Artillery Diplomacy - North Korea Tensions (Analysis)

Today, tensions on the Korean peninsula are at their highest levels since late 2010.

As of this posting (03:20 EST), North Korea has fired a number of artillery shells into South Korean waters near the Northern Limit Line (a traditional flashpoint area). RoK forces have responded with reciprocal artillery fire and have launched Combat Air Patrols into the area. 

The incident apparently began at about 12:15 local time (MON)/23:15 EST (SUN).

I have a number of thoughts.

1) This is North Korean strategy 101

Over the past two weeks, the North Koreans have been signaling their intention to increase tensions on the peninsula. This intent has been specifically evident both in North Korea's threats to conduct a ''new form'' of nuclear test and in recent missile launches. 

Now we have the artillery diplomacy.

It's an old game.

After all, North Korean political strategy has long resided upon a foundation of extortion. Believing that the international community lacks the confidence to compel them to alter course, the North smokes the air with the specter of war. 

North Korea thus uses its military as a kind of tolling booth for international security - 'Want peace? Then pay up.'

Of course, there's more at play here than random blackmail.

As I see it, the North probably had two specific motivations for sparking this latest crisis. First, the North Korean leadership wants to send a message of anger to the US/RoK in reference to war games. Second, the North Koreans want to remind the international community that the world does not begin and end with MH370 and Ukraine. 

Regardless, like any good extortionist, the North Koreans know that they have to be predictably unpredictable in order to succeed.

2) The potential for escalation is real

It's easy to regard the North Koreans as perpetual bluffers.

But that would be a serious mistake.

In fact, two factors make this latest crisis an especially dangerous one.

First, it's pretty clear that the North Korean regime is beset by growing factionalism. As the public purge of Chang Song-thaek illustrated back in December, Kim Jong-un remains obsessed by a ''factionalist filfth'' in the ruling elite. And while Kim has asserted greater control over the military, he appears to remain somewhat insecure. Correspondingly, the North Korean leader may consider that by increasing tensions with South Korea, he can consolidate his credentials as a strong leader. In flowing vein however, internal tensions in North Korea will make it much harder for Kim to back down if the South responds with confident resolution.

And this speaks to the second point.

The incumbent President of South Korea, President Park, is no 'sunshine-esque' Kim Dae-jung. Indeed, many in Park's party - New Frontier - are calling for an far tougher policy stance towards North Korea. As a result of this, we shouldn't expect the South Koreans to yield (nor should we). Still, the fact that the North Koreans gave South Korea advanced warning about this artillery 'exercise', could suggest that they want to avoid precipitous escalation. 

Nevertheless, it's critical to remember that the North Korean regime exists in a perpetual condition of near psychosis - incidents like the 'tree hacking attack' aren't just history. Rather, they are testaments to a totalitarian dynasty that is capable of just about anything. 

It's in this sense that the ultimate key to restraining North Korean aggression is not China. Instead, as I've argued before, North Korea can only be deterred by one thing - unwavering American resolve.

3) The Obama Administration/International Community have encouraged Kim Jong-un

From my perspective, the greatest failing of President Obama's foreign policy is the manner of its vacuum-like existence - the President seems to think that American adversaries pay no attention to US policy around the world. 

Except that the evidence is clear - the opposite is true. 

For one example, consider Russia.

During Putin's invasion of Georgia in 2008, President Bush helped restrain Russia by sending US Military flights into Tblisi. Conversely, as I argued last week, President Obama's hesitation has rewarded Putin's aggression in Ukraine. Yesterday, we saw the limits of Obama's rhetoric - ''a frank exchange''.

For another example, consider Iran.

Alongside Iran's continuing deception with regards to their nuclear program (see the latest IAEA reporting), the Islamic Republic has decided to appoint a new Ambassador to the UN - a man who once stormed the US Embassy in Tehran. 

It reeks of what it is - utter disdain for American power.

And North Korea sees all of this. 

For a regime that resides upon the appraisal of power as an end in itself, it's a catastrophic dynamic. Where Kim Jong-un senses weakness, he also sees opportunity. In turn, alongside the ludicrous dysfunction of the international community, President Obama's hesitation is empowering the worst instincts of authoritarians across the planet. While we gut our defense budgets, they continue their advance. I worried that this would happen.

If interested, please see my thoughts on North Korea's nuclear strategy.

Ukraine and the Tombstone of the Reset

What's happening in Ukraine represents the tombstone for President Obama's reset. As I've argued before, (here and here) the Russian Government has successfully manipulated US foreign policy over the past five years. Cognizant of the President's international trepidation (an issue I've also written on here), Putin has advanced Russian strategic interests at the cost of both American prestige and influence. As I see it, the Russian surge into Crimea has two specific purposes - to deter western intervention and support for the new Ukrainian Government and to ensure that Russia's access to its Black Sea naval bases is sustained.

Still, this is about more than power politics. In part understandably (considering the ethnic make up of Crimea), Russia is deeply concerned by the prospect of appearing to abandon its key supporters. Russia wants to ensure that their opinion is represented by the new government.

Again, it's absolutely crucial to note that Russian foreign policy is always focused on local domination in service to the central authority of the Kremlin.

But of course, this is also about Putin's willingness to use military force in order to achieve his political objectives (see the video below from 13.58). Putin wagers that the US and the EU lack the constitution to restrain his intimidation. He may be right. In the days ahead, it is critical that President Obama show Putin that there are limits to Russia's power. In essence, the American President must restore Russia's faith in American power.

Iran Nuclear Deal - Implementation

The implementation of the Geneva interim nuclear deal will begin on January 20th. That's welcome news. After all, in recent weeks it seemed like the agreement might fall apart before it even began. On another positive note, Iran will shortly begin to dilute its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. Still, I have a number of concerns.

• While inspectors will apparently be allowed daily, physical access to the Fordo site, there will only be monthly inspections at the Arak based heavy water reactor. That's far from ideal. If the Iranians are serious about addressing fears that they are pursuing a plutonium-route nuclear weapon, allowing more vigorous inspections at Arak would be the perfect place to start. Instead, the reluctance to afford access to Arak suggests that the Iranians may want to hide what's happening there. It raises questions and it fosters mistrust.

• The Iranians are crowing. While this is to be expected at some level (and helps Iranian moderates placate their hard-line colleagues), it's worrying that many Iranian officials are so gleeful in their claims that this deal doesn't bind them in any significant way. Again, it suggests an absence of seriousness in the pursuit of trust towards a lasting arrangement. Without hope of a lasting agreement, this deal will be rendered into irrelevance.

• It's problematic that the negotiators have taken so long to reach implementation. This reality suggests an agenda disconnect. Since 2003, Iran has attempted to evade the international community in its efforts to ensure a non-weaponized nuclear program. Delay has formed the primary strategic gambit on Iran's part. In short, what we're seeing looks like more deliberate time wasting.

While I supported this deal at the time of its creation, it's also abundantly clear to me that Geneva hasn't got off to a good start. The US will have to work exceptionally hard to ensure that Iran fulfills its obligations. At the same time, Congress will have to play a constructive but cautious role in supporting US diplomacy. Still, if this effort fails, the only options left available will be dramatically tightened sanctions alongside the prospect of military force. 

Time is running short.

Related thoughts

KSM Arraignment

The arraignment of KSM and his accused 9/11 co-conspirators will occur later today (the link has good bios on the guys). 

My thoughts... I stand by an earlier post in which I welcomed that these individuals would be charged and tried under the military commissions process. The head prosecutor is also the best of the best of what America has to offer (the accolades in the linked article are matched by statements that I have heard from others who know Martins). 

Back to the trial authority question... From my perspective, the 9/11 attacks were an act of war against the US. The strikes were carried out by a group of individuals serving the political agenda of a formal organisation focused on destroying the United States. I disagree with the notion that it is only states that can carry out acts of war. This is the 21st century.. for a few examples of non-state actors able to wage effective war, just look at current instability in Afghanistan, Mexico and Yemen. For another example, Hizballah's military power in Lebanon means that this group has effective power over the stability of that country's political process (a power they are not afraid to use). My point is that non-state actors have extroadinary power potential. To treat them as simple criminals ignores the fundamental political nature of their agenda and their associated acts. A criminal law focus also allows these organisations to use the criminal justice system as a propaganda weapon and thus as a vehicle for the continued pursuit of their agenda. There is a final relevant point... the jurors who would consider a civilian court trial simply do not have a sufficient understanding of the military-political component of organisations like Al Qa'ida.