1) The US air strike against a leader of Al-Shabab is welcome news. As I argued in the aftermath of the Nairobi Mall attack, the US must conduct a vigorous, wide ranging and durable counter-terrorism strategy against this group. It's important to note that alongside this air strike, JSOC/US IC are also conducting regular operations inside Somalia.
2) Befitting the Baathist legacy to which they subscribe, the Syrian Government is made up of pathological liars. Still, the prospect of an evacuation from Homs offers one small spark of hope from Geneva II. My thoughts on what the US should be doing at the conference are provided here.
I'm a firm supporter of the US-Israeli alliance. Still, I struggle to understand the psychology of some Israeli politicians. Take Israeli Defense Minister Ya'alon. Studying his background, Ya'alon is clearly an intelligent, strategically minded man. After all, this is a leader who commanded Israel's foremost Special Operations unit and then became his nation's most senior military officer. But what Ya'alon said about Kerry didn't make much sense. Even if he's overly optimistic, Kerry's pursuit of Middle East peace is a worthy one (I've argued why hereandhere). As much as Ya'alon might be angry about Kerry's peacekeeping force proposals, his words were not clever. To be sure, Netanyahu doesn't like Obama. That was clear a few years ago. And in many ways, Netanyahu's dissatisfaction with Obama is understandable (US policy in the Middle East is a mess).
Nevertheless, in the context of the 'settlement snub' of 2010 and the ongoing 'Pollard release' lobby, Ya'alon's comments were unjustifiable.
I posted an earlier version of this piece on Saturday. However, some readers were confused that the earlier post was combined with some other thoughts on the NSA. So, paying heed to developments from over the weekend, here's an updated new post without the NSA material!
Friday's bombing in Beirut was almost certainly the work of the Syrian GSD and/or Hizballah. I make that argument based on three factors.
1) Hizballah is under extraordinary physical and political pressure inside Lebanon. The group is thus desperate to reassert its domestic power-perception position. Because of Chatah's symbolic representation of the March 14 bloc and his well known association with the Hariris, he offered an opportune target from which Hizballah could broadcast their overarching message - 'we are prepared to wash the streets with blood in order to maintain our power'. Let's be clear, this is political terrorism in its most unambiguous form.
2) The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (established to investigate the Hariri assassination and a number of other attacks) will shortly begin its trial (in absentia) of a number of Hizballah operatives. Those accused include Mustafa Badr al-Din (the suspected head of Hizballah's foreign operations directorate)*. In this regard, Chatah's assassination was likely intended to send another basic message to the international community - Hizballah will not acquiesce to outside pressure.
3) The Lebanese Hizballah has a long history of engaging in assassinations against its political opponents. Further, the Syrian Civil War provides abundant proof that the group has little compunction about massacring anyone who stands in their way (a truth that I once underestimated). As SOP, Hizballah denies any responsibility for these kind of atrocities. Still, their record is transparent.
On a related note, it's critical that we pay heed to Siniora's evident fury (which reflects popular concerns) over what's just happened. In articulating that the March 14 bloc will push for restrictions on illegal arms, Siniora is (as the Daily Star notes) issuing a thinly veiled threat to Hizballah. In short, he's laying the foundations for a tougher counter-response. As a corollary, Saudi Arabia's grant of $3 billion to the Lebanese Army is surely designed to provide a counter-weight to Hizballah. The walls are closing. In further vein, it will be interesting to see how Michel Aoun reacts to this attack. Although he remains largely sympathetic to Hizballah, Aoun has also publicly flirted with the notion of a rapprochement with the Future Movement. Should Aoun decide to move towards Siniora/Hariri, even in a limited way, this assassination could cause major blowback for Hizballah. After all, it's hard to underestimate how much Hizballah relies upon Aoun; both for political support and cross-sectarian political cover.
*Interestingly, much of the evidence against Badr al-Din was garnered from cell phone intercepts. These may have been provided to the Tribunal by the NSA (Hizballah is a high priority collection target for the US Intelligence Community).
1) The Lebanese Hizballah appears to have lost another leader. Whoever was responsible for Lakkis's death last week, it's obvious that hostile pressure on the group is growing. With Hizballah now fully invested in Assad's survival, sectarian reactions to that strategy are also growing in intensity - hence the less of three senior leaders in as many weeks. In basic terms, Hizballah's political adversaries are taking advantage from the group's associated guilt for incidents like this one. As I've written before, Hizballah is suffering from an identity crisis of serious proportions. Devoid of a cross-sectarian base of sympathy, the organization's carefully constructed 'anti-oppression' narrative is being rendered for the lie that it is. Whatever happens with Assad, in Lebanon and beyond, Hizballah's strategic choices will leave them increasingly vulnerable. For a few of my related thoughts on Hizballah, please click (point five here), here and here. 2) ISIL continues to wreck havoc upon Iraq. In the absence of US Intelligence capabilities (please see my BBC debate on the NSA - takes a minute to load!) and amidst continuing political discord (please see my thoughts here), ISIL and its affiliates are once again endangering Iraq's stability. As the ISW's Jessica Lewis notes, ISIL has embraced a highly effective strategy of impatient resurgence. Again, it's important that we note the targeting methodology that ISIL embraces. As with their Salafi violent-extremist counterparts around the world, they are members of a death worshiping cult. Recognizing this truth, we should still be astute to the political grievances that allow groups like ISIL to prosper. Nevertheless, we must also grapple with the reality of a movement that sees cafes, markets, malls, roads and playgrounds as military targets.
3) The protests in Ukraine continue to grow. President Yanukovych has a problem. At a basic level, he has wagered against a long brewing discontent. Outraged by endemic corruption and Yanukovych's subservience to Putin's bullying/influence, many Ukrainians believe they're in a struggle for the very future of Ukraine. Quite understandably, these citizens have little interest in a future that abandons them to the ignominy of existence as a buffer state for Putin's Russia. While it's true that Ukraine is far from unified in its support for a pro-west future, younger Ukrainians are firmly ensconced with the pro-EU/US crowd. The trend lines are clear. Still, there are US policies that could help catalyze this process. Recognizing Ukraine's deep vulnerability to Russian energy blackmail, the US should urgently begin to provide an alternate source of energy to Eastern European states. By loosening regulations on US companies, exports of US Liquefied Natural Gas exports could begin in earnest. That alternate supply portfolio would enable Ukrainians to break free from their present headlock-like relationship with Russia. For some of my thoughts on Putin, please click here and here.
Imran Khan should have stuck to cricket. The Pakistani political party, PTI (Movement for Justice), has reportedly leaked the name of the CIA's Station Chief in Islamabad. For the interests of the Pakistani people, this was a profoundly idiotic move.
First, even before now, the Station Chief's identity was almost certainly known to the Pakistani authorities - one of the primary responsibilities of a Station Chief is to liaise with the foreign government. The PTI hasn't helped the Pakistani Government uncover a foreign spy. But via this leak (if only for a short time), the PTI will have weakened Pakistani-US intelligence cooperation. This is not a small concern. The US-Pakistani intelligence relationship is of great importance to the people of Pakistan. In specific terms, it's instrumental to Pakistan's ability to keep innocent civilians safe from violent extremists.
That incontestable reality speaks to a deeper truth.
This leak was about one thing - domestic politics. Over the last couple of years, Khan has cultivated a seriously unpleasant alliance with various Islamist extremist groups. At the same time, the PTI leader has sought to blame the United States for Pakistan's woeful security situation. This all culminated with Khan's rally last week against the CIA's drone program (an issue he has embraced as his defining populist cause). To be sure, many Pakistanis do not like the idea of a foreign power using force in their country. Nevertheless, as I've argued before, US drones help Pakistan to address critical threats that would otherwise go unchallenged.
Ultimately, Khan's actions speak to a broader problem in much of the Islamic world. Rather than facing up to major socio-political difficulties, far too many politicians choose to blame the United States for their nation's ills. It's certainly easier than confronting brutal extremist movements. In the short term, it also offers voters a rallying point to express their diverging discontent in common cause. Yet, the problem with this type of political strategy is that it renders such negative consequences - sacrificing the interests of the people at the altar of a patently false agenda. Take this example from a senior PTI politician. After calling for the CIA Station Chief's arrest, the MP also called for his ''interrogation'' in order to garner the identities of drone pilots. It's absurdity personified. Mazari knows that will never happen, she's simply stoking the fires of an easy anger.
Khan and the PTI aren't helping to build a better, independent future for Pakistan. Instead, they're simply fueling extremists who want to destroy any semblance of hope for a more just and prosperous democracy.
I have stopped updating this page. The areas below are a frequent area for my writings so the best way to find the latest is to google "Tom Rogan [whatever area/topic you might want to read]" THANKS! I'm now updating this page less regularly (please visit my Washington Examiner page for more recent posts). Writings on other issues related to security/intelligence/counter-terrorism/AQ Core etc. are listed under OTHER header towards the end of this page. Please also see my TV/Radio page for related interviews/speeches. Relevant academic background - I hold a BA in War Studies from King's College London and a Master's degree in Middle East Politics from The School of Oriental and African Studies, London. My work has been recognized by the BBC + BBC, + BBC, + BBC, +BBC, the UK Parliament, the American
Enterprise Institute, the Council
on Foreign Relations, CNN’s FareedZakaria, the Foreign Policy
Initiative,
The Week magazine reviews, The
Wire + The
Wire + The
Wire + The
Wire,
the Center on National Security at Fordham Law School, and Real World
Politics/Real Clear Politics. My examination of US security challenges at the
end of 2013 was reviewed as the global ‘‘must read’’ of the day by the BBC.
Thank you very much for reading.
IRAQ (most Daesh/IS/ISIS/ISIL pieces under this header)
Why Hizballah will desert Assad before the end (The Guardian) (I still support the essence of my argument here, but in hindsight, it's also clear that I placed too much emphasis on Hizballah's concerns over domestic/regional political perception.)
