Yesterday's bombing in Beirut illustrates the primordial influence of sectarian hatred in shaping Middle Eastern politics dynamics. As I noted on Monday, the Lebanese Hizballah is struggling to contain the wave of Sunni extremist violence that's directed against it. Regarding this sectarian anger, it's clear that there have been two separate counter-responses to Nasrallah's intervention in Syria. On one side, the March 14 bloc is trying to weaken Hizballah's political influence at the governing level. Supported by the Saudis in the form of new aid to the Lebanese Army, Siniora and Hariri are pushing for Hizballah's separation from any new cabinet. Conversely, motivated by their fanatical ideology, Salafi extremist groups are also seeking to weaken Hizballah. However, for these groups, the chosen mechanism of political activity is significant violence. What's clear is that sectarianism is now front and center in Lebanese politics (Martin Chulov gives a good reporting primer on Hizballah's role in this evolving dynamic).
But it isn't just Lebanon. If interested, here are some of my thoughts on the challenge of sectarianism in terms of...
Reports suggest that the US Army's ACE (aka Delta Force) was involved in the Tripoli operation to seize al-Liby. This news shouldn't surprise anyone. After all, we already know that the FBI/CIA were involved in the capture. In that vein, Delta's involvement would have afforded an extra contingency capability had al-Liby/allies resisted the strike team. As this video illustrates, direct action orientated special forces (like Delta) focus on overpowering their adversaries with speed and overwhelming force. The key to their tactical methodology is to psychologically and physically dominate a target in a manner that denies the opportunity for effective resistance.
That being said...
The SEAL raid against the Baraawe compound illustrates an equally important counterpoint - even Tier One SMUs have their limits. In terms of the Baraawe assault, once the SEALs presence became known, the odds quickly shifted against them. In short, they were outmanned and outgunned in hostile territory. At that point, they were forced to withdraw under fire.
Taken together, the Tripoli/Baraawe operations speak to two fundamental truths.
First, that a small group of highly trained individuals can achieve a major strategic effect (whether removing one senior Al Qa'ida leader from the battlefield - or eviscerating an enemy network*). Second, that special forces are neither superhuman nor bullet proof. In the end, the employment of these forces requires a situationally weighted calculation of risk v reward and a policymaker understanding that Von Moltke's law continues to abide- "No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy.''
The near-simultaneous capture of Anas al-Liby, a longtime Al Qa'ida planning and logistics officer (and a suspected plotter for the 1998 US Embassy bombings), represents an important counter-terrorism success for the United States. His detention will also allow for some relief at GMP, New Scotland Yard and Thames House - embarrassingly, al-Liby was granted asylum in the UK until 2000 and then escaped the country before a belated raid by UK authorities. One positive - he left behind AQ's operational handbook aka the 'Manchester Manual'. That intelligence coup afforded western intelligence services a crucial insight into AQ's operational methodology. Anyway, these two actions illustrate the US counter-terrorism apparatus at its best - patient, resourceful and decisive. (Updated 01:20 EST Sunday): Early Saturday, a force of DEVGRU SEALs attacked an al-Shabab compound on the Somali coast. The New York Times reports a US Government source as stating that the attack took place after a period of 7-10 days of planning. This suggests that the US had high confidence intelligence that their intended target would be at the location. Nevertheless, the BBC is reporting that the assault failed to capture or kill the target. We'll have to wait for a few more hours for confirmation on that. Regardless, it does appear that the SEALs encountered heavier than expected resistance and were forced to withdraw. Two weeks ago, I suggested that this specific type of military operation would likely form an increasingly important element of the US response to the Westgate atrocity. Though US counter-terrorism operations in Somalia are far from a new development, I'm glad that President Obama appears to have ordered an increasingly aggressive US posture against al-Shabab.
As I commented yesterday, it will concern the US Government that an attack on this scale occurred without prior intelligence warning. As Bergen and Sterman explain, in recent years, Al-Shabab has garnered significant support from elements of the Somali-American community. Due to this fact, the US Intelligence Community regards Al-Shabab as a high priority collection target.
Yet, even amidst this intense Intelligence scrutiny, Westgate proves that Al-Shabab's operational security is sufficient enough for the group to successfully plot and conduct a major attack. This reality encourages two conclusions. First, that Al-Shabab is following Al Qa'ida's evolving preference for ''going off the grid'' in its plotting (avoiding electronic communications, compartmentalizing operational cells etc.). Second, that the US/allies need to do more to penetrate the group's power base in southern Somalia.
In another area, it's equally important that we recognize the recent developments in Al-Shabab's organizing character. In short, though its still hampered by factionalism, the group is now orientated under a leadership that holds a significant and growing interest in global Jihad. Lead by Ahmed Abdi Godane; a young, hyper aggressive leader, over the last few months, Al-Shabab forces have ruthlessly purged former commanders and others (like Hammami) who have dared to criticize or challenge their new kingpin.
Godane's consolidation necessitates a US response.
In this vein, we should expect increasingly aggressive US counter-terrorism operations inside Somalia - likely via both manned strike aircraft and UCAV platforms and potentially also from US Special Forces stationed at Camp Lemmonier, Djibouti and/or on US Navy vessels stationed off the Somali coast.
Alongside new counter-terrorism operations in Somalia, we should also expect some government responses here in the United States. From my perspective, three particular actions are necessary.
1) As I noted yesterday, the US law enforcement community must ensure that Somalia orbit counter-terrorism efforts are well resourced.
2) State and local government authorities must update their crisis plans. During the recent Navy Yard shooting, DC authorities and the media failed miserably in their responsibility to deliver accurate, coherent and timely public advisories. Because of these failings, had Alexis acted alongside other attackers focused against other targets, Washingtonians would have been placed in unnecessary jeopardy. Defeating Mumbai 2008/Westgate style attacks is complex enough. But by learning from pastincidents, US metropolitan authorities will maximize their ability to save lives in the future.
3) Echoing point 2, on the specific tactical side, it's also crucial that local law enforcement agencies work with the FBI to refine their planning. As is the case in the UK, ongoing and multi-faceted preparation is a critical endeavor. Ego contests (like that between the FBI and NYPD) are fundamentally unhelpful.
Ultimately however, we, the American people, must wake up. Yes, in the moment of attacks we're glued to news reports. However, once incidents have concluded, our attention often becomes absorbed by blame games. Take the Navy Yard/Capitol CERT controversy. Had that tactical team stayed at the Navy Yard, it's possible that they may have saved lives. Yet, as mentioned above, had Alexis operated as part of a broader cell that also held the Capitol as a target (the extent of threat was unknown at the time of the CERT recall), the decision to remain at the Navy Yard could have been catastrophic.
My overarching point here is a basic one - counter-terrorism isn't simple. Protecting America requires our shared and astute attention. Related Thoughts
For my core thoughts, please read my latest piece for the National Review Online.
Here are two further thoughts.
1) The attack undoubtedly involved a significant degree of operational planning. This preparation likely included advance reconnaissance, specific training and a considerable mobilization of manpower and resources. In this vein, it's telling that the US Intelligence Community apparently had no information to suggest a major attack was about take place. Combined with reports which suggest that three Americans may have participated in this atrocity, the US government appears to lack a satisfactory intelligence penetration of the al-Shabab network. This is a serious concern. Over the past few years, a number of Americans have traveled to Somalia to fight alongside al-Shabab. Others have provided the group with funding support. As is the case regarding US Citizens in Syria, a major fear is that Americans in Somalia will return to the United States to conduct attacks (see my recent piece on Zawahiri). In the aftermath of this incident, we can expect a beefing up of the FBI's East-Africa focused counter-terrorism teams.
2) The attack matrix was clearly orientated around a Mumbai 2008 style model: a heavily armed force seeking maximum destruction against a soft target. The cell's objective - to stay alive as long as possible - to kill as many people as possible. Due to the fact that shopping centers attract large crowds but lack major security capabilities, locales like Westgate are exceptionally difficult to protect. A further complication- mobile cells of suicide attackers pose a serious challenge for responding tactical teams. Counter terrorism officers must balance hostage rescue efforts with the containment of the attackers. The first priority is to prevent terrorist skirmishing squads from breaking off into various parts of a city. Relevant thoughts - 'Other' section
The rescue of a danish and an american hostage in Somalia provides another example of the skill of the US military's special operations community. Operations like these require extraordinary patience, careful intelligence preparation and extremely well trained forces. (And some luck). It only works when each element comes together.
