Tripoli/Baraawe - Special Forces methodology

First, please see my post from Saturday (I've updated with new information). 

Reports suggest that the US Army's ACE (aka Delta Force) was involved in the Tripoli operation to seize al-Liby. This news shouldn't surprise anyone. After all, we already know that the FBI/CIA were involved in the capture. In that vein, Delta's involvement would have afforded an extra contingency capability had al-Liby/allies resisted the strike team. As this video illustrates, direct action orientated special forces (like Delta) focus on overpowering their adversaries with speed and overwhelming force. The key to their tactical methodology is to psychologically and physically dominate a target in a manner that denies the opportunity for effective resistance.

That being said...

The SEAL raid against the Baraawe compound illustrates an equally important counterpoint - even Tier One SMUs have their limits. In terms of the Baraawe assault, once the SEALs presence became known, the odds quickly shifted against them. In short, they were outmanned and outgunned in hostile territory. At that point, they were forced to withdraw under fire. 

Taken together, the Tripoli/Baraawe operations speak to two fundamental truths. 

First, that a small group of highly trained individuals can achieve a major strategic effect (whether removing one senior Al Qa'ida leader from the battlefield - or eviscerating an enemy network*). Second, that special forces are neither superhuman nor bullet proof. In the end, the employment of these forces requires a situationally weighted calculation of risk v reward and a policymaker understanding that Von Moltke's law continues to abide- "No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy.''

*  1) If you prefer a video explanation... click here. 2) I'm very astute to growing insecurity in Iraq.

Please see related links.

Capture of Anas al-Liby/Navy SEAL strike against al-Shabab

The near-simultaneous capture of Anas al-Liby, a longtime Al Qa'ida planning and logistics officer (and a suspected plotter for the 1998 US Embassy bombings), represents an important counter-terrorism success for the United States. His detention will also allow for some relief at GMP, New Scotland Yard and Thames House - embarrassingly, al-Liby was granted asylum in the UK until 2000 and then escaped the country before a belated raid by UK authorities. One positive - he left behind AQ's operational handbook aka the 'Manchester Manual'. That intelligence coup afforded western intelligence services a crucial insight into AQ's operational methodology. Anyway, these two actions illustrate the US counter-terrorism apparatus at its best - patient, resourceful and decisive.

(Updated 01:20 EST Sunday): Early Saturday, a force of DEVGRU SEALs attacked an al-Shabab compound on the Somali coast. The New York Times reports a US Government source as stating that the attack took place after a period of 7-10 days of planning. This suggests that the US had high confidence intelligence that their intended target would be at the location. Nevertheless, the BBC is reporting that the assault failed to capture or kill the target. We'll have to wait for a few more hours for confirmation on that. Regardless, it does appear that the SEALs encountered heavier than expected resistance and were forced to withdraw.
          Two weeks ago, I suggested that this specific type of military operation would likely form an increasingly important element of the US response to the Westgate atrocity. Though US counter-terrorism operations in Somalia are far from a new development, I'm glad that President Obama appears to have ordered an increasingly aggressive US posture against al-Shabab.

Like the global Salafi-Jihadist movement it supports, al-Shabab must be confronted.

Finally, it's worth remembering that we're lucky to have such skillful special forces units at our disposal. Their capabilities are hard won.

Related thoughts - under 'Other' section.

Massacre in Nairobi

For my core thoughts, please read my latest piece for the National Review Online.

Here are two further thoughts.

1) The attack undoubtedly involved a significant degree of operational planning. This preparation likely included advance reconnaissance, specific training and a considerable mobilization of manpower and resources. In this vein, it's telling that the US Intelligence Community apparently had no information to suggest a major attack was about take place. Combined with reports which suggest that three Americans may have participated in this atrocity, the US government appears to lack a satisfactory intelligence penetration of the al-Shabab network. This is a serious concern. Over the past few years, a number of Americans have traveled to Somalia to fight alongside al-Shabab. Others have provided the group with funding support. As is the case regarding US Citizens in Syria, a major fear is that Americans in Somalia will return to the United States to conduct attacks (see my recent piece on Zawahiri). In the aftermath of this incident, we can expect a beefing up of the FBI's East-Africa focused counter-terrorism teams.

2) The attack matrix was clearly orientated around a Mumbai 2008 style model: a heavily armed force seeking maximum destruction against a soft target. The cell's objective - to stay alive as long as possible - to kill as many people as possible. Due to the fact that shopping centers attract large crowds but lack major security capabilities, locales like Westgate are exceptionally difficult to protect. A further complication- mobile cells of suicide attackers pose a serious challenge for responding tactical teams. Counter terrorism officers must balance hostage rescue efforts with the containment of the attackers. The first priority is to prevent terrorist skirmishing squads from breaking off into various parts of a city.

Relevant thoughts - 'Other' section