The American Retreat

“I have therefore asked the leaders of Congress to postpone a vote to authorize the use of force while we pursue this diplomatic path.”

President Obama, September 10th 2013

George Washington once said that ''to be prepared for war, is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.''

President Obama evidently believes otherwise.

Under this Commander in Chief, American foreign policy is adrift. The currents of others now control our course. The mafia regime of President Putin has become the arbiter of a corrupted international justice.

Children die while the world spins.

Watching his speech last night, it was clear that President Obama regards his strategy as the modern partner to Teddy Roosevelt's diplomatic mantra- ''Speak softly, and carry a big stick.''

Sadly however, if the stick is made of Jell-O, the metaphorical carrot is also rotten. 

Obama's diplomacy is negotiation without an anchor and the threat of force without a threat. It isn't real, it's just delusional. In fact, it's absurd.

Now, in a looming conference in Geneva, we await the 21st century successor to Munich. A hopeless endeavor in pursuit of an impossible cause. A pretense of peace in service of brutality.

I say pretense, because the cause of peace is only rational when it's real. Devoid of rationality; without the prospect of beneficial realization, peace is injustice cloaked in false morality. Towards Assad, it's a rhetorical abstraction purchased with suffocating children.

Yes, the President might have been passionate in arguing why our intervention is important - how, as he put it, ''Our ideals and principles, as well as our national security, are at stake in Syria.'' But as much as this sounds credible in America, our domestic perception is ultimately irrelevant. In the end, what matters is what our adversaries think. And what our friends think. 

They think we're weak. No longer can America be trusted.

This is a strategic disaster of epic proportions - a collapse of resolve and influence not seen since Saigon. A superpower humbled, uncertain and fearful. Global adversaries emboldened and unconstrained. A peace process full of holes. This is the change Obama has wrought. Its bitter taste will linger for a long, long time.

Twelve years ago today, facing our own Ghouta, President Bush framed the horror with an enduring call to American purpose.

''None of us will ever forget this day,'' he said, ''yet we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world.''

Today, twelve years on, the retreat has sounded.

How the Bin Laden raid can guide US intervention in Syria

When it comes to military operations that are 'limited' in scope and duration, the key to functional impact is found in the strategy of application.

So, let's consider some examples.

In 1998, President Clinton ordered a 'limited' strike against Al Qa'ida (AQ) bases in Afghanistan. Unfortunately however, this operation was negated by weak intelligence and the President's desire to tick a political box (looking tough domestically) in preference to all other concerns. In result, the resolve to achieve a meaningful strategic impact was distinctly absent. In its failure, this action propelled extremist conceptions of an American 'paper tiger'.

Yet, the failure of one particular action should not be allowed to define all 'limited' military actions. 

As he plans a response in Syria, President Obama should look to another operation against AQ. More specifically, the 2011 raid that killed Bin Laden. 

This action didn't simply weaken AQ's operational power, it denied that group their perversely charismatic talisman. The 'limited action' produced a profound strategic effect.

Paying heed to Operation Neptune Spear, President Obama could draw three lessons worthy of application in the present crisis.

1) Secrecy - As he seeks to persuade Congress on the merits of intervention, Obama must cautiously follow General Mattis's core maxim - ''don't tell the world you're weak and make darn certain you don't tell your adversary what you're not going to do...'' 

Prior to May 2011, Bin Laden found false safety in his belief that the United States would never be able to find him. The US played to this sensory deficit - right up until the raid, the US offered no hint that it had an idea of the terrorist leader's location. In the same vein, balancing with the need to persuade Congress, Obama must also ensure that General Dempsey's targeting portfolio is kept secret. In order to achieve impact, Assad must be denied the ability to protect his vulnerable assets. This leads to the issue of 'impact'...

2) Impact -  Where the Abbottabad raid's 'limited' but decisive force pummeled Al Qa'ida's center of gravity, the failed 1998 action allowed Bin Laden to continue his plotting (as did other missed opportunities that were lost to hesitancy). The lesson is clear- if it proceeds, US intervention in Syria must bear an absolute focus towards weakening Assad's WMD program - targeting the officers (WMD leadership), assets (WMD launch platforms) and infrastructure (C4ISR) that enable the employment of that program. The sustaining focus must situate in achieving military impact and not in achieving a political satisfaction of the 'red line'.

3) Expectations - Again, just as the Bin Laden raid was never expected to end Al Qa'ida terrorism, nor should US intervention in Syria be expected to end Assad's bloodletting. The President and Congress must accept that a limited strike will not cripple Assad's ability to massacre. Further, assuming they adhere to points (1) and (2), they must not blame each other if the operation fails to significantly weaken Assad's regime (the evident rancor in Congress suggests that this may well occur). This is a hard but basic point - the President must focus on doing the possible, but recognizing the limits of his power. Nonetheless, unconventional complements to military force remain at his disposal.