Iran Nuclear Deal - Implementation

The implementation of the Geneva interim nuclear deal will begin on January 20th. That's welcome news. After all, in recent weeks it seemed like the agreement might fall apart before it even began. On another positive note, Iran will shortly begin to dilute its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. Still, I have a number of concerns.

• While inspectors will apparently be allowed daily, physical access to the Fordo site, there will only be monthly inspections at the Arak based heavy water reactor. That's far from ideal. If the Iranians are serious about addressing fears that they are pursuing a plutonium-route nuclear weapon, allowing more vigorous inspections at Arak would be the perfect place to start. Instead, the reluctance to afford access to Arak suggests that the Iranians may want to hide what's happening there. It raises questions and it fosters mistrust.

• The Iranians are crowing. While this is to be expected at some level (and helps Iranian moderates placate their hard-line colleagues), it's worrying that many Iranian officials are so gleeful in their claims that this deal doesn't bind them in any significant way. Again, it suggests an absence of seriousness in the pursuit of trust towards a lasting arrangement. Without hope of a lasting agreement, this deal will be rendered into irrelevance.

• It's problematic that the negotiators have taken so long to reach implementation. This reality suggests an agenda disconnect. Since 2003, Iran has attempted to evade the international community in its efforts to ensure a non-weaponized nuclear program. Delay has formed the primary strategic gambit on Iran's part. In short, what we're seeing looks like more deliberate time wasting.

While I supported this deal at the time of its creation, it's also abundantly clear to me that Geneva hasn't got off to a good start. The US will have to work exceptionally hard to ensure that Iran fulfills its obligations. At the same time, Congress will have to play a constructive but cautious role in supporting US diplomacy. Still, if this effort fails, the only options left available will be dramatically tightened sanctions alongside the prospect of military force. 

Time is running short.

Related thoughts

Assassination in Beirut

I posted an earlier version of this piece on Saturday. However, some readers were confused that the earlier post was combined with some other thoughts on the NSA. So, paying heed to developments from over the weekend, here's an updated new post without the NSA material!

         Friday's bombing in Beirut was almost certainly the work of the Syrian GSD and/or Hizballah. I make that argument based on three factors. 

1) Hizballah is under extraordinary physical and political pressure inside Lebanon. The group is thus desperate to reassert its domestic power-perception position. Because of Chatah's symbolic representation of the March 14 bloc and his well known association with the Hariris, he offered an opportune target from which Hizballah could broadcast their overarching message - 'we are prepared to wash the streets with blood in order to maintain our power'. Let's be clear, this is political terrorism in its most unambiguous form.

2) The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (established to investigate the Hariri assassination and a number of other attacks) will shortly begin its trial (in absentia) of a number of Hizballah operatives. Those accused include Mustafa Badr al-Din (the suspected head of Hizballah's foreign operations directorate)*. In this regard, Chatah's assassination was likely intended to send another basic message to the international community - Hizballah will not acquiesce to outside pressure.

3) The Lebanese Hizballah has a long history of engaging in assassinations against its political opponents. Further, the Syrian Civil War provides abundant proof that the group has little compunction about massacring anyone who stands in their way (a truth that I once underestimated). As SOP, Hizballah denies any responsibility for these kind of atrocities. Still, their record is transparent.

                On a related note, it's critical that we pay heed to Siniora's evident fury (which reflects popular concerns) over what's just happened. In articulating that the March 14 bloc will push for restrictions on illegal arms, Siniora is (as the Daily Star notes) issuing a thinly veiled threat to Hizballah. In short, he's laying the foundations for a tougher counter-response. As a corollary, Saudi Arabia's grant of $3 billion to the Lebanese Army is surely designed to provide a counter-weight to Hizballah. The walls are closing. In further vein, it will be interesting to see how Michel Aoun reacts to this attack. Although he remains largely sympathetic to Hizballah, Aoun has also publicly flirted with the notion of a rapprochement with the Future Movement. Should Aoun decide to move towards Siniora/Hariri, even in a limited way, this assassination could cause major blowback for Hizballah. After all, it's hard to underestimate how much Hizballah relies upon Aoun; both for political support and cross-sectarian political cover.

*Interestingly, much of the evidence against Badr al-Din was garnered from cell phone intercepts. These may have been provided to the Tribunal by the NSA (Hizballah is a high priority collection target for the US Intelligence Community).

Related thoughts.

Flow Chart - Predicting the ramifications of an Israeli military operation against Iran

Continuing from yesterday's flow chart - Predicting the regional ramifications of a nuclear armed Iran, the chart below offers my assessment of what might happen if Israel launches a military operation against Iran. Caveat- this is just a basic outline of thoughts. Related writings can be found here.

Flow Chart- Predicting the regional ramifications of a nuclear armed Iran

This chart encapsulates why I believe a serious peace deal (or it fails, the military option) must be pursued in order to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. I accept that my graphics skills are limited!

Related writing links. If you prefer flow charts, here's my relevant piece on the Syrian Civil War.

How to Manage a Nuclear Iran - Preparing for the Worst Case Scenario

It isn't just their support for Assad. Propelled by an ordained mission; from Baghdad to Beirut and from Buenos Aires to Washington DC, Khamenei and his agents leave no question as to their resolve.

Their commitment is paying off - Iran’s admittance to the nuclear arms club looks likelier with each passing day. To guard against diplomatic and/or military failure, we need to prepare to manage an Iran that's armed with nuclear weapons.

The danger is real. Having called President Obama on his ‘red line’ bluff, Assad has eviscerated American deterrent value. In Obama's eager détente with Rouhani, Iranian perceptions of American malleability have grown. As Dexter Filkins explains, Iran pays great attention to American resolve (or the absence thereof). As I’ve argued before; whether in terms of a regional arms race, a further sectarian dissection of Middle Eastern politics, or reactive strategies by Israel, an Iran possessing nuclear weapons would cause a geopolitical earthquake. In my opinion, faced with that world, the United States would need to enact a four-part strategic response.

    1) Obama would have to codify a new security doctrine.

Many commentators argue that the threat posed by a nuclear armed Iran is greatly exaggerated. As they see it, the fear of mutually assured destruction would deter Iranian nuclear aggression. I disagree. Their supposition happily ignores Iran’s enshrined ideal of martyrdom (the ‘submission of the self’). Time and time again, Iran's leaders have risked catastrophic consequences in the pursuit of their political agenda. This is a regime that sent children to clear minefields during the Iran-Iraq war. This is a regime that continues to call for the annihilation of America and Israel. As a corollary, deterring a nuclear armed Iran would require more than SSBNs - it would demand Iran’s recognition of an alternate cost-benefit analysis. In short, Iran would have to believe that a direct or indirect (via terrorist proxy) nuclear attack against the United States or its allies would result in one-sided retaliatory apocalypse. Articulating this new framework would be a horrific clarification. It would also be absolutely necessary for global security.

               

    2) The US Government would have to counter-balance an emboldened Iranian security strategy.

Iran’s nuclear accession would catalyze the Revolutionary Guards/Iranian Intelligence. In this scenario, the US could not stand silent. US security interests would require increased disruption operations against covert Iranian activities around the world. Here, the overarching US intention would be a simple one – ensuring that Iranian hardliners understood their choices were bound inexorably to consequences beyond their control.

    3) The US would have to pursue a regional defense agreement.

Highly evident tensions between the US and Saudi Arabia emphasize the importance of this point. At a deeper level, were the US to fail in reconciling its security relationships to a nuclear Iran, the consequences would be disastrous. As encapsulated in the Syrian Civil War, in America’s absence, states like Qatar and Saudi Arabia revert to terrorist proxies as mechanisms of self-defense - without American reassurance, a nuclear Iran would likely be joined by a flourishing spring of Sunni Jihadism. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is already flirting with its own procurement of nuclear weapons.

    4) US nuclear weapons would have to be upgraded.

Facing a nuclear Iran, the assurance of continued US nuclear supremacy would be a non-negotiable.

It’s true; a replacement for America’s aging nuclear deterrent must recognize growing fiscal pressures. That being said, the acceptance of substantial costs would become unavoidable. Like all totalitarians, the Ayatollahs understand power in brutally simplistic terms – through the barrel of a gun. Bound to a credible deterrent doctrine as outlined in point (1), the United States would have to halt the creeping doubt surrounding its nuclear credibility.

              This 'management' plan would be complex, expensive and risky. Regardless, a nuclear Iran would systemically alter the geopolitics of the Middle East (and thus the world). America could not remain inert.

Related writings

2 Presidents and 3 diplomatic delusions regarding Iran

Few agendas are as necessary or as noble as the advancement of global peace. After all, a just peace represents the merging of morality and unified political interest.

But peace isn’t easy.

For a start, it requires the honest appraisal of realities in the moment, not the appraisal of realities as we would wish them to be. The distinction is important – diplomatic delusion feeds political dysfunction. History is littered with bloody testimony to the dear costs of wishful thinking.

Regrettably, regarding Iran, I fear that US delusion is back in town.

1)      Delusions regarding the Iranian leadership

It’s no secret that President Rouhani lacks ultimate power over his country’s policies - that authority flows from Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. Nonetheless, western excitement over Rouhani’s supposed détente has encouraged the belief that a nuclear deal is near. The new implication – Rouhani wants peace, Obama wants peace and thus peace will become reality.

There’s a problem here.

Not only does Rouhani lack decisive power in Iran’s political system, his power is inherently limited by the governing essence of the Iranian theocracy. In Iran, the underpinning of political authority has a central source - the ‘Guardianship of the Jurist.’ Conveniently codified by the Ayatollah Khomeini, this doctrine enshrines absolute power in Iran’s Supreme Leader. Absolute is the operative word here. In comparative terms, this guardianship is Iran’s opposite to the European royalist ‘divine right of kings’ – one leader proffering the ordained will of God on Earth.

In other words, Khamenei is the key.

So follows the question- does the Supreme Leader want a deal?

Some say yes. David Ignatius (a top analyst plugged into the US Intelligence Community) suggests that Khamenei's willing to give serious peace a go.

 I'm not so sure.

Political rule 101 - always review the historical record in preference to the campaign speech. At a basic level, Khamenei is no friend of peace – his power resides upon the bodies of the Iranian people. The Supreme Leader cannot be trusted. Moreover, studying Khamenei's statements and those of the men who sit close to his throne, it’s abundantly clear that America isn't regarded as a prospective partner (an understanding on which a successful nuclear deal would depend). Consider the words of the Chairman of Iran’s powerful Guardian Council, Ayatollah Jannati:

‘’At the end of the day, we are an anti-American regime. America is our enemy, and we are the enemies of America. The hostility between us is not a personal matter. It is a matter of principle. We are in disagreement over the very principles that underlie our revolution and our Islam.’’

Men like Khamenei, Jannati and their ideological spawn (think Qassem Soleimani) are principled enemies of the United States. They don’t want our friendship. They want us gone from the region. It’s crucial that we grapple with this reality. At best, Rouhani is a well-intentioned Secretary of State style figure. But divorced from real power, his words are words alone.

2)      Delusions regarding Iran’s nuclear intentions

Iran’s leaders like to claim that their nuclear pursuit is peaceful – as Rouhani argued at the UN: it’s all about societal advancement (an assertion that would be more believable if the regime weren't so desperate to control information flows). Yet, this isn’t about society. It’s about power. And not the energy supply kind. Rather, Iran’s leaders believe that the day they come into possession of a nuclear weapon, will be the moment that they guarantee the survival of their regional revolutionary project (this judgment having been reinforced by perceptions of Assad's WMD enabled survival). As a corollary, when we pretend otherwise; that somehow Iran’s nuclear ambitions are on the bargaining table of standard diplomacy, we guarantee one of two outcomes. Either an Israeli strike against Iran, or eventually, a nuclear armed Iran.

Instead, if we’re to avoid a nuclear Iran, we must first take stock of the importance that the theocrats place in their nuclear endeavor. Normal diplomacy just isn’t going to cut it. We’re going to need to up the ante; offering Iran a peaceful low-enrichment program with one hand and tougher sanctions/the credible threat of military force with the other.

Put simply, Khamenei must come to realize that the price of nuclear weapons will be too heavy to bear.

3)      Delusions regarding US-Iranian ‘mutual interests'

In his speech to the UN, President Obama stated the following:

 ‘’I don’t believe this difficult history can be overcome overnight – the suspicion runs too deep. But I do believe that if we can resolve the issue of Iran’s nuclear program, that can serve as a major step down a long road toward a different relationship – one based on mutual interests and mutual respect.­­­’’

I’d love to know what ‘mutual interests’ the President is talking about.

Apart from what’s now effectively an indirect alliance in Syria, across the world, US and Iranian interests stand in starkest opposition. Just a few examples…

The US supports Lebanese democracy; Iran supports a Hizballah hegemony.

The US operates a robust network of alliances with the Sunni Arab kingdoms; Iran regards those governments with an overt and active hatred. (Admittedly the Arab monarchies aren't huge fans of Iran.)

The US opposes North Korean nuclear proliferation; Iran stands in alliance with the Stalinist kingdom.

The US seeks an Iraqi government independent of malevolent influence; Iran supports militias in furtherance of its agenda in both Iraq and Syria.

The US pursues a semi-stable democracy in Afghanistan; Iran supplies the Taliban.

The US confronts those who slaughter civilians; Iran embraces terrorism with zeal.

These are the facts. We ignore this reality at our peril.

                     Don’t get me wrong. These three delusions are not to say that diplomacy with Iran is pointless. In fact, because of the scale of these problems, effective diplomacy is of pivotal importance.

That's my point - our diplomacy must be level headed.

Preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon will require far more than wishful thinking and a sprinkling of pleasant words - that path is plainly redundant. If Iran is to change course, it won’t be because of Obama's outreach (new centrifuges indicate that they’re quite happy with their current road to Damascus), it will be because their nuclear road is blocked by American resolve.

The appropriate US strategy is a simple one – to empower our East River dialogue with New York bluntness – speaking to Khamenei in terms he will easily understand. America must offer the Ayatollah two choices- peace by verified disarmament, or tougher sanctions backed up by the certain threat of US military power.

To those who call me a warmonger for this post - that Rouhani deserves our easy trust and flexibility, I have a simple rebuttal. In his speech yesterday, President Rouhani claimed that Iran defends ''.... peace based on democracy and the ballot box everywhere.. and believe[s] that there are no violent solutions to world crises.''

If you believe that, you'll believe anything.

Links to my other related writings

Thoughts on Netanyahu speech at UN

Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu has just delivered his speech at the UN General Assembly.

Specifically noting the theological foundation of the 12th Imam (the Mahdi), Netanyahu explained why he believes that there's a fundamental difference between the former Soviet Union and the Iranian theocracy. One believes in life as a construct that defines its own existential purpose. The other believes in life as inherently subject to the larger service of God's existence. For Netanyahu, this means that Iran's leadership cannot be codified as rational by traditional notions of analysis. To some degree at least, he has a point here. The centrality of 'the sacrifice of the self for the service of the faith' is crucial to Shia Islamists like the Lebanese Hizballah and the Iranian regime. This is an ideology which finds physical representation each year at the day of 'Ashura'. Netanyahu's great fear? In pursuit of eliminating Israel and 'liberating' Jerusalem, Iran's leaders would embrace death as the successful culmination of their human existence.

Having articulated the ideological underpinnings of the Iranian regime, Netanyahu passionately argued why he believed a 'red line' would be necessary to prevent Iran's continued nuclear pursuit. Using a deliberately simple diagram, Netanyahu affirmed that he would take action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. This was a message designed for an unmistakable translation- Israel will use military force if diplomacy fails.

Whatever one thinks of Netanyahu's policy or his understanding of the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon, in political terms, this was foreign policy messaging at its best - Compelling and determined.

For related thoughts.