The FAA's decision to approve a number of new drone testing sites should not be a cause for shock or concern. As technology evolves so do social expectations - years from now, we'll accept drones as an every day part of life. The simple fact is that drones will become an increasingly important part of the US economy. To be sure, drones will continue to play a critical security role. Nevertheless, we should welcome research that offers the potential for thousands of jobs in a way that benefits broader society.
Anyway, here are some of my previous thoughts on drones:
I posted an earlier version of this piece on Saturday. However, some readers were confused that the earlier post was combined with some other thoughts on the NSA. So, paying heed to developments from over the weekend, here's an updated new post without the NSA material!
Friday's bombing in Beirut was almost certainly the work of the Syrian GSD and/or Hizballah. I make that argument based on three factors.
1) Hizballah is under extraordinary physical and political pressure inside Lebanon. The group is thus desperate to reassert its domestic power-perception position. Because of Chatah's symbolic representation of the March 14 bloc and his well known association with the Hariris, he offered an opportune target from which Hizballah could broadcast their overarching message - 'we are prepared to wash the streets with blood in order to maintain our power'. Let's be clear, this is political terrorism in its most unambiguous form.
2) The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (established to investigate the Hariri assassination and a number of other attacks) will shortly begin its trial (in absentia) of a number of Hizballah operatives. Those accused include Mustafa Badr al-Din (the suspected head of Hizballah's foreign operations directorate)*. In this regard, Chatah's assassination was likely intended to send another basic message to the international community - Hizballah will not acquiesce to outside pressure.
3) The Lebanese Hizballah has a long history of engaging in assassinations against its political opponents. Further, the Syrian Civil War provides abundant proof that the group has little compunction about massacring anyone who stands in their way (a truth that I once underestimated). As SOP, Hizballah denies any responsibility for these kind of atrocities. Still, their record is transparent.
On a related note, it's critical that we pay heed to Siniora's evident fury (which reflects popular concerns) over what's just happened. In articulating that the March 14 bloc will push for restrictions on illegal arms, Siniora is (as the Daily Star notes) issuing a thinly veiled threat to Hizballah. In short, he's laying the foundations for a tougher counter-response. As a corollary, Saudi Arabia's grant of $3 billion to the Lebanese Army is surely designed to provide a counter-weight to Hizballah. The walls are closing. In further vein, it will be interesting to see how Michel Aoun reacts to this attack. Although he remains largely sympathetic to Hizballah, Aoun has also publicly flirted with the notion of a rapprochement with the Future Movement. Should Aoun decide to move towards Siniora/Hariri, even in a limited way, this assassination could cause major blowback for Hizballah. After all, it's hard to underestimate how much Hizballah relies upon Aoun; both for political support and cross-sectarian political cover.
*Interestingly, much of the evidence against Badr al-Din was garnered from cell phone intercepts. These may have been provided to the Tribunal by the NSA (Hizballah is a high priority collection target for the US Intelligence Community).
As I thought would be the case (no pun intended), the Federal Judiciary has overturned last week's ruling that the NSA metadata programs are unconstitutional. That was the correct decision - management of these programs belongs with the Executive and the Legislature. As the reviewing Judge noted, these NSA programs help to find valuable information in an ''Ocean of seemingly disconnected data''. As I've argued before, the US experience in Iraq proves how this method of intelligence collection can save many lives.
Shinzo Abe was wrong to visit the Yasukuni Shrine.
Why?
Because at a foreign policy level, Abe's pilgrimage will be regarded by Beijing as a one-fingered salute. Indeed, Abe almost certainly intended to send such a message. The Japanese Prime Minister might have had fun, but his action was ill-advised. For a start, it's crucial to remember that the Chinese are desperate to advance their regional power base and perceptions of that power. This unambiguous reality is evident in both the East China Sea and in Space. In this sense, by challenging China in such an emotionally evocative way, Abe is playing straight into the hands of the Politburo hardliners. In essence, he's granting them the political cover that they need in order to push a tougher line against Japan. With Sino-Japanese relations already poisonous, this injection of emotion is thus likely to further destabilize the region. China's Foreign Ministry has already hinted that China may respond - they've stated Japan will bear responsibility for the ''consequences'' that follow. Let's be clear, this wasn't the way to send a (necessary) signal of Japanese courage. This wasn't the way to let China know that Japan won't back down in face of growing Chinese aggression. Instead, calm resolution is the far better option - China must understand that Japan and the US will not equivocate; that while we favor good relations, if necessary, we'll use force to defend our interests.
Rather, this was a product of arrogance. The Japanese political elite remains largely unwilling to face up to the horrific crimes that Japanese military forces committed during WW II. By hiding from that reality, the Japanese Government has failed to understand how deeply those crimes are etched into the Chinese socio-political psyche. Their failure catalyzes the deeper problem - emotion plays a toxic influence in political strategy. It fosters mistrust in place of effective communication and it makes a miscalculation all the more likely. By playing games under the umbrella of American security, Abe has dishonored the United States. While that unyielding umbrella should (and will) of course remain in operation, Obama should also make clear his dissatisfaction over this profoundly unproductive act.
I'll be writing about North Korea in the next couple of days. I have concerns about their latest statements regarding potential nuclear tests. I'll explain why. Until then, here's a link page for some of my previous writings on North Korea. Anyway, Happy Christmas!
This is just one story of many. Nevertheless, it encapsulates a profoundly important truth. Whether in Iran or the Sunni Arab Kingdoms, repression remains a very real fact of life for the average citizen. While human rights are the most obvious concern in face of these social restrictions, political stability is another deeply relevant issue. Relevant, because the lesson of recent history is clear - until states respect the rights of their citizens, they'll fail to achieve a lasting stability. In fact, they'll make stability even more distant. Faced with major demographic challenges (young populations that demand jobs and greater opportunity), continued repression only delegitimates the very power structures that it aims to protect. Sadly, the lessons of the Arab Spring continue to be ignored. In my opinion, extremists are the ones most likely (see point 5) to benefit from bad governance.
A few thoughts on the moves in Congress to pass a tough new sanctions bill.
1) It's already clear that the Iran deal is in jeopardy. The Iranians have yet to commit to a timetable for enaction of the Geneva protocols. At the same time, the Iranian government is complaining about US action to tighten existing sanctions. In short, the omens don't look good. For a Congress that was already deeply skeptical of the President's deal, evidence of Iranian non-compliance is a catalyst for existing trepidation. In this sense, it's obvious that the President is going to have a tough time convincing Democrats to back down.
2) It's also clear that Israeli concerns are heavily influencing this deal. In contrast to the President, the Israelis believe that only a full cessation of Iranian nuclear activities will suffice. Obama is open to a final agreement that allows for a low-enrichment capped continuation of the Iranian nuclear program. If this bill does in fact pass and carries a stipulation that the President must only accept a deal that ends Iran's nuclear program completely, the Israelis will have dragged the Administration into alignment with their own position.
That being said, as Commander-in-Chief, Obama has significant flexibility in the conduct of US foreign policy.
3) In its present reported form, this bill would, if passed, also bring other US-Iranian points of discord into the nuclear negotiations process. For a start, the bill contains caveats that continued Iranian support for terrorism against the US, and/or a bad faith negotiating strategy, would both cause these new sanctions to kick in. While I understand and share these concerns (more so than many others), their introduction into this process will be profoundly unhelpful. It would create two negative follow on effects. First, Iranian hardliners would never agree to halt ongoing covert operations against the US (these occur all the time, but rarely make the news). Second, the caveats would be destabilizing to those on the Iranian side who are prospectively amenable to a deal. It's important to remember that Iran's negotiating strategy is infected by hesitation and a balancing of interests - Rouhani's 'moderates' vs IRGC hardliners. New pressure in different areas of policy would isolate the moderates. For one example, do we seriously expect that Iran will cease support for groups like the Lebanese Hizballah?* At a basic political level, these concerns seem to have been included in the bill in order to provide Congress with a subjective window of opportunity in which to enact sanctions at a point of their own choosing. After all, Congressional leaders are fully aware that Iran will never conform to the stipulations that this bill would lay down.
4) Although the present character of this bill is unhelpful, Congress can play a constructive role here. First, as is the case with Israel, Congressional anger over this deal may actually strengthen the President's hand in the negotiating process - encouraging the Iranians to swiftly comply with that which they've already said they would comply with. Second, if Congress were to pass a simpler, tighter bill - one that focused on a clear articulation of automatic sanctions if Iran fails to enact the Geneva deal within a short time window (for example...), they could reinforce the strength of their role as noted in point one. An effective bill would also offer automatic sanctions in the event of Iranian 'game playing' with the implementation of Geneva. By pursuing this course, Congress would produce a necessary understanding in the Iranian hardliners - that the US is neither weak nor open to perpetual delays.
* - Were the bill to specify that the caveats only applied to specific terrorist attacks against US citizens, that would of course be legitimate.
I am better off than he is – for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows; I neither know nor think that I know. Plato’s delivery - The Apology of Socrates.
In their boycott of Israeli academic institutions, the American Studies Association (ASA) has betrayed the ideal of learning.
Academics are supposed to be dedicated to the unencumbered advance of knowledge.
Because if ‘knowledge’ has one sustaining certainty, it’s that the pursuit has no limit. By boycotting Israel, the ASA has incorporated the opposite understanding. They’ve clarified that when it comes to Israel, they know that there’s nothing left to know.
Theirs is the undeniable inversion of the Socratic Method. Rather than trying to persuade Israel to enact policy changes, the ASA has joined a cabal of intellectual retrenchment. They’ve staked their place in a new understanding of ignorance – ignorance as knowledge. The ASA claims that their boycott won’t prevent Israeli academics from engaging with their US counterparts, but they're being disingenuous. Were the ASA’s ban ever implemented, Israeli professors would no longer be able to represent their institutions or their country.
Let’s cut the spin, this boycott is an academic apartheid.
But this isn’t just about philosophy. It’s also about political reality. Although the ASA obviously believes otherwise, their actions will do very little to facilitate the agenda they pursue. For a start, the Israelis don’t tend to appreciate attempts at blackmail. Even then, this boycott also flatly ignores the present Israeli political landscape. While fashionable opinion asserts that Netanyahu is a trademark hardliner, the reality is more complex. Consider that alongside his tough stance on Iran, Netanyahu has thrown his support behind the latest US drive on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. He's doing so against the wishes of cabinet ministers who are deeply skeptical of that agenda. Avigdor Lieberman and Naftali Bennett provide two such examples. The ASA should have recognized this evident reality. Instead of coalescing with the cause of peace, the ASA has decided that it’s easier to be ignorant. And now, by showing their disregard for Netanyahu’s efforts, they'll only strengthen the hand of those Israelis who say his efforts are pointless.
There’s also a deep moral issue at stake here.
At a basic level, this boycott is extraordinarily hypocritical; it applies to only one state.
Regarding Israel, the ASA is perfectly happy to bracket independent academic institutions with the Israeli government. Yet, the ASA doesn't apply those same standards to Gaza. They apparently care little that Gaza is run by an organization that revels in blowing up Israeli children. Of course, it's not just Gaza. Iran? No problem. Syria? Absolutely. Venezuela? You bet. See the sick dichotomy? While democratic Israel is public enemy number one, totalitarian regimes are de-facto partners. When the New York Times asked the ASA’s President to explain this impossible incongruity, he offered a pathetic response: ‘’One has to start somewhere’’. Maybe it’s just me, but this solitary blacklisting carries some unpleasant echoes.
Unfortunately, it’s not just the ASA. It’s clear that the academic boycott of Israel is growing in strength. In equal vein, the support of a few big names is lending a deeper pretense of legitimacy. We must remember it’s a veneer. The ultimate truth is unambiguous.
The frontiers of knowledge have no geographic boundary; to claim otherwise is to deny the known and unknown bounty of human creativity.
As I suggested would be the case (here and here), the diplomatic fallout from Snowden's leaks is increasingly obvious. American allies are recalibrating their approach towards co-operation with the US. Their actions speak to a broader political complexity. Just as the United States must continue to spy on Europe, so too will American allies continue to react to evolved domestic political environments at home (these governments know that the US spies and why it does so - but they must also satisfy the increased demands of their citizens for concerns like privacy etc.).
On a related note, it's my opinion that the NSA 'metadata' judgment will be overturned. I believe that the Federal Government will be able to show a compelling state interest in the collection of this narrow bracket of data. That being said, I also expect that the government will ultimately be compelled to reduce the time frame of its metadata storage on US persons. Related thoughts.
