Jazeera America)

Syria - US policy challenges (Radio - 660 AM The Answer)

Obama goes to Congress on Syria: Big mistake (The Week)

Kerry press conference (Blog)

Why the British Government vetoed intervention in Syria (Blog)

Syria and US Foreign Policy - Values and Outcomes (Blog)

Syria Update... (Blog)

Why the US should intervene against Assad (Monocle 24 Radio)

Obama fails to lead on Syria (The Guardian)

5 proposals for American intervention in Syria (Blog)

Actors in the Syrian Civil War - Flow Chart (Blog)

The suffering of Syria, the shame of America (Blog)

It's time to arm the Syrian rebels (The Week) 

On the EU's Hizballah delusion (Blog)

How the US should deal with Assad's chemical weapons threat (Huffington Post)

Hizballah's Identity Problem (Blog)

5 ways Obama should get tough on Hizballah (The Week)

Oct 2012 Beirut Bombing (Blog)

Why Hizballah will desert Assad before the end (The Guardian) (I still support the essence of my argument here, but in hindsight, it's also clear that I placed too much emphasis on Hizballah's concerns over domestic/regional political perception.)

IRAQ

Iraq and the challenge of sectarian terrorism (Blog)

Why Iraq is on the precipice of a civil war (The Atlantic)

In Defense of the Iraq War (The Week)

AL QA'IDA in the ARABIAN PENINSULA

7 Thoughts on the August 2013 AQAP threat (Blog)

BBC World Service discussion on August 2013 AQAP threat (BBC)

AQAP Intelligence Leaks (Blog)

On the Foiled 2012 AQAP plot (Blog)

EGYPT 

Five observations about Egypt chaos (Fox News)

Egypt and the failure of US policy (Blog)

Why the Egyptian Army Issued Morsi a Deadline (Blog)

Why Egypt Needs Democracy (Blog)

SOMALIA/AL-SHABAB

Tripoli/Baraawe - Special Forces Methodology (Blog)

Capture of Anas al-Liby/Strike Against al-Shabab (Blog) 

The Evil of Global Jihad (National Review Online)

How the US must respond to the Westgate Mall attack (Blog)

Massacre in Nairobi (Blog)

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

Why the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks are worthwhile (Blog)

American conservatives should support the peace process (Blog)

Why America is right to support Israel (Blog)

LIBYA

Capture of Anas al-Liby/Strike against al-Shabab (Blog)

Obama's subversion of war powers (The Guardian)

Assessing allegations of a CIA cover-up in Benghazi (Blog) 

Benghazi and why truth makes a difference (Blog)

OTHER - (Somewhat relevant here: In 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2012, I was the Deputy Lead Player Escort (#2 rank), G4S – Wimbledon Tennis Championships. This role involved ensuring player/VIP security during the tournament and required extensive liaison with the UK's Metropolitan Police Service and other parties.

Why Islamic extremists don't appreciate satire (Blog)

Notes on Sayyid Qutb (Blog) 

British Jihadists in Syria (Blog)

The Evil of Global Jihad (National Review Online)

Debate - Is America right to spy on Europe? (BBC)

Why America should spy on Europe (National Review Online)

US Intelligence Operations in Europe (Al Jazeera America)

Merkel and the NSA - Analysis (Blog)

A delicate dance - France and the NSA (Blog)

In Defense of Drones (National Review Online)

UK Intelligence Chiefs - Analysis of Testimony (Blog)

London Counter-Terrorism arrests, Snowden and UK Intelligence (Blog)

Oct 2013 London Counter-Terrorism arrests (Blog) 

Zawahiri and AQ Core's evolving strategy (Blog)

Brazil, the NSA and a Snowdened state visit (Blog)

The protection of President Obama's family shouldn't be political football (The Guardian)

On the challenge of terrorism and nuclear proliferation (Blog)

On the US-UK intelligence relationship (Blog)

A new kind of terror comes to London and the world (Fox News)

On the drone debate (Blog)

Why I support the CIA's UCAV (drone) program (Blog)

Obama must not undo success of surge in Afghanistan (The Guardian)

The role of religion, the definition of terrorism - beware the original thinkers (Blog)

Why the Tsarnaevs turned to terrorism (Blog)

Why Guantanamo Bay should remain open (The Daily Caller)

BBC World Service debate on Guantanamo Bay (Radio) (BBC)

BBC World News debate on Guantanamo Bay (TV) (BBC)

Why Muslims must confront Islamic extremism (Blog)

In Defense of Lawful Secrecy (The Week)

Analysis of Washington Post Intelligence Community reporting (Blog)

The Challenge of Hostage Rescue Operations (Blog)

The War on Terror isn't over. Here's how the US can win it (The Week)

Republicans must speak out against attacks on our Muslim fellow citizens (The Daily Caller)

Conservatives and Counter-Terrorism (The Week)

On the new axis of evil (synergy between terrorists and state actors) (Blog)

On the weakness of EU counter-terrorism efforts (Blog)

US Spying on EU (Blog)

(All pretty serious topics, so here's some pleasant music...) 

 

Israel - Hamas conflict - What Israel expects from a cease fire

The conflict between Israel and Hamas shows few indications of de-escalation. From my perspective, the Israelis are conducting an effective campaign against Hamas. The IDF is weakening Hamas military infrastructure, degrading Hamas command and control apparatus and exerting huge pressure on the group's fighters. As a result of these successes, the Israeli Government believes that it has the power to impose a tough price tag on Hamas demands for a cease fire. This was evident in yesterday's failed talks in Egypt. At the discussions, in addition to requiring that Hamas end their rocket fire as a prerequisite for a reciprocal halt to IDF operations, Israel also demanded a longer term Hamas pledge to disavow violence and accept that Israel would have the enduring right to launch pre-emptive attacks in case of 'imminent' threat intelligence. In essence, the Israeli leadership made demands that would fundamentally alter the status quo. Why? Israel does not want a cease fire which only allows Hamas time to regroup and reconstitute for future attacks. I'm sympathetic to this approach. A cease fire is supposed to be an agreed termination of combat, designed to provide political space for a broader negotiation framework. A cease fire is not supposed to exist as a tactical retreat which services the pursuit of Hamas broader strategic end; the destruction of Israel. This distinction is fundamentally important in driving Israel's perspective on when Operation Pillar of Defense can end. Put simply, Israel wants a cease fire that portends a more durable peaceful reliability.

As a side note, it is crucial to remember that Hamas and their allies are extremely astute to the regional and international political environment. They understand that media reporting of Palestinian casualties in Gaza produces diplomatic difficulties for Israel. They understand that engaging Egyptian and Turkish Government anger over Gaza, in turn increases pressure on the US/EU to then pressure Israel for a quick cease fire. This dynamic informs why Hamas and the PIJ use Gaza's civilian infrastructure for cover. For these groups, Gaza civilians are little more than a shield and a propaganda tool. Fortunately, even amidst Hamas efforts to immerse themselves among the people, Israel has been effective in their clinical application of force. For an example, see this morning's highly discriminate attack on an Islamic Jihad leader who was operating out of one floor of a media building.*

It is my opinion that until Israel believes a cease fire will be durable and will lead to a real rather than fake peace, the state will not accede to Hamas demands to end the violence.

*Contrary to what some might say, if an enemy agent is operating in a media capacity that focuses on the command and control and mobilization of his forces, then that agent is not a journalist protected under international law. He is an enemy combatant and a justified military target.

Israel-Hamas conflict continues

The conflict between Israel and Hamas shows no signs of abating. Neither Netanyahu nor Hamas believe that they can back down at this point. As I have written (see posts over past few days), both Israel and Hamas have broader reasons for their actions in this conflict. This overarching dynamic has not weakened, instead it is exacerbated with each new death. However, by effectively injecting themselves into the conflict, the Egyptian Government's actions will lead to two evolutions. First, Israeli-Egyptian relations will further deteriorate (both now and in the medium term): at some point this may lead to a skirmish along the Egyptian/Israeli border. Second, Egypt's engagement gives Hamas a huge, (although I would argue unwarranted) PR boost. Having said this, the Israeli Government will not significantly alter their operational planning because of the presence of Egyptian officials in Gaza. When the Egyptian PM visited Gaza earlier today, Israel implemented a cease fire. However, when Hamas continued to fire rockets during that cease fire, Israel responded with further air strikes. The Israelis will be anxious to send the message that they will not allow Egypt to provide a form of 'human shield' for Hamas. Earlier today a friend who lives in Jerusalem (and who is a top Israel-Palestinian conflict expert) told me that he cannot understand why Hamas is firing on Jerusalem. As he noted, many Palestinians live in that city and the rocket fire risks damaging the Dome of the rock. I think this shows the faux morality of Hamas 'liberation' narrative.

 I believe that this conflict will continue for at least a few more days; Israel's targeting of Hamas PM Haniyeh signals Netanyahu's strategic intent to strike a major blow against the group. But one thing is important. Regardless of individual attitudes surrounding the debate over 'right versus wrong' in this particular operation, it is important that observers do not become pawns for Hamas propaganda. 

           Hamas is not a liberation force struggling valiantly for freedom. They exist on a platform of overt hatred towards Jews, the destruction of Israel and the imposition of an ideological tyranny on the Palestinian people. Think about these truths. For Hamas, a bus is not a method of transport, but instead an opportunity for murder. A nightclub is not a place of celebration, but instead a place to blow up kids. An apartment block is not a place for living, but instead a place for a targeting post. A college is not a place for learning, but instead for a bomb factory. A Palestinian civilian is not a fellow citizen deserving of protection, but instead a human shield.

Violent protests - What America should do

Sadly it appears that the 'film protests' are continuing unabated. The US Embassy in Yemen is currently under attack and protests are continuing outside our embassy in Cairo. The United States is now being directly challenged. Iran, Assad, Hizballah, Al Qa'ida and every other group that hates America are now watching to see what we do. Here's what we should do.

1) The President should order the deployment of military reinforcements to secure our diplomatic facilities in the region. He has currently sent FAST units, however, this may not be sufficient. The US has considerable military assets in the EUCOM and CENTCOM areas of operation. We should not be afraid to utilize these assets as necessary.Our response should also involve tightening security procedures at diplomatic facilities in states like Indonesia and Pakistan - which may face protests after tomorrow's Friday prayers. The key is that we ensure we are able to protect our diplomats and our facilities. Secretary of State Clinton must require that host nation security forces are provided to defend our diplomats. 

2) The President should unequivocally (and angrily) condemn the violent reaction that has followed reporting on this film. His speech yesterday was not sufficient. There is no excuse for the kind of violence that we have seen. This film was produced by a private group of individuals in the conduct of free speech. Free speech defines America. We must stand up for this right while emphasizing that the US govt. had nothing to do with the film. Where there is positive regard for the United States in the Middle East, in large part this feeling stems from a high regard for our freedoms. The President must condemn those who violently protest as morally pathetic human beings. They need to be called out for their repellent ideology.

3) The President should take substantive action to bring to justice those responsible for the Benghazi bombing. This should include the application of military force if targets can be identified (for example in the Libyan desert). The US is currently appearing impotent and weak in the Middle East. From my perspective, this is in part a result of the President's appearance of timidity on Iran. Whether this is a fair perception or not, appearance is as, if not more important than reality when it comes to Middle Eastern political dynamics.

This is somewhat personal to me, my father was a diplomat with State and my grandfather was a US Marine. We need to make sure we protect our citizens.

Cario and Benghazi - thoughts

In addition to my US politics focus, I have an MSc in Middle East Politics from SOAS, London. The area is one where I maintain a more analytical interest.
The actions that took place yesterday at the US Embassy in Cairo and the US Consulate in Benghazi, Libya were disgusting. In Cairo, the US flag was ripped down, set on fire and then replaced with a black flag representative to that adopted by Al Qa'ida. In Benghazi, an armed mob attacked the US Consulate and murdered the US Ambassador as well as three other staffers. Why did this happen? Because some individuals are upset about a video. Yes, a video. In this case, the video is one apparently being produced by moronic Florida pastor Terry Jones and a number of Egyptian Copts who live in the United States. Jones is the same guy who threatened to burn Korans a while back. There are a number of comments that I want to make here.

1) There is absolutely no excuse for the violence we saw yesterday. Freedom of speech is an inherent right. If Terry Jones wants to be a moron then he has that right under the 1st amendment. Those who are upset by his film have every right to protest, but must do so in a peaceful way. Anyone who thinks that the appropriate reaction is to resort to violence and murder innocent diplomats is a pathetic human being. Religious leaders across the Islamic world must assert this point. There is a profound example of where this guidance has previously occurred - Ayatollah Sistani. In post-2003 Iraq, Sistani played a major role in persuading Iraqi Shia to engage with the political process and to reject the sectarian war that AQI and Sadr sought.

2) The US State Department public reaction to this incident was not good. Although Hillary Clinton has offered a tougher statement of condemnation this morning, the decision by the US Embassy in Cairo to condemn free speech was a grave error. Instead, the Embassy should have noted the US legal position on free speech while distancing themselves from Jones's idiocy. Relinquishing free speech in face of violent intimidation is always the wrong choice.

3) These incidents indicate the broader tensions that are still cooking in the region. In Egypt, the Copt community has long faced sustained persecution (including violence since President Morsi was elected). It would appear that the Salafist extremists who made up at least part of yesterday's Cairo protest, were to a degree, motivated by their natural hatred for the Copts. In Libya, political fractures remain a key challenge for the provisional government. The key is that regional political dynamics remain fundamentally unstable.

4) The USMC Embassy Security Detachment did a superb job in Cairo. They were calm, professional and allowed the crowd's fury to burn itself out. What happened in Benghazi is less clear.

UPDATE - It appears that two US Marines were killed while attempting to protect diplomatic personnel in Benghazi. The US Military has initiated a Crisis Action Team and is in the process of deploying a FAST unit to reinforce US security capabilities in Libya. 

Republicans and 'democracy' in the Middle East

This has been annoying me for a while now. 

Republicans cannot condition support for democracy in the middle east on the basis of our personal affinity for particular ideologies. If the party is to stand for democracy in Iraq, it must also accept the need for Palestinian democracy, Egyptian democracy and democracy in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Without honest, genuine support for democracy across the Middle East, Republicans have a total lack of credibility to argue that america's foreign policy is centred around promotion of freedom. In this hypocrisy, Republican candidates serve to provide politically astute adversaries like HAMAS, Hezbollah and the Sadrists, with talking points to suggest that the US only supports those with whom it agrees. In an inescapable sense, this feeds traditional extremist narratives hostile to US interests..

IE -  the argument - 'Don't trust or work with the Americans or their agents, because they have no interest in your welfare but instead only care about pursuing a blindly, pro-Israel agenda'. This narrative serves to unfairly deligitimise the nature of America's regional actions and relationships.

Aside from the diplomatic damage caused, such wilful contradiction between words and reality, ultimately undermines the cause of freedom itself (to which america's extremist opponents in the middle east are ultimately ideologically averse). Supporting democracy does not mean that we should automatically agree with other democracies, but it does mean that we accept the notion that popular power is at its basic but ever developing level, a good thing.

The central point here is that if republicans still believe in democracy as a moderating force (the underlying premise of the Bush ideology that Republicans have overwhelmingly supported since 9/11), then in favour of an ultimately more just, peaceful and stable middle east, republicans must be willing to accept that in the short term, while democracy may not always produce results that we would like, it is crucial to stand in support of freedom.